MNOs giving away Billions to Banks.

March 6, 2012

If you can solve Authentication.. everything else is just accounting

–          Ross Anderson, KC Fed, March 2012

Good news: Someone is reading my blog.

Bad news for Mobile Operators…. It is the Banks.

3 years ago I wrote $5B Mobile Operator Opportunity: KYC.  If I were in control of ANY aspect of mobile.. I would work to ensure that privacy and anonymity reign. Google/Apple should work to ensure that mobile browsers and apps have VERY WELL DEFINED controls around user identity, tracking (ie cookies, fso, …), location, payment, … Similarly mobile operators should have VERY TIGHT controls around who can leverage tower information, customer information, .. for location and “hidden” identification of users.

Today I learned that one of the top 3 banks has struck a unique agreement with the ISIS telecos to do KYC, account opening, and really act as an agent. This is just brilliant for the bank… as it decreases its cost to acquire and cost to serve. However striking a one off deal with a big bank is short sighted.

The Mobile Operator KYC/Agent opportunity is TREMENDOUS if MNOs can focus a business around this and make KYC a generic service. As I stated in Future of Retail Banking: Prepaid?, Retailers and Mobile operators have a competitive advantage in their physical distribution. Retailers like WMT, Tesco and Target are doing a tremendous job here. International Mobile Operators like Docomo, Vodafone, Sing Tel, SKT, Bharti are also far in their planning. US Mobile operators are completely out of the game…. Perhaps things like this slip to “deal” because they “outsourced” the strategy to a dysfunctional consortium (ISIS, see Walled Garden) .

MNOs why would you want to be an agent for a SINGLE bank, when you could sell a service that could be used by every bank, every commerce company, every government agency… to the BENEFIT of your customer (example mobile esignature below).

Operators, let me be specific in my recommendations.

  1. The mobile device will become the key point of confluence between virtual and physical world. You can only take a role in the economics if you can retain the integrity of customer relationship (and data).
  2. Don’t look for a “deal” to distribute a single bank’s products. Create a business around KYC leveraging your distribution. Make the banks bid for your capabilities. This is akin to “agent” networks in emerging markets
  3. The critical piece of payment is authentication. You have many unique capabilities here for your post-paid plans. You ID, phyisically sight and credit check consumers. What if you also registered them for an “e signature” process… a generic security process which could be re-used in banking, commerce, government, health care
  4. You have a “token” today.. it is phone number. Please just go buy Payfone and make it your new payments AND KYC focus.
  5. Control customer data and location. My top recommendation is watch out who is using consumer location data.. just as banks want to own the payment rails.. ensure there are tight consumer protections around this.. YOU SHOULD BE THE TRUST ENTITY (hey that rhymes).

I believe that Apple gets this, as we can see from their acquisition of Authentec. Creating a digital storage locker for identity.. is much more important than creating one for music.. (hint).

I also think Square get this.. and has built a business around identity as the key for physical commerce AND payment. Given that Square and Apple are also all about creating great consumer experiences.. with a maniacal product focus.. I would love for them to get together..

Apple and NFC?

Apple and NFC? I don’t think so.. my bet is 70% against. Great that Apple can keep us all guessing. Why put a 5th radio in the iPhone? AND hand carriers control of SE.

1 Feb 2012

Apple and NFC? I don’t think so.. my bet is 70% against. Great that Apple can keep us all guessing. Why put a 5th radio in the iPhone? AND hand carriers control of SE. There is just no upside for Apple here. NFC would not enhance their wonderful mobile customer experience…  it may even kill their Apple/App Store/Apple ID/Payment Instrument advantage.

It would be smarter if they would buy Square… payments belong in the cloud… not locked in the phone. All you really need at a POS is an Irrefutable ID. In a Square scenario, Apple could leap frog everyone in customer adoption and enable every iPhone owner to pay with their voice and GPS location ( Apple has payment instruments tied to every iTunes account). The gap in this scenario is merchant adoption, existing merchant processor agreements/hardware, and retailer reconciliation (if multiple processors). Apple, if I were you I would sit down w/ Square, FirstData, TSYS, … and see what could be done. NFC requires coordination of too many parties.. a late follower would be a much better place to be. Your top risk is that consumers will buy phones based on mobile wallet. Your short term strategy? I pay with my iPhone today (see pic). 

