Paypal at the POS?

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18 August 2010

Great WSJ Article Today – Paypal looks to real world commerce

First Draft…. final tomorrow.

As stated in my previous blogs about Apple, Bling, and the Mercury NewCo we are in the midst of a revolution in consumer payments, driven by large non banks, with new value propositions. For example, we see established organizations like AT&T, Verizon, and Discover collaborating (Mercury NewCo) with a payment value proposition driven by mobile advertising, Card networks attempting to develop PayPal killers (see Visa PayClick) and mobile handset manufactures attempting to create models for payments separate from banks (see Nokia and Apple NFC).

The worst kept secret in mobile payments today is: there aren’t any (except for MNO unbanked solutions). Efforts like Mastercard/Obopay have failed globally because they have focused on P2P (no existing volume). Alternatively, PayPal’s efforts are focused on the POS. Enabling any “merchant” to accept any card either at POS or virtually (see previous blog on PayPal’s virtual terminal). This approach is a win for banks (card acceptance), a win for consumers (convenience/loyalty), and a win for merchants (reduced merchant fees and interchange).

PayPal is best positioned of any major player to link the virtual and physical payment worlds (see here for detail): they have a consumer base, merchant base and a phenomenal fraud/risk team of 300+ with commensurate tech and ops. However their ability to execute is not without challenges. For example, what % of their current merchant base does POS transactions? Will there be a need for merchant terminals? If so who will pay? As discussed in the article above, Bling has been mentioned as a potential approach. Issuing Bling tags to PayPal’s employees is certainly a useful way of testing the consumer issues associated with issuing (and using) a payment tag.

My guess on PayPal’s “focus”?

Given PayPal’s strengths I would see a “phone as POS” approach as the most logical.  As consumers we focus on our individual accounts, but PayPal is one of the few “2 Party” payment networks (others are Discover, Amex) that also include merchant acquisition. 2 Party systems are uniquely positioned to control the costs and value proposition between the merchant and the consumer. One of the major NFC challenges is POS infrastructure: who will pay for it? The phone as POS would certainly address this Gordian Knot for small merchants. Small merchants are a group that also feels the most pain in interchange and card acceptance fees due to their lack of negotiating leverage. Oddly enough large banks seem to be supportive of PayPal’s efforts here with the view that their actions will help drive cash replacement. In other words, if PayPal’s innovation is indeed focused on NFC acquisition then they will be able to process all cards..

On the merchant side, PayPal has already completed much of the heavy lifting with its existing virtual terminal service. This service equips PayPal merchants with ability to accept any card at the POS (see Virtual Terminal blog). NFC or RFID form factors are just another abstraction for this card.  On the consumer side, I would expect to see PayPal working to link PayPal accounts to multiple form factors. Expect PayPal to make an acquisition in this space.

As of today, here is my view of the teams competing in mobile payments at POS

  • Mastercard/Citi/Obopay/Nokia
  • Visa/Monitise
  • Apple
  • AT&T/Verizon/Discover/?Google/First Data
  • PayPal/?

More to come tomorrow.

Ruminations: Durbin and Debit

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13 Aug 2010

Time for a blog with many questions and few answers. My natural perspective is that of a banker. Banks are created to act as trusted intermediaries of commerce, and I’m concerned when their ability to act on this charter changes. I want banks to win and to create products that satisfy the customer, build trust, and effectively serve in commerce.

A friend and I were discussing the impact of Durbin’s 2 tier debit structure (Excellent analysis by Mercator here) on the incentives for large banks to continue to issue debit. My perspective (as a banker) has been greatly altered from my time at 41st parameter working with the largest retailers in the world. I’ve developed a new view and a new appreciation for the pain felt by merchants. It would not be too extreme a statement to say that there is a deep hatred of the cards networks. The feeling is both visceral and reasoned. I remember when a senior executive from Wal*Mart came to Wachovia for a presentation and was asked what he thought were appropriate interchange rates for credit and debit. He said “0” dead pan.. then during the quiet of the audience, he said “actually we think we should be paid for accepting your cards” and emphasized that this was not a joke.  

Will Merchants loose sleep if debit goes away? Answer probably rests with what will take its place. The retail banks are very unorganized around payments. With few exceptions (Chase, WFC, USAA, ..) bank payment executives do not get the focus of their retail organizations.  In general, retail banks are challenged to relate payments to profitability (and hence the overall retail strategy). Debit was a clear exception to this challenge and a “killer product” for cash/check replacement.

