PayPal under attack.. Not just Facebook…

Existing research (such as Morgan Stanley) are keen on Paypal’s chances as they survey merchants likely to use Paypal’s new services. This research is backward looking, as merchants don’t understand what new services will do for their business, and new value propositions are not yet in market. In my view Paypal’s entire eCommerce revenue is at risk.. with their only advantage (DDA integration/cost of funds) lost because of new Debit pricing of $0.07 cents. This is not just a US thing, or a mobile thing, or a POS thing.. this is EVERYTHING. They have no competitive differentiator… and are not positioned well to compete in ORCHESTRATING COMMERCE.

eBay shares were down 3% on news that Facebook has launched a new payment service (see article). Facebook came out later the next day to emphasize it was a small test and it has a “great relationship” with Paypal (see Businessweek article).

Paypal is a cluster unto itself (see Battle of the Cloud 5). The negative “cluster” connotation (ie heard with respect to Vietnam) seems to stick well with Paypal’s current US prospects in several segments.  Last week we heard of Facebook’s payment pilot.. the future of which presents a just one of the many real threats to Paypal’s “core” eCommerce (off eBay) volume.Network Clusters

The nature of payments is changing… and I’ve stated often: the stength of networks is their resilience and resistance to change; they were formed around an defined value proposition where participants were aligned… The  strategic threat for Paypal is that the nature of competition is changing as advertisers and channels couple payments with other services (social, community, advertising, …) to deliver a better COMMERCE experience through insight into customer data.  Merchants gain CUSTOMERS… For example, both Google (instant buy) and Facebook payment will offer merchants an API that allows them to pull consumer information into the checkout page. This means a greatly improved checkout experience, improved ad targeting, improved lead attribution, improved consumer analytics, improved mobile conversion, and of course much more data for Google and Facebook. The MNOs also have a service in place with Payfone, (to launch in next month or so.. see blog).

The entities most capable of delivering on mobile payments (in order of likely success)

#1 Touch the consumer BEFORE the purchase (ability to add value and couple w/ advertising)

  • Channels: Google, Facebook, and Amazon

#2 Have a direct consumer “mobile relationship”, with payment history, and can authenticate/manage Fraud

  • MNOs (Payfone), Braintree/Venmo

#3 Have a physical POS relationship (or part of existing POS network)

  • Retailers, Visa (V.me), Mastercard (Masterpass), Amex/Serve (Payfone)

Online merchants are asking themselves where do my customers come from? how can I improve customer experience? customer conversions? Reduce cost of payments. The answers all point to very poor PayPal’s prospects. Paypal does NOT bring customers to the merchant, they can add no value to merchants beyond Autofill, a task much better suited to channels that already have authenticated the consumer before they enter the merchant’s virtual store.

Look at Google’s Instant Buy, Google’s delivers one click mobile buying AND financial savings to the online merchant in EVERY transaction with a  160bps (non Durbin regulated debit) taking a LOSS on EVERY transaction. Paypal’s cost of funds is around 80-110bps, and average merchant cost is over 240bps.

eBay’s 2012 10-k reports that $13B of TPV was assigned to marketplace mobile Commerce (page 5). On page 7 we see

In 2012, PayPal’s net total payment volume, or net TPV, for transactions using mobile devices reached nearly $14 billion, up from approximately $4 billion in 2011. PayPal’s mobile products are designed to deliver an end-to-end mobile shopping experience in a safe and secure environment. PayPal’s mobile checkout solutions offer a convenient and easy way for merchants to accept payments from mobile devices, and for consumers to pay, through a mobile-optimized user experience

This leads us to assume just $1B of “mobile payments” was off eBay commerce related.  In other words, all “mobile payment” growth from eBay participants finishing transactions on mobile/iPad.