Don’t get me wrong, NFC can work.. but the carriers have proven inept at managing a platform business which would incent the participation of many businesses, allowing all to make money. Instead they operate as a toll bridge, but expect to take a portion of the goods in transit. If you operate as a toll bridge you are a dumb pipe… period.  It just does not take much intelligence to run a control business, sure it is complex to build the bridge..  But it even more complex to coordinate the logistics of the world’s commerce. The carriers focus on control is killing the prospects for NFC’s success, as they attempt to act like an orchestrator (requesting a % of goods in transit) but have the ability of a toll collector.

Commerce will find another path… one of least resistance. This is what Apple should do as well. NFC is just a radio… one whos standards are largely controlled by banks, mobile operators and card networks. Why would retailers want to participate here at all?  We should not act to enrich the complexity of payment networks, or wireless ones, but rather form new networks that are retailer and consumer friendly.  Bluetooth, wifi, gps, voice, facial recognition, sms, .. all can do the job NFC does.  We will not see harmony here over the next 20 years, particularly as the only payment instrument in a mobile wallet is a 300bps+ credit card.

Why is Japan successful? because they have a dominant carrier that built a business model..  same in Singapore and Korea… in the rest of world.. chaos will reign until someone delivers retailer and consumer value.

http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/12/01/30/mastercard_acknowledges_it_needs_apple_to_bring_nfc_payments_into_the_mainstream_.html

Related Blogs

 

Update 3 April 2013

My bet on next version of iPhone? Broadcom’s BCM43341 chip 

Broadcom has launched the industry’s first quad-combo chip. The BCM43341 combines NFC, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and FM radio on one chip and, says Broadcom, “offers OEMs unmatched size, power and cost advantages.”

A second new product is a single card solution that pairs a BCM20793 NFC controller as used in the Google Nexus 4 with an 802.11ac (5G) WiFi radio and is aimed at high end mobile phones and devices.

Does that mean the next iPhone will have NFC? yep.. but not in the way we think about it today.

 

http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2011/02/03/isis-platform-ecosystem-or-desert/

http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2011/12/05/isis-delay/

http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2011/10/26/apples-commerce-future-square/

http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2011/01/26/apple-and-nfc/

ISIS: Antonym of Nimble?

ISIS – The Antonym of Nimble

Last week’s announcement that ISIS is abandoning plans for its own payment network (NFC Times) is not a surprise. This blog has covered ISIS since 2009 (before it had a name). Now we can add ISIS to the great names in mobile payments: PayBox, Obopay, Firethorne, Monitise, Enstream, …

It turns out ISIS was a Desert.. why have they failed?

  • Business Strategy based on “Control” instead of value.
  • Consortiums are not nimble, MNOs are not nimble, and a consortium formed around a poor business strategy will not be able to adapt without a very strong and experienced CEO.
  • Existing networks and ecosystems did not align with (or support) ISIS initial strategy.
  • Building a new network is an expensive undertaking.. building one without a value proposition is impossible

From my perspective the tipping point that killed ISIS was their inability to exert control over the secure element. Their entire business plan was dependent on this. When RIM announced its SE architecture 2 weeks ago, with Apple likely to follow.. it became perfectly clear that ISIS could not control and provision wallets, cards and applications that access the SE (related blog).

Mobile payments are still firmly in the hype stage. Until a real consumer value proposition develops that leverages the handset’s unique assets, consumer’s data, payment, retailer integration in a way where multiple parties can “participate” it will remain a niche. Getting excited about NFC is like getting Satellite radio in your car.. sure it’s cool and all cars will eventually have it, it may even improve your life.. but there are plenty of alternatives and many people have no need of it at all.

That said, there are many useful software products that could use this technology to deliver real consumer value. Most innovations are either targeted to either the top end (cutting edge performance) or to the bottom end (lower cost) of requirements. NFC adoption will take place within multiple solutions targeting the “top end”, each of which has a strong network effect component. Solutions will succeed either by delivering the most value point-point or through network scale. Payments are but one core service that NFC must deliver on.

From my previous Blog

Globally, MNOs are looking for a platform where Operators can benefit from interaction between consumer and merchant, with flexibility to deal with a heterogeneous regulatory environment. The competitive pressures on Visa/MC are much different then they were 5 years ago (when both were bank owned). The network fee structures and rules were written with banks and mature markets in mind. …

All of this leads to the case for a new “Mobile Payments Settlement” network, a network which will alienate many banks. I expect to see Visa roll out the initial stages of this network in the next 2 months with an emphasis on NFC. Quite possibly the best kept secret I have ever seen from a public company. I’m sure many Silicon Valley CEOs are crossing their fingers (with me) on this, as a “new wave” of innovation is certainly close at hand that will drive growth (and valuations).