The bank value proposition for debit was clear. However, what was the merchant value proposition? Certainly reduction in check fraud, funds availability… but at what costs? The federal reserve studied interchange rates in graph to the right. What exactly drove this step creep? How did it drive value? What were the economic forces that pushed back against it? What additional investments did Visa/MA make in their network?

Will banks develop a debit replacement? Clearly Durbin has reduced banks incentives to push debit (w/ assets over $10B). I project that the market is ripe for a merchant friendly payment method that is much different than the products available today. Instead of funding the card product on merchant interchange.. perhaps mobile advertising?

Can banks/cards regain the trust of merchants as intermediaries of retail commerce? Could the wholesale or merchant acquisition business which drives a new payment product (ie Amex Revolution Money)?

 Thoughts appreciated

AT&T, Verizon in Mobile Money Newco w/ Discover and FirstData

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AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, .. create NewCo to deliver mobile payments w/ Discover

2 August 2010

In press today – Bloomberg Today – AT&T and Sprint to create prepaid venture

Previous Posts

Mainstream press has added a few additional details to what we outlined back in November. The biggest surprise to me is that Discover is the network partner (quite frankly I assumed it was Visa). Discover is an interesting partner, given its capabilities (issuer and acquirer) and reveals much about the mobile network operator (MNO) plans to bring a merchant friendly (lower interchange) strategy to market. It appears that First Data is in this alliance as well acting as the trusted service manager (TSM).  NewCo represents a major investment (rumors are that the major operators are investing north of $200M) and may start a new venture wave  in the valley as NewCo positions itself to be the “Google” of mobile advertising.

Don’t think about NewCo as a card business, think about this as the next Google and payments are the KEY that ties together the mobile, virtual and physical world. As I discussed in March:

Q: What will it mean when every AT&T subscriber receives a pre-paid Discover card with an NFC sticker?

Answers

  1. Tipping point for mobile commerce, ushering in a new era where the mobile phone can transact with a wallet that spans the virtual and physical world, aggregating every other account type and payment instrument.
  2. A new business for AT&T which could drive 30-60% growth in LT revenue
  3. Software REVOLUION. The “Next wave” for iPhone AND the entire mobile commerce ecosystem (see googlization)
  4. New mainstream marketing channel as couponing integrates with payment, location awareness and detailed knowledge consumer behavior/preferences
  5. Card business killer for Bank/Issuer revenue as MNO Pre-paid encroaches on the consumer relationship AND issuer debit/credit products (Decoupled Debit)
  6. Cash replacement for small value payments as merchants of all types adapt POS to accept NFC, and small merchants take out POS terminals in favor of making their phone a cash register
  7. .. would love to hear from you on the next 100…

There are at least 3 major elements to this announcement which warrant further discussion, as impact on the venture and payment community will be significant:

–          NewCo business model: It’s all about marketing and control

–          Payments shift from banks, Visa, and MA

–          Mobile payment value proposition. Can NewCo make this work for consumers and merchants?

Business Model

The AT&T Universal card changed the credit card landscape in 1990. AT&T demonstrated it could both create a card business AND leverage distribution muscle as it attracted over 10M card holders in under 2 years. Citi acquired the AT&T Universal card for $3.5B+ in 1997 and it remains the largest affiliate card in Citibank’s portfolio.

As I wrote back in November, The US market is ripe for a break from the 6 party political “fur ball” that is hampering delivery of mobile payment (Card Issuers, Acquirers, Network, Merchant, MNOs, Handset Mfg). For those outside the US, MNOs have substantial control over handset features and applications, and have been leveraging this “node control” to “influence” direction of payments. The central US MNO argument being: “it is our customer, our handset, our network we should get a cut of the transaction rev”. Unfortunately existing inter-bank mobile transfers/ payments are settled through existing payment networks that provide limited flexibility in accommodating a “new” MNO role and the network rules leave much room for improvement in: authorization, authentication and consumer “control”. The Discover partnership would appear to offer NewCo the opportunity to define new rules, rates and incentives for consumers and merchants to participate.