Paypal’s core is in improving the eCommerce checkout experience, and will NOT extend into mobile as mobile participants are better able to leverage their channel positions, consumer insight and existing services to better deliver both a merchant and consumer value proposition. Beyond mobile.. what are Paypal’s prospects?eBay 2Q13

POS – FAILURE

Paypal is going absolutely no where with POS payments. For example, I had two separate industry experts tell me that FirstData has refused to route any Discover/Paypal traffic (see my May 13 Blog).  Paypal’s approach to this network roadblock is to partner with processors (like Vantive) and offer a spiff (say $500k) to switch from FD to Vantive.  Can you imagine the laughter.. I’m going to switch from FirstData to accept a Paypal payment product that is more expensive than anything other than a premium Visa credit card? Why?? exactly what is the consumer adoption. It all makes no sense at all… Thus, I hear internally that Don Kingsborough’s continued POS push may be short lived (product and person?).  Given Home depots experience of 5 transactions per WEEK, it would seem obvious.

eCommerce

This is Paypal’s core.  How do consumers find products online (see Forbes Article). With more product searches initiated on Amazon than Google, what if Amazon is well positioned for both: Retail/aggregator/reseller/distributor role AND the payments/advertising role.

eCommerce is very, very LUMPY, with eBay/GSI, Visa/CYBS, Amazon accounting for over 60% of Sales in US. In Japan, Amazon and Rakuten have similar shares, with similar concentrations in other markets.  An obvious investor question is to ask: what is PayPal’s penetration is within these other “networks”?  for example, within CYBS merchants, what have been PayPal wins within last 2 years.

Paypal has won here historically because of its ability to manage fraud and deliver great consumer experience.. it was a consumer facing value proposition. It will now be under attack as the same “channel” dynamic described for mobile above takes shape.  Google, Facebook and Amazon will change the nature of “payments” competition. No longer is it about experience and cost… payments is just part of a long commerce process. Channels are much better positioned to bring consumers to retailers (consumer’s search, select and shopping online). Payments is the last (easiest) part of this cycle.

Analysts (such as Morgan Stanley) are keen on Paypal’s chances as they survey merchants likely to use Paypal’s new services. This research is backward looking, as merchants don’t understand what new services will do for their business, and new value propositions are not yet in market. Paypal won market adoption because of its ability to make commerce easier (consumer) AND deliver benefit to Merchant. It is no longer cost competitive in EITHER as other entrants can offer service at BREAK EVEN costs to support their overall PLATFORM business.

Investor Impact

PayPal Competitors will:

  • Drive reduction in off e-bay take rate.
  • Introduce new P2P products
  • Take lead in orchestrating commerce
  • Destroy Paypal’s funding mix advantage through use of debit

Paypal generates 64% gross margins from online transactions. PayPal’s blended cost of funds is 104bps, with fraud costs of 30 bps. For total cost of funds = 134 bps.  2Q13 Take rate was 379bps, of which cross border was 22% (250bps fee for cross border).  Standard Merchant fees are published and tiered (See pricing), with average domestic of approximately 300bps.

Google’s merchant pricing for InstantBuy currently brings pricing down to 160bps, with Facebook, Amazon and MNOs/Payfone capable of matching.paypal take rate 3

2012 Off eBay payments revenue was $5,146 (on $97.2B TPV), which includes both remittance and commerce volume. I don’t have good numbers on breakout here, so lets assume Commerce represents 80% of off eBay payments revenue = $4B , with US taking approximately 50% ($2B).

Revenue at risk is US eCommerce revenue * (competitor take rate/current take rate ) =

$2B * 160/300 = $1.07B  ( 7.6 % of total 2012 revenue of 14,072MM)

Google has also announced a rollout of a Gmail P2P money transfer service, as will Facebook.. In my view Paypal’s entire eCommerce revenue is at risk.. with their only advantage (DDA integration/cost of funds) lost because of new Debit pricing of $0.07 cents.  This is not just a US thing, or a mobile thing, or a POS thing.. this is EVERYTHING.  They have no competitive differentiator… and are not positioned well to compete in ORCHESTRATING COMMERCE.

in 3Q13 we will see at least 3 major eCommerce initiatives launch which will impact Paypal

#1 Google InstantBuy (keep your processor and save on every transaction)

#2 ATT/Verizon Payfone

#3 Visa/Mastercard V.me/Masterpass

Networks are also changing the rules to make Paypal’s life more difficult. Example is Mastercard’s 35 bps staged digital wallet fee which ONLY impacted Paypal.

I’m short on eBay…. the reasons are above.

Chase QuickPay and Quick Deposit

Chase has a stellar eCommerce and mobile team in both their retail and cards organization, and they are poised to deliver tremendous payment innovation across both of these business units. This innovation that has been “in the works” over the last few years, and Jack Stephenson (PayPal’s former head of strategy) is fortunate to have a joined at a time where both the payment platform and team is gaining traction. This month the JPM retail team has delivered new capability in its iPhone versions of QuickPay and Quick Deposit products.