NFC Game: MNOs 1, Banks 0

There is much written on the technology, standards, pilots and who is doing what.. this is an attempt to understand the business incentives within the ecosystem(s) and WHY key actors are pursuing/supporting different strategies.

2 February 2011

The actual scoring is probably a little more complicated. This blog is focused on investors and business heads that are not deep in the trenches with mobile payments. There is much written on the technology, standards, pilots and who is doing what.. this is an attempt to understand the business incentives within the ecosystem(s) and WHY key actors are pursuing/supporting different strategies. Getting NFC in a mobile handset was no “obvious” decision for MNOs or Handset manufactures, in fact just 18 months ago Apple told a major bank “we have enough radios in the phone, can’t we just use one of the existing ones?”  The point shouldn’t be missed, there are many, many ways which a consumer can store information and transmit it to another device (like a POS).  As an example: the US State department (in its infinite wisdom) decided to put an unencrypted RFID tag that contains your name and passport #… Another wacky example is Google Zetawire Patent.

Why NFC? Technically it operates on the same ISO/IEC 14443 protocol as both RFID and MiFare so how is it different? I’m not going to get into the depth of the technology (see Wikipedia), but the biggest driver was  GSMA/NFC Forum’s technical definition (UICC/SWP) that ENABLED CARRIERS to control the smart card (NFC element). This in turn enabled carriers to create a business model through which they could justify investment (See NFC Forum White Paper). 

(Sorry for the pedantic nature of this, but since blog readership is going up.. I’m taking some license in assuming that the style is not irritating too many people.. and besides getting right use of terminology is important. )

Banks and card networks have been circling mobile/contactless payments for sometime. Mastercard’s PayPass (2003) led the way for many of the current bank contactless initiatives. Visa later followed (and still trails) with PayWave in 2007, and Discover with Zip in 2008.  All card initiatives operate on the same ISO/IEC 14443 protocol as NFC, most with numerous “successful” pilots.  The issues with contactless card platforms are not technology, but business model.

As with any new “platform” it must support a business model for some… preferably for many … participants. Card focused models focused on either cash replacement (ex. Transit, Vending, P2P, …etc.) or “premium” convenience play (see Best Buy NFC Pilot). For those of you not in the card or retail business… there is little love loss between the 2 groups. Retailers are not about to invest in anything that helps either banks or card networks unless it improves sales or margins (see Banks will win in Credit). The NFC model allowed carriers to control the radio, and integrate it into the SIM (UICC) for management of secure applications and data (see Apple and NFC).

Prior to NFC, the “control” for contactless payment was with each contactless network. Visa and Mastercard took 12-18 months to certify every new device. That meant every single new POS Reader, handset, … had to go through multiple certification processes. What  manufacturer would want to invest in this contactless model? Alternatively, NFC contains standards and specifications operating within ISO 14443 with an independent certification process. The NFC specification does provide for an independent entity, called the Trusted Service Manager (TSM), to assume the role of gatekeeper (See Dutch Example). But MNOs are not likely to give up the keys prematurely. In the US ISIS model, this TSM will be run by Gemalto (for the MNO consortium).

What does this mean? Q: Can Visa develop a PayWave application on an NFC certified phone? Yes.. can Mastercard develop a PayPass Application? Yes.. that have already. Can TFL develop an Oyster Application? Yes. Vendors like Zenius design secure applications that do just that. NFC enables the phone to host multiple applications that can use the “radio” in different ways (example open secure doors). These mobile applications are secure and can be provisioned and updated remotely. This is the “beauty” of the NFC ecosystem. Investors note: In all of these examples, it takes the MNO and/or TSM to approve your application. In the case of Visa and MA… they are not approved.  This means your start up can build the slickest app in the world.. but someone else owns the keys to consumer use.  For Visa and Mastercard: their PayPass and PayWave brands are mere NFC applications that can be denied within the NFC enabled phone.

Another important control point (for NFC payment) is POS infrastructure. A new NFC payment instrument must be supported by both the POS (certfication) and the processor(s). POS terminals typically support multiple standards, protocols and payment insturments (see VivoPay 5000M). For each payment method  (PayWave, PayPass, Zip, Bling, ..) the POS terminal must undergo a proprietary certification process. POS terminals connect to one or more processors (ex. FirstData, FIS, …) and in addition to processing the transaction, the terminals can receive and process updates (example ISIS/Zip protocol which is still in definition). A recent example of POS payment upgrade: Verifone’s efforts to include Bling/PayPal acceptance at POS, a very big story that has received little attention.