The key to unlocking this new business model is not interchange, but creating a new market for mobile advertising, NewCo will be to mobile advertising what Google was to online. For example, rumors are NewCo is attempting to consolidate $1-5B+ in Madison Avenue marketing spend in first year (See consumer scenario here). The MNOs are brilliant! Their collaborative efforts here are a severe threat to both banks and established payment networks. Widespread adoption of NFC will revolutionize consumer payments and may result in the next boom cycle for silicone valley. Make no mistake, NewCo will be the leader of the next great ecosystem.

More tomorrow.

CitiGold in NA – Kudos to Manuel

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27 July 2010

Admittedly I’ve been critical of Citi’s recent NA efforts (Bank of the Future, Bundle, …), but I’m a big fan of Manuel and the new Citigold strategy described in the FT Article above. This blog is addressed to companies looking to partner w/ Citi (insight into the labyrinth), as it is one of the most complex organizations to understand globally. If it makes you feel any better, its hard for people inside the organization as well.

For you outsiders.. Banamex is not a poor stepsister to anyone in retail. As a proof point, in Citi’s most recent quarter (2Q10) LATAM alone provided 2x the earnings of Citi North America. The BOD (and most in Citi) consider Manuel to be a banker’s banker, and in Citi’s Banamex franchise excellence attracts excellence. Over the last 3 years retail strategy has been stunted by the churn of executives in its top ranks, the loss of Ajay Banga was a particularly hard blow. Manuel’s experience combined with that of the LATAM team (and BOD support) position him well to “turn around” Citi NA; an audacious goal that will enhance Manuel’s position as successor to Vikram.

Under Teri Dial, thousands of man hours were spent by every Citi retail (and card) executive planning for “bank of the future”. While customer servicing, touch screens and iPhone apps are important.. you first need to get the customer into the store and sold on your products (in person or remotely).  Bank of the Future was an effort that frustrated Citi’s cadre of excellent business leaders; an empty strategy that gave no near term focus to BAU.. nor a “profitability” for the “future” end state.

Citi’s international retail franchise is a star globally: an affluent bank strategy with minimal branch footprint. Citi’s breadth of products and expertise was an original goal of the Sandy Weill’s supermarket. While loosing significant wealth talent and capability at the top end (with SSB’s $2.7 spin out), Citi still retains products and capabilities globally to serve the affluent segment in the US (just as it does internationally).

Manuel’s US CitiGold strategy is an excellent approach.  Citi is already an affluent bank (as shown in 2006 Comscore data below), maintaining average balances twice that of their nearest competitor (my rule of thumb is that the average BAC customer has twice the products, and the average Citi customer has twice the balances).

Re: US CitiGold, the international team has long questioned why the US continued to push sand up hill in a mass market focus given its minimal branch footprint (#9 as stated in WSJ article above). A new affluent focus will drive marketing, product and most importantly sales.. Citi DOES have unique capability, internationally it also maintains a great brand, let’s see if it can dust itself off for a premium US debut.

This new affluent US focus will not be without challenges, from both existing banks and new start ups (like Bill Harris’ SafeCorp Financial).  However, Citi’s capabilities uniquely resonate with several high end demographics that are already customers of its other lines of business (CEOs, Investment bankers, hedge fund managers, expats/international executives, CFOs, …). Internationally CitiGold services normally started with clients of the institutional side and expanded to the expat community. My guess is that Citi’s decision management team would say that the ability to sell CitiGold in the US (absent these connections) is not well established. On the execution side we will probably see many more relationship managers (wealth lite) pop up in the branches that do exist, and focused marketing efforts outside of mass media. Affluent is about brand and service.. which does align with a few of the CitiForward initiatives.

On the innovation side the “Citi Forward” concept has been around the table for quite some time. Evolving over the last 4 years and piloting itself in Citi Australia.  This is all good stuff: integrated financial management tools, comparison and cross selling. However all of this servicing will not bring you customers if the products are not competitively priced, limited marketing and no sales team (discussed in my previous post – Citi/Bundle). Hope to see Manuel empower a strong US retail head with a focused strategy that will empower them to take the reins of all technology and innovation activity. Citi has fantastic technical capability, but the business needs to focus it (particularly after the bank of the future mess).