25 July 2010 (Updated 20 Aug)

Chase has a stellar eCommerce and mobile team in both their retail and cards organization, and they are poised to deliver tremendous payment innovation across both of these business units. This innovation has been “in the works” over the last few years, and Jack Stephenson (PayPal’s former head of strategy) is fortunate to have  joined at a time where both the payment platform and team is gaining traction. This month the JPM retail team has delivered new capability in its iPhone versions of QuickPay and Quick Deposit products.

QuickPay Overview:

QuickPay is a JPM’s money movement “pay anyone” service that provides registration for both Chase and non Chase customers. Chase was very late to the money movement game, rolling out its first QuickPay service in 2008 (whereas Bank of America and Citi have been providing this since 2002  through CashEdge). From a strategy and organizational perspective, JPM is well known for their “preference” to develop applications internally. It may have taken some time for JPM to complete the QuickPay internal build, but in the current release it has surpassed the domestic capability (and usability) of all other banks. JPM is now the leader in retail online payments.

Non-Chase customers can register for QuickPay before or after receiving funds. For non customers, registration for QuickPay is similar to PayPal (or CashEdge’s PopMoney), with the QuickPay wallet currently constrained to single linked checking account. Chase customers have a streamlined enrollment process and the QuickPay functionality is integrated into their existing online experience (demo above). This differs substantially from BAC, where the same capability to transfer funds exists but the usability is very poor. BAC is missing a substantial opportunity to capture beneficiary phone/e-mail information, an unnecessary miss since the capability exists (BAC is Cashedge’s largest US customer but has not yet signed on with CashEdge’s mobile POP money service).  Beneficiary information is critical to maintaining an accurate directory.. the key element in any payment system. Chase’s QuickPay maintains e-mail, phone and other information which gives it a head start in the directory battle (subject of future blog).  Given Chase Paymentech’s role in acquisition (for card, paypal, …) you can see potential for further directory synergies internally.

Quick Deposit

The articles above provide a great overview of the new iPhone App, with Chase following in the footsteps of USAA’s Deposit@Mobile. Application is from Mitek Systems and it is just super, and for small merchants this may become the payment method of choice (when compared to card):

Merchant benefits:

  • No transaction costs (savings of 150-350bps)
  • Usability and simplified enrollment
  • Same day availability of funds
  • Fits existing consumer behavior pattern (checks)
  • Legal protections/enforceability (paper checks vs. electronic signature)
  • Instant verification, risk and fraud management
  • Leverages bank imaging systems and processes (regulatory and consumer receipt)
  • Notification/receipt to consumers

JPM Business Case

  • Check imaging (op expense)
  • Small business acquisition (Customer Net Revenue for SME = $3-$5k)
  • NRFF for non-customers (NIM on settlement funds held)
  • Future “directory” business case, cards growth
  • Prevention of DDA Account Number Breach

The JPM Quick Deposit application was reportedly built in-house, other Vendors such as EasCorp’s Depozip provide similar functionality. As for the success of this application, NetBanker reported USAA’s recent numbers for Deposit@Mobile. (update 20 Aug, my friends at BAC tell me that they have been trialing the Mitek application for almost 3 years now, fine tuning the app and the support process and are set for launch any day) .

Given that the audience for this blog (investors, start ups and innovators), you might ask why it takes 2 years for a bank to roll out this type of innovation. An excellent question! The iPhone app itself is the easy part, perhaps consisting of less then 20% of the overall budget. The “hard work” is in integrating it into existing systems and risk controls. For example, the primary value proposition, for QuickDeposit, is improving check acceptance and funds availability. At the teller line, banks have tools like DepositChek which allows the bank to determine if information on the check is correct and the account is in good standing (stopping check fraud before the check image gets into the system). These same tools must be integrated into the online and mobile process to reduce risk. I’ve picked this particular example because it is a tool unique to bank entities (not available to non-banks). In addition to the technical integration costs, banks have become very prudent in testing, and accessing impact of new functionality to call center support costs. Given the wide availability of both of these applications, it is essential that they are intuitive to JPM customers.

These applications are a great retail success. I understand that the JPM cards team is also poised for a major release in mobile soon (with multiple alliance partners). Well done JPM!

Enroll for QuickPay – www.chase.com/QuickPay

Overview of Quick Deposit  – www.chase.com/quickdeposit

Thoughts appreciated