The “downside” of NFC for many stakeholders is that they are no longer in control. In the NFC model, the “keys” to the NFC platform sit with the MNO who controls the UICC.  This control is necessary, as it is the MNO who fulfills the KYC (Know your customer) requirement linking a real person to a SIM (and hence to a transaction). In the NFC model, Visa will still need to certify their own NFC software application to be PayWave compliant.. but will NOT necessarily need to certify the chipset/OS and device in which the application runs. Of course the details are a little sketchy here because Visa has not tested their own application for this environment, as handset manufactures are still in flight with their designs (focused on ISIS compatibility). I believe the ISIS dynamic is also the driver of why the latest Android Nexus S had write functions disabled..

Stakeholders

In analyzing the Total Addressable Market (TAM) for any investment I always look at who are the existing stakeholders and their realative markets. Within the NFC Ecosystem I see the following:

 

MNOs have had very little experience in running a software platform ecosystem, or a payment network.. or a TSM. Closed systems usually precede open systems, and I would expect this trend to follow within NFC. The vendor most able to coordinate a value proposition which spans payments, software, mobile platform, advertising, … ? Apple. Say what you want about Apple’s penchant for control.. they are one of the few companies with the skills and experience to address all of the issues surrounding a new mobile platform.

Banks and card networks are the only group not to score in NFC because of their inability to create a new value proposition with MNOs and retailers, as such they loose.  Banks hold out hope that existing card loyalty programs hold, and consumers refuse to use payment instruments that are not currently in their pocket. History demonstrates that telecom operators have ability to sell and market cards (see AT&T Universal) to create compelling incentives…. Banks will likely begin pushing the benefits of Credit cards (Reg Z consumer protections). Will carriers respond by expanding their consumer credit risk through carrier billing initiatives (Boku, Bango, billtomobile)?

Message to banks.. stop depending on Visa and Mastercard for this.. develop your own payment network, with a unique POS integration.

Thoughts appreciated

Part 2 – “Unprofitable” Payments

Yesterday’s post was “Banks will win in Payments”, a general rule of thumb that had one major caveat: Payments which are profitable. What about payments which are not profitable?

January 31, 2011

Yesterday’s post was “Banks will win in Payments”, a general rule of thumb that had one major caveat: Payments which are profitable. What about payments which are not profitable? Primary examples:

Historically Checks and Cash were a cost of doing “bank business”. Debit cards proved to be the most successful product in converting cash and checks into electronic payments (see Cash Replacement). Recent US financial legislation will move the debit business into a break even business for banks.. from 120bps of the transaction to a flat fee of $0.12. This has caused Banks to take a hard look at the “payment business” to determine if and how they make continued debit investment. Why support a Visa/MA branded debit card at all? Austrailia, Canada, Japan and Germany have similar dynamics here.. if you go to Canada and pay with “debit” it is your Interac card.. a bank owned debit network.. which retailers prefer as their payment mechanism of choice. In these geographies Visa and MA are known for Credit transactions only.

Clearly “payments” are a necessity for every transactional account (Demand Deposit Account – DDA). As US retail banks attempt to adjust DDA account fees, to rebalance overall product profitability, there are new alternatives developing that present a much more cost effective value propositions, particularly for segments below the mass market. Low value payments can support and even enhance existing value propositions of other non-bank networks, a dynamic I described in Why MNOs will Rule in Emerging Markets. As such, we are beginning to see “fragmentation” within “low value” payment solutions. In the US carriers are developing partnerships with mobile billing solution providers (Boku, billtomobile, …). In model, carriers are taking on some additional “credit risk” but are starting off small with digital goods. Low value payment further enhances the overall consumer value proposition for the mobile operator (retention, network use, network effects, on us, …).

Top Tier Banks must tread carefully on DDA fees, not only do they face competition from credit unions (not impacted by the interchange fee limits), and MNOs but also from pre-paid cards and brokerages which provide much of what mass consumers need in transactional accounts. The downside for mass market consumers is one of credit. Banks make credit decisions based upon relationship, credit history and DDA records. Keeping your balances out of a top tier bank (or the banking system) will make it harder to get a loan. As comments are coming due on the Dodd-Frank amendment.. a key bank argument is that the regulation will indeed create more unbanked.

Part 3 will cover new models where ad spend replace interchange in driving payment system revenue.

Message for start ups.. payments are a mine field.. the new debit interchange rates will drastically reduce merchants costs. Be cautious in building solutions around existing debit networks.. banks are planning changes.

India: Instant Interbank Mobile Pmt Service

Just as in the case of RBI’s MPFI group they are attempting to build a standard (ie platform) by which everyone must play, and therefore exert control. These platforms will continue to fail, as there must be at least one group with a sustainable business case. IMPS does nothing to address the unbanked needs and seems to be an outgrowth of NEFT and MPFI

National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) launched the instant interbank mobile payment service (IMPS).