Chase QuickPay and Quick Deposit

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25 July 2010 (Updated 20 Aug)

Chase has a stellar eCommerce and mobile team in both their retail and cards organization, and they are poised to deliver tremendous payment innovation across both of these business units. This innovation has been “in the works” over the last few years, and Jack Stephenson (PayPal’s former head of strategy) is fortunate to have  joined at a time where both the payment platform and team is gaining traction. This month the JPM retail team has delivered new capability in its iPhone versions of QuickPay and Quick Deposit products.

QuickPay Overview:

QuickPay is a JPM’s money movement “pay anyone” service that provides registration for both Chase and non Chase customers. Chase was very late to the money movement game, rolling out its first QuickPay service in 2008 (whereas Bank of America and Citi have been providing this since 2002  through CashEdge). From a strategy and organizational perspective, JPM is well known for their “preference” to develop applications internally. It may have taken some time for JPM to complete the QuickPay internal build, but in the current release it has surpassed the domestic capability (and usability) of all other banks. JPM is now the leader in retail online payments.

Non-Chase customers can register for QuickPay before or after receiving funds. For non customers, registration for QuickPay is similar to PayPal (or CashEdge’s PopMoney), with the QuickPay wallet currently constrained to single linked checking account. Chase customers have a streamlined enrollment process and the QuickPay functionality is integrated into their existing online experience (demo above). This differs substantially from BAC, where the same capability to transfer funds exists but the usability is very poor. BAC is missing a substantial opportunity to capture beneficiary phone/e-mail information, an unnecessary miss since the capability exists (BAC is Cashedge’s largest US customer but has not yet signed on with CashEdge’s mobile POP money service).  Beneficiary information is critical to maintaining an accurate directory.. the key element in any payment system. Chase’s QuickPay maintains e-mail, phone and other information which gives it a head start in the directory battle (subject of future blog).  Given Chase Paymentech’s role in acquisition (for card, paypal, …) you can see potential for further directory synergies internally.

Quick Deposit

The articles above provide a great overview of the new iPhone App, with Chase following in the footsteps of USAA’s Deposit@Mobile. Application is from Mitek Systems and it is just super, and for small merchants this may become the payment method of choice (when compared to card):

Merchant benefits:

  • No transaction costs (savings of 150-350bps)
  • Usability and simplified enrollment
  • Same day availability of funds
  • Fits existing consumer behavior pattern (checks)
  • Legal protections/enforceability (paper checks vs. electronic signature)
  • Instant verification, risk and fraud management
  • Leverages bank imaging systems and processes (regulatory and consumer receipt)
  • Notification/receipt to consumers

JPM Business Case

  • Check imaging (op expense)
  • Small business acquisition (Customer Net Revenue for SME = $3-$5k)
  • NRFF for non-customers (NIM on settlement funds held)
  • Future “directory” business case, cards growth
  • Prevention of DDA Account Number Breach

The JPM Quick Deposit application was reportedly built in-house, other Vendors such as EasCorp’s Depozip provide similar functionality. As for the success of this application, NetBanker reported USAA’s recent numbers for Deposit@Mobile. (update 20 Aug, my friends at BAC tell me that they have been trialing the Mitek application for almost 3 years now, fine tuning the app and the support process and are set for launch any day) .

Given that the audience for this blog (investors, start ups and innovators), you might ask why it takes 2 years for a bank to roll out this type of innovation. An excellent question! The iPhone app itself is the easy part, perhaps consisting of less then 20% of the overall budget. The “hard work” is in integrating it into existing systems and risk controls. For example, the primary value proposition, for QuickDeposit, is improving check acceptance and funds availability. At the teller line, banks have tools like DepositChek which allows the bank to determine if information on the check is correct and the account is in good standing (stopping check fraud before the check image gets into the system). These same tools must be integrated into the online and mobile process to reduce risk. I’ve picked this particular example because it is a tool unique to bank entities (not available to non-banks). In addition to the technical integration costs, banks have become very prudent in testing, and accessing impact of new functionality to call center support costs. Given the wide availability of both of these applications, it is essential that they are intuitive to JPM customers.

These applications are a great retail success. I understand that the JPM cards team is also poised for a major release in mobile soon (with multiple alliance partners). Well done JPM!

Enroll for QuickPay – www.chase.com/QuickPay

Overview of Quick Deposit  – www.chase.com/quickdeposit

Thoughts appreciated

Visa Payclick

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30 June 2010

Summary on Visa Payclick: “Partnering with banks” is very challenging…. do banks want Visa to deliver a “bank friendly” PayPal competitor.. or would banks prefer to create something they can control? View Payclick today as an Australia “test market” of something Visa intends to grow, with an initial consumer focus on digital goods.