From MyDigitalFC

To use the IMPS service, customers have to register their mobile number with the banks where they hold an account. When the customer registers, he will be assigned a three digit code that will be their mobile money identity (MMID) and each bank will be assigned a four digit national bank identification number (NBIN).

Both the sender and the receiver needs to get their NBIN and MMID in order to facilitate the transaction. The funds transfer can take place in seven seconds by using the MMID and NBIN numbers of both the banks.

This is a concerted effort by RBI to take a leadership (control) role in mobile payments as the MNOs continue to work for necessary regulatory change.  RBI and the banks are under substantial political pressure to develop services to the rural poor, and create mechanisms/licenses for agents (and MNOs) to serve this demographic. Announcements like this just further a “delay game” by which RBI seeks to create an image of progress.  

RBI constituted the NPC in 1999. This instant mobile “press release” is more hype than substance particularly given the adoption of NEFT and processes surrounding electronic transfers today. For example, in A2A (Transfers between domestic accounts that I own at 2 financial institutions) transactions, many financial institutions still require customer sighting and a paper documents FOR EACH TRANSFER. Within India, the NEFT system is just beginning to get traction (NEFT FAQ) as banks are reluctant to give customers control. India’s RTGS system, is also in its infancy (list of bank branches here) with only 60k transaction/day. Indian bank A2A  “controls” are similar to those in the US as banks like Chase and Wells,  as barriers to move money (to another FI) prevents deposit run off. These controls also allow the banker to call and ask “why are you moving money out.. we can offer that rate as well”.

Just as in the case of the MPFI group RBI is attempting to build a standard (ie platform) by which everyone must play, and therefore exert control. These central bank platforms will continue to fail, as there must be at least one group with a sustainable business case (see MNOs will rule).  IMPS does nothing to address the unbanked needs and IMPS seems to be an outgrowth of RTGS and MPFI..  I certainly hope that the unbanked and the MNOs continue to work toward influencing real regulatory reform, as today I have a system for banked account transfers which is “instant” but may require a customer to come into the branch to sign a document first.

MNOs as Depository Institutions?

Updated November 10, 2009

Excellent Background Articles:

Success and value breed trust and loyalty. MPESA customer surveys by CGAP point to desire for MPESA to offer interest on balances. The genesis of MPESA’s success is not something that Banks have seen before (in emerging markets):

  • Cash replacement (without their control)
  • Technology
  • Customer segment – Growth from the LOW end of customers that banks normally serves

Deposit taking, and payments are typically a regulated businesses which banks have excelled. However their past success was serving a customer segment that was far different then what MPESA serves today. Can Banks adapt to the new opportunities service the unbanked in emerging markets? Will new Micro Finance Institutions (MFI) emerge as the principle banking entity? Will MNOs seek approval to offer financial services separate from Banks or MFIs?

In Kenya, the explosive growth of MPESA has put both regulators and banks in a very awkward position. It was originally launched as a money transfer business, and has emerged as an effective cash replacement with an annual transaction volume of over 10% of Kenya’s GDP. Consumers have unexpectedly embraced MPESA, and regulations have had a challenging time adapting (or anticipating) the vector in which it has grown. The regulatory challenge now is “connecting” the MPESA network to the “banking” network and evolving the:  regulatory authority, regulations and controls around it.

In 2005, Kenya drafted the Deposit Taking Micro Finance Bill which was past at the end of 2006.

http://www.microfinanceregulationcenter.org/files/25464_file_Kenya.pdf

http://www.microfinanceregulationcenter.org/files/39171_file_Microfinance_Act_2006.pdf

In addition to supporting traditional MFIs, the Act made it possible for non-banks to participate in deposit taking as an MFI (in the future), and now the first “non-bank” MFI has been accepted (just 3 months ago in June 09).

http://www.microfinanceregulationcenter.org/resource_centers/reg_sup/article/57056/

It remains to be seen whether an MFI license will be granted to MPESA, to extend its money transfer license. A more likely route will be for (multiple) MFIs to be approved to source funds from MPESA (MPESA as payment network)

The Philippines may provide the best example for MNO/Bank collaboration in mobile money. GCASH in the Philippines is the mobile money solution from MNO Global in conjunction with Bank of the Phillipines (BPI).