Visa just launched Payclick (www.payclick.com.au) with plans to expand globally. I see this service competing more with Bango (see http://www.bango.com/) and payforit (www.payforit.com) than PayPal. There is no way for a consumer to withdraw funds placed in the wallet, or to be paid..  (it is not a wallet), it allows for the addition of current account funds through BPAY integration (note BPAY is a bank owned consortium in Australia providing common services like telephone and online bill payment). Allowing multiple funding instruments provides for a lower cost of funds, and BPAY penetration is over 80% in online customers. However the inability to credit the wallet, while  simplifying risk and fraud operational challenges, limits the consumer value proposition and the addressable market. Given these wallet restrictions, Visa has chosen an initial market focus on teens buying digital content… this narrow market focus may provide Visa the opportunity to “kick the tires” on the system before expanding it (geographically and demographically).

Re: Expansion.  I understand that Visa is “in flight” with expanding the AFT/OCT transaction set (See Patent) which is the heart of the Visa Money Transfer service. My global card contacts tell me that Visa is attempting to get issuers on board with credit push in an updated issuer agreement (see Visa Money Transfer Overview – Issuer presentation). The “incentive” for issuing bank to accept new agreement is a $0.50 revenue share. Banks are not biting on this (subject of another blog on Visa and card remittances).. hence my guess is that the Payclick service has “visions” for being bi-directional.. but not until issuers sign off on accepting OCT transactions.

We should not assess Payclick based solely upon current functionality, given Visa’s substantial investment here there must be plans for additional transaction types. The CYBS acquisition gives Visa assets to develop something much more comprehensive. For example, with the CYBS could serve as an acquirer for Payclick as a “light” tool for small merchants selling digital goods in mobile market places and app stores.  On the consumer side, Visa has a steep hill to climb in creating a value proposition which would drive consumers to store card information with Payclick (particularly given the competing payment methods above).

Risks I see for Visa in Payclick:

  • Initial target demographic is well served by both Bango, Paypal, iTunes Wallet, prepaid card (for my teen), payforit (UK), MNO billing, …
  • “Send only” functionality will not create critical mass in either consumers or merchants
  • Banks will not bite on OCT transaction set and service functionality will not be able to expand
  • Visa will loose focus after core innovation team departs
  • CYBS can acquire and service… but it will take serious marketing dollars to create a new consumer brand… as well as a solid value proposition.

Add these risks to Visa’s existing “dynamic” with  retailers (a group that is not favorably inclined toward assisting Visa nor any card network) in creating another payment type  (issues w/ interchange, compliance, fraud, payment system integrity, ..). Since Visa’s IPO,  Banks are no longer in control and also view Visa’s efforts through a new competitive lens. Banks also like the idea of having their own brand on payments. Thus, Visa is stuck managing a complex 4 party system with limited ability to create an innovative value proposition which all parties can agree on.

Visa is facing head on competition from “unshackled” teams like PayPal. In fact PayPal just launched mobile instant checkout today .

Feedback appreciated

Emerging Markets: MMU Revenue Challenge

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4 June 2010

Subject: In this post I attempt to estimate “critical mass” financial numbers for a mobile money to the unbanked (MMU) service to be sustainable.

I’m a few weeks late in publishing this, it just slipped off my radar. Attended the GSMA Mobile Money Summit last month in Rio. Great people in attendance, although the event itself leaved much to be desired.  The MNOs had a focused set of meetings on the opening Monday covering “how to work with regulators” which is certainly a key to success. I was struck by the volume numbers in country pilots.. they are so small.

Safaricom released earnings at the beginning of the month. This data coupled with the data from the Mar 2010 Gates foundation report provides insight into the challenges faced by new payment mechanisms in other emerging markets. Market approaches will surely be tested as other countries attempt to replicate the MPESA success. It has taken 3 years, and some very unique market conditions, for Safaricom drive this service into profitability. 

Summary

  • MNOs must reach around 8M users (or around $300-500M per month GDV) to break even
  • Bill Payment is key to driving payment volume in emerging markets
  • Without a regulatory partnership everyone looses. Phillipines wins prize for best bank, MNO, regulatory partnership in the world.. if you want an example of success talk to Rizza at GCASH.