http://www.bpiexpressonline.com/index/find_page.aspx

Last year Global and BPI partnered in the creation of a new microfinance provider:   Pilipinas Savings Bank

http://www.syminvest.com/market/news/microfinance/philippines-ayala-corp-bpi-globe-set-up-rp%E2%80%99s-first-microfinance-bank-to-help-small-business-/2008/10/31/1322

The Philippines was one of the first countries to develop a comprehensive law in support of MFIs. In 2000, Philippine regulators acted in response to the updated General Banking Law which mandated recognition of microfinance as a legitimate banking activity. Regulators developed a unique set of rules and regulations MFIs as the updated Law declared microfinance as a flagship program for poverty alleviation.

http://www.microfinanceregulationcenter.org/resource_centers/reg_sup

Bank as Depository Institution

Before tackling the issue of Deposit taking in Kenya, let’s discuss the issues surrounding existing (non MFI) banks servicing MPESA customers. Having spoken to several of the key parties in Kenya, the business issues surround: who “owns the customer”,  who is assuming the risk (“money transfer” v. bank ) burden for this connection. For purposes of example, let’s take the KYC requirement in Kenya (as in most countries) a customer sighting (by a bank employee) with valid ID. Kenya has had problems with counterfeit IDs

http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=1144013210&cid=472&

How should regulators proceed? Bank infrastructure in many parts of the country is immature. There are over a million people that would need to go through the KYC process, most of which do not have an identity card (separate from issues in article above). Should regulators relax the KYC burden? Should money transfer agents be allowed to operate under MFI regulation? In my post below, I’ve outlined a few of the regulatory approaches

http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2009/11/01/mnosrule/

I would certainly like additional feedback, but my understanding is that regulators are taking a concurrent track: Updating the MFI regulations (originally designed in 2005), updating the “Money Transfer” regulations as covered within the General Banking Act, approving MFIs to source funds from MPESA (services on the MPesa Network) and defining a new regulatory scheme for mobile money which would touch both banking and telecommunications regulations. Vodafone’s regulatory experience here will likely prove to be a tremendous differentiator in future markets, as their ability to field a team capable of partnering with regulators further enhances their creditability.

(A very broad summary of the issues, apologize in advance for the gaps.) From a Bank perspective, concern is justified over MNOs ability to create a liabilities business. Banks should have the right to compete for these deposits, with a level regulatory playing field. From a MNO perspective, banks have not served these customers in the past. For MPESA, the Banks interest in this segment arose after the MNO developed it. The banks should pay for this “customer acquisition” and servicing, and the MNO should be able to offer products and services that support customers.

MNO Deposit taking

There are currently 3 separately regulated parties that are positioning to provide interest bearing accounts: Money Transfer Services, MFIs, and Banks.  Emerging markets have invested significant resources in defining MFI regulations, however these were drafted prior to the success of services like GCASH and MPESA. The CGAP data in Kenya clearly shows customer “interest” (pardon the play) in using MNO services beyond that which a “money transfer agent” is licensed to perform. However accelerating the attractiveness of these money transfer services, by providing interest bearing accounts, may further exacerbate an already challenging regulatory situation. I would expect to see regulators requesting that MNOs open up/partner with traditional banks (as the depository institution) prior to approving MNOs as an MFI, or enabling traditional MFIs to compete. Interoperability between these licensed entities must be addressed. This view flows out of MNO incentives (e.g customer ownership, high fees for cash out) and current agreements with bank(s) with regard to settlement of funds. With that said, I would expect very little success for traditional banks attempting to provide this service, as it does not align to their business model. A model which will likely succeed is MFIs access to “non-traditional” payment services, as both MNOs and MFIs are nimbal and able to adapt quickly here and support their existing business model. See Western Union example below (in India)

http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report_western-union-takes-mfi-route-for-rural-spread_1299994

The challenges that MPESA faces, while challenging, are extremely exciting as it represents the “Phase 2” success of mobile money in emerging markets. Just look at the rate of change in issues facing service in Kenya today, compared with 18 months ago

http://technology.cgap.org/2008/05/28/can-m-pesa-work-for-microfinance-clients/

Mobile Money: MNOs will Rule in Emerging Markets

Payments, banking and regulation may well evolve differently in emerging markets over the next 5 years as new services establish a unique ecosystem that serves 1 Billion consumers never “connected” to the world’s economy.

Updated Dec 15, 2009

Regulators in Africa and India are working actively to ensure consumers (and the global banking system) are protected in the exciting confluence of mobile and finance. Their involvement is completely appropriate given the opportunity to improve the lives of millions of unbanked people around the world. Defining responsibility and the commensurate controls associated with connecting non-traditional (unregulated) networks to highly regulated banks is a herculean effort which may lead emerging markets to remake a “payment system” that is more efficient than that which exists in today’s developed countries. This opportunity for “leap frog” improvements will be driven by the unique path emerging markets are evolving. Key stakeholders will be able to leverage learnings of developed countries, and trials in emerging markets, as they develop infrastructure necessary to support a network that enables both financial services and telecommunications.

Today’s regulatory approach, within these emerging markets, may be best summarized as an “experimental period” with simplified controls. Very early regulations have focused on simplicity by ensuring that the “value” stays within the MNO network, and limiting: balances, ticket size and beneficiaries. By constraining transfer of “value” to well defined  MNO services (ex top-ups) regulators have certainly addressed many risk, AML and audit issues. These early controls have provided time for regulators to review progress and fashion new regulations in which existing regulated entities can comment. This order, with which emerging economies are proceeding, may come as a shock to some in the developed world.

Many believe that this more cautious orderly approach in mobile payment was driven by the unstructured success of MPESA (links below). An estimated 10% of Kenya’s GDP currently passes through this channel.  Governments, banks and MNOs leveraged the learnings of the Kenyan market, first among them is: once a new payment system takes hold, it is hard to change. The alacrity with which MPESA was adopted by Kenyans has caused “a new awareness” among governments and business for both the opportunity to provide access, and the challenges faced in managing it. For regulators, there is a renewed sense urgency for defining the “rules” by which to protect consumers and hold participants accountable. Ex in India below

Vodaphone MPesa in India

Regulatory changes have significantly impacted many investments made to date, with the key example of Reserve Bank of India’s Aug 2009 regulation preventing non-banks from domestic money transfer (destroying Obopay’s P2P plans). Banks have created much friction for the expansion of “pilots” and their capabilities. The banks’ position is that once value is exchanged between network participants, or to another network, that these services compete directly with a regulated “payment system”. So we have a “dance” of 4 parties: Regulators, MNOs, Banks and Consumers. In my discussions, the regulatory approach may be generalized by the following:

A)    Experiment.  Set interim guidelines with expectations that they could be revoked/changed. Communications regulators are driving this approach as they try to assist their stakeholders. MPESA began because of Communication regulatory authorization… not KCB

B)    Review. Require submittal of plans to both communication and banking regulators.

C)    Establish. Legal/Regulatory accountability. Define responsibility and audit guidelines for responsible regulators. For example in Kenya their was very little consumer protections for electronic transactions, the Kenya’s electronic transactions act was just established this year and serves as a model for Africa.

D)    Define Audit responsibility for MNO. May force partnership with regulated bank for clearing and settlement. Set auditing guidelines for MNOs under communications regulations (Monitor/audit payments and transfers).

E)     Constrain. Set limits on MNO services and “value” allowed to accumulate in MNO “wallet”, …etc. Example RS 5000 in India, Prohibit/restrict any bank functions in MNO. ex, No interest bearing accounts.

F)     Isolate. Restrict payments connections external networks. Ex in Africa.. Commercial “beneficiaries/payees” must be approved over a certain volume threshold. (regulatory Instrumentalism). Note: MNOs have addressed this by shifting value to a “regulated” payment (ex. Pre-paid card) and partnerships.

G)    Enforce KYC responsibility for MNOs engaging in payments at Cash in/out points. Example retail partner is responsible for validating identity.

Business Model

It is difficult for established businesses to create effective business models “down market” from their current customer base (see Clayton Christensen – Innovators Dilemma). MNOs may be best positioned to execute, on the mobile money value proposition, given that the “unbanked market” is market that they serve much more effectively today (reputation/brand/service/efficiency), and the fact that “mobile money” is a key to sustaining their growth.  I cannot underestimate this point. For banks serving the unbanked represents a low margin (if not money loosing) value proposition for all of their current products. Similarly, payments are a profit neutral business for banks separate from the lending or commercial services which surround them. Bank product lines are typically not focused on accounts with balances of less the RS 5,000 ($100). In addition, existing Bank systems typically do manage millions of small ticket real time money transfers (think SEPA or Wire) with associated risk, authorization, and AML controls. This “gap” in serving emerging markets is prompting indigenous efforts (ex RBIs: RTGS, National Infrastructure for Mobile Payments, and India Card).

For MNOs in emerging markets, mobile money is aligned to their current business and in fact essential for growth. Allowing “cash in” and “transfer” enables customer usage  through pre-paid plans. For MNO consumers, access to money services provides ADDITIONAL value to their EXISTING MNO relationship (more on this later). MNO success in “mobile money” is assured because the service further enhances the EXISTING MNO business model, a model which the team and infrastructure to: market, sell and service the unbanked is established (and profitable).