Safaricom Revenue Data

Safaricom Annual Report shows MPESA “Total Annual Revenue” of 7.56B KES ($93M USD, 9.48M users) for the year. Gross Volume is not published.. but there is other “anecedotal data” to give more color:

  • transferred a cumulative Sh405 billion since launch
  • US $320 million per month in person-to-person (P2P) transfers
  • US $650 million per month in cash deposits and withdrawal transactions at M-PESA stores (Gates foundation)
  • Average Sh1.8 billion a day ($670M per mo total). In Earnings release. (does not align w/ number above)
  • Grew from 5M to 9M users in 2009
  • Interest from $1B+ settlement funds is not included in either Vodafone nor Safaricom’s earnings. Understand there is agreement between CBK and other parties to use for infrastructure, education and microfinance.
  • Note: The Gates foundation numbers on P2P and Tran volume seem high.. I’ve never had them before

Calculation

  • Given growth of 100%, assume average 2010 (May-May) volume GDV of 320+650/2 = $485M USD
  • Monthly revenue of $93M/12 = $7.75
  • Take Rate = 7.75/485 = 160bps (seems about right)

Previous/Related Posts

Obopay/Mastercard

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http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_107/mastercard-offers-cash-transfer-app-1020320-1.html

Am I the only one that thinks this is a little sad? Why would you roll out a service that can’t be used (no banks signed up for it)? Obopay has built an iPhone app for the Money Send service.. the only way to make it work is for both the sender and reciever to have a Bancorp pre-paid card.  They should have probably sit on this until they get a bank signed up.. ? Given that Obopay has MSB licenses in 48 states.. recievers could get notified, registered, link bank accounts and get cash 3-5 business days later after they validate bank account? sound convenient to you?

Mobile Advertising Battle: Beyond the Internet

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10 June 2010

Apple is brilliant!

Having just read today today’s WSJ Article- Google Blasts Apple on iAd Rules, a few random thoughts started to coalesce (which doesn’t happen as often as it used to) into a new ‘‘investment perspective’ on mobile advertising.

Yesterday Magna estimated that online advertising will climb 12.4% in 2010 to $61.0B and surpass $100B by 2013. For perspective, AFP reports that advertisers will spend $59.6B on TV ads and around $600M on mobile advertising (eMarkerter, $1.3B by 2013). The growth here is just astounding, there is little wonder for the transactions over the last 3 years:

  • MSFT aQuantive $6B (May 2007)
  • Google DoubleClick $3.2B (April 2007)
  • Google AdMob $650M (May 2010)
  • Apple Quattro Wireless (Jan 2010)

In my experiences as global buyer, online was by far the most cost effective way to acquire a customer (with SEM the most cost effective). From my perspective, Online Advertising brought a solution to the challenge faced by marketers for decades: data. Finally I could relate marketing spend to customer acquisition. Marketing went from throwing a blanket.. to a shotgun.. In 2005-2007 this shotgun was very hard to use.. particularly outside of the US. Although most agencies were well versed in spending through Ad Networks for display ads, few had any experience in SEM across search providers. Those Agencies that did still did not provide tools for my teams (buyers) to calculate CPA (determining which ads resulted in customer acquisition). Hence, large companies had to develop their own internal expertise or manage their spend directly with a chosen few suppliers (eg. GOOGLE). Internal marketing thus took on the form shown below.

The Ad industry recognizes that the ability to track a customer is key to measuring effectiveness, target ads and thereby key to greater marketing spend. There are a number of technical solutions which have developed over the last 3-4 years, tagging customers with cookies is all something we are familiar with.  Apple’s strategy in defining standard for “tracking” is challenging Google’s unique position as the “starting point” of a customer’s online activity. It moves the starting point to the iPhone device. This is a brilliant move by Apple given its 50M iPhones (and 30M iTouches), particularly when you look at the demographic of the owners and the media capabilities of this killer mobile appliance.