The consumer value in mobile money stems from the macro economic transformation that exchange of value provides in moving from “informal” communication to money centered “business” communication. Payments and value may well evolve differently in emerging markets over the next 5 years as payments, telecommunication, regulation and new services establish a unique ecosystem that serves 1 Billion consumers never “connected” to the world’s economy. It is the combination of “network access” and “value access” that provides transformational opportunities to the world’s consumers. This market dynamic leads to transformational “leap frog” opportunities within emerging markets.

MNO Fragmentation

The principle challenge for MNOs to address is in emerging markets is: fragmentation. A large reason Vodafone was successful in Kenya was that they had 80% of share. Fragmentation of consumers in highly competitive mobile markets, combined with conflicting standards, technology and retail partnerships may cause consumer confusion. This chaos is anathema to the “trust” necessary to establish consumer confidence in payments and value storage. For example, in Nigeria can you pay your utility bill on any cell plan? Dominant MNOs will likely race to establish payment networks and partnerships, even in the constrained regulatory environment. Less dominant MNOs will likely look to regulators, standards, interoperability and other mechanisms to level the playing field. It is essential that MNOs get this right the first time, as “trust” is something earned over many years and quickly destroyed.

In emerging markets, MNOs may be best served by attacking “breadth” opportunities first. Very simple services that can have very broad impact, with very little assistance from external vendors may provide better support for immediate growth:

  • Nature of network effects are that you must deliver value to everyone on the network (whether a bank or an MNO). Successful networks must have established physical distribution points.
  • Objective in payments is to establish use and acceptance. Example, receive your pension… now establish a savings account, or send money to your grandson.
  • Trust.. Serviceability, manageability, and risk management in “simple services”.

For Bankers

As a banker myself, I never admit defeat in attacking a profitable market segment. Given that payments are not particularly attractive for banks (separate from the products and balances that support them), there are several strategic options (Beyond the scope of this post.. but which I would love to discuss). In general banks should maintain engagement with regulators and MNOs, and focus on providing services that protect their network and enable access to consumers. Examples:

  • Switching. Extending payment capabilities in existing accounts and networks. Switching between multiple MNO value stores
  • “Participating” on the mobile network. Micro lending through “supporting role”.
  • Risk Management.
  • Partner w/ large existing customers in their participation. Example, Pension/Payroll to mobile plans, or connecting to MNOs to business (retail lockbox on mobile)
  • Managing compliance. Example: Cash out

For Software Vendors (ISVs)

In emerging markets, I would expect to see rapid evolution constrained only by regulation. Expect to see very simple services that can have very broad impact, and support MNOs existing value. A key distribution point for these services are local agents. For those of you in the US, think of these agents as the local “country store” of 80 years ago, trusted members of the community that frequently extend informal credit. Banks in Kenya are just gained access to agents in distribution of their services in order to compete with Vodafone and ZAP.

Many of the “consumer facing” services will require very little assistance from external vendors until the networks mature and value is transfered beyond the MNO network. Example issues for vendors today:

  • MNOs have very solid SMS development skills. Look at MPESA, ZAP, GCASH.. who developed the software behind them? The MNO.
  • Simplicity lends itself to better risk management, a key for reinforcing the “integrity” of a new payment system. Solid risk management is even more pronounced in the face of new regulations.
  • CEO visibility with MNOs, Banks and Retailers. Paying a “US Vendor” for anything relating to a payment function is not likely. Citi mobile teams have built tremendous SMS applications in weeks (sorry Silicon Valley).
  • Government Visibility. In addition to CEOs, governments and regulators are highly involved in addressing the needs of their citizens, whether “unbanked” or “unphoned”. Regulators globally are looking to share learnings from Kenya, Philippines, India, … Banks expect between 600M-800M people will gain first time access to financial services over the next 8 years. A tremendous market, that will be served much differently then banks (and retailers/MNOs) have operated in the past.

This is not to say that ISVs have no role, but rather their role will be supportive of facilitating exchange of value… NOT leading with a brand (ex Obopay). Examples:

  • Government  pension distribution across multiple MNOs
  • Business connection to multiple MNOs payments
  • Businesses clearing settlement, AR integration and reporting
  • CRM solutions for customers, automated response
  • Assist MNOs, Banks and Businesses in compliance and reporting.
  • Bank connection to MNO networks. Ex: micro lending… receive your pension… now establish a savings account, or send money to your grandson.
  • ISVs should look at supporting services in connecting business to this new network.

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