Apple’s plans to take ownership of the iPhone’s “Ad Ecosystem” will not end with these standards. In the online advertising model, the objective was an online acquisition. In the mobile ad model the objective is for either an acquisition online or at a physical point of sale (POS). The mobile device is in a unique position as a point of convergence between the virtual and physical world. In this model the iAD/mobile market expands from mobile advertising (as a sub category of online advertising) to generating store traffic at the POS. The challenge for a iAD at POS is similar to the “customer tracking” challenge described above.. how do I know the customer went to the store? Answers: coupons, payment, geolocation, …

Expect Apple and the MNOs to become very active in linking mobile advertising to these activities (ex Apple’s NFC patent, MNO prepaid consortium). The linking of card data to mobile advertising (consumer behavior and preferences) also provides a tremendous opportunity Banks/Issuers to monetize consumer information (see Googlization of Financial Services).

We may be seeing the beginning of a seismic change in advertising spend, and the way consumers are tracked and targeted. The “addressable market” for mobile advertising should not be viewed as a subset of online spend, both because of POS opportunities and the media richness (and now multi-tasking) of the iPhone. Apple’s strategy is brilliant, I would imagine them taking a regulatory position that all ad networks are welcome to work through their standard…. Apple is protecting customers’ privacy.

Related Content

April 2010 online ad spending report

Thoughts appreciated

Random Thoughts

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7 June 2010

Rumor Mill

Paypal’s new virtual terminal may be just in time. Rumor is Visa is planning a slew of new product announcements in next month.. from NFC, to mobile coupons to bringing down the barriers of card acceptance. Perhaps this is the primary driver for the CYBS acquisition, there must have been a dependency given the multiple paid.

Thought for the day: What  is “banking innovation”?

How many times per day do you really want to check your bank balance? From how many different devices? Is comparing yourself to others innovation?

From my perspective a “killer” customer value proposition (in any market) is making “up market” premium services available to the masses. How would you like to be treated like a client of a private bank? Your bills are paid, your lawn is mowed and your dog is walked… You have a relationship with the banker, he is invited to your children’s wedding. He actually knows your name when you walk into the office or call him on the phone…. and he also consistently delivers superior market returns to your portfolio.

As a bank customer.. does your bank know who you are? your history with them? What your goals are? Is it any wonder that bank customers are rate driven? There is no relationship (or trust) in the average mass market portfolio of a large national bank. Why do customers select a bank today? (sorry for stale data)

Banks know that Customer Satisfaction strongly equates to profitability, and retention. Customer focused innovation starts with focusing on what your customers need… I’m surprised at the lack of effort here…. What would my top area be?  That’s easy.. financial education. Banks that help educate customers stand a very good chance of building better relationships, and increasing wallet share. Today I’m left with an “apply” button on my brokerage tab for Wachovia, Citi, Chase, Wells.. the average customer doesn’t want to apply for an account until they understand how this “product” will serve them and gain insight into how BankX’s services compete.

Who will take on financial education 301? I don’t really want banking to be “fun” (aka Virgin).. I want it to be serious and thoughtful.. US retail banking is just plain backward when it comes to innovative products (Foreign currency accounts, structured products, international equities, …). Perhaps there is a “catch 22” with our collective financial literacy.. or lack thereof.

Examples

The banks above have obviously invested time thinking about this, however my guess is that few current customers know about (or use) any of these services.

What would a private banker do for a new relationship? He would probably try to find out my risk tolerance and develop a plan to better manage cash (ex sweep account) and investments with consideration for taxes and personal plans. Why are banks outsourcing this to a CFP?  Of course the answer is that banks are product focused (as opposed to customer focused), there is great margin in that 0.25% CD that grandma buys.. also a great source of liquidity which drives Tier 1 capital and my bond rating (cost of capital).  All of this seems to point to great opportunities for small banks, particularly those that cater to affluent (Aquestabank and their 1.2% CD).

It seems that the ABA and OCC are frowning on deposit competition right now, a heavy price for consumers.. take a look at rates in the UK this week (http://www.moneysupermarket.com/savings/) . The incentives for the large banks is to act as a “late follower”… after all until balance run off occurs there is little incentive to change.. US branches (and their sales teams) continue to excel in generating margin.. with consumers poorly equipped to evaluate options.

Make no mistake, the consumer market will change..  Will banks that depend on customer illiteracy for success will have adapting? US banks are very fortunate that the average consumer is not a British replica… where  consumer “rate hopping” is at an extreme … perhaps Mint, bank rate, and money supermarket will get more traction and bring greater transparency..

Thoughts appreciated.