Google just completed a massive “relaunch” of Google Pay this week.
Without POS integration AND Retail data sharing this will not work.. the customer experience is terrible, as is the campaign’s restriction on basket level discounts. The ubiquity of cards is attractive.. as is bank data on “Store preferences”…. But both work to the detriment of retailers.
27 March 2012
We see in the press that Google/MA have gone beta with Card Linked Offers, and Bank of America is about to go live with “BankAmeriDeals”. I last gave an overview of this space back in November in my Card Linked Offers post. For those that haven’t seen it, there is also a must read blog by Reed Hoffman in Forbes on the subject: The Card is the new App Platform.
Here is my blog from 3+ yrs ago – Googlization of Financial Services – outlining data flow. My purpose is mentioning this blog is not to show how smart I am (as an alternate view is already firmly established), but rather to highlight how much my view on the opportunity has changed over the last 3.5 years. As I tell all of the 12 start ups in the CLO space.. if Visa couldn’t get this to work what makes you think that it will be easy for anyone else.
There is a CORE business problem I didn’t realize back then.. merchants don’t like cards and are VERY reluctant to create ANY unique content (offers) where card redemption is REQUIRED. Further constraining the “capabilities” of CLO is lack of item detail information within the purchase transaction. IBM is the POS for 80% of the worlds to 30 retailers. Take a look at the 4690 overview here, notice what incentive solution is integrated? This was a 5 yr project for Zavers…
A story to illustrate my point on retailer reluctance. As most of you know POS manufactures like IBM, Micros, NCR, Aloha are implementing POS integration solutions similar to what Zavers has done. Most of the CLO companies above are paying the POS manufactures to write an “adapter” that will work within their POS and communicate basket detail information. (ISIS is rumored to have a 200 page Spec for this POS integration as well). There is a very big difference between having integration capability, and a RETAILERS agreeing to use it (ie share data). There must be a business value proposition for retailers to move… and I can tell you with a great deal of certainty.. Retailers don’t like the BANK card platform.
I emphasize BANK for a reason.. I was with the CMOs of 3 large retailers a few months ago. When asked what their payment preferences where, they answered without hesitation: Store Card. This is their most profitable product used by their most loyal customers (think private label). Do you think for a moment that a Retailer would deliver “incentives” to customers that are not in this group.. Remember, these PVL loyal customers also hold a number of other bank cards, and there is not much in the way of customer matching between data sets. I think you get my point.
As I stated previously, all offers businesses are highly dependent on targeting. Targeting is dependent on customer data, relevant content, effective distribution (SMS, e-mail, an App), campaign management (A/B testing, offer type, target audience, …). Campaign management is very dependent on feedback. There are very few companies that can effectively TARGET and DISTRIBUTE. The current group of CLOs is partnering with the banks to solve the targeting problem (example Catera/Citi, Cardlytics/BAC, …). This is further EXASERBATING the poor Retail adoption. Why? Here is what a CMO told me:
“Tom, lets say a consumer just shops at Nordstrom.. the card network and bank see that I just completed the transaction and now market to them … the advert is “go to Macy’s and save 20% on your next purchase”… Given that they can only offer basket level incentives this is how it must work… Tom do you know what will happen? The customer will return what they just bought and go to Macy’s and get it. How is this good for Retail?”
From an Ad Targeting/Distribution perspective, Mobile Operators certainly have an eye on this ball (mobile phone). But only a few companies like Placecast can actually deliver it for them. MNOs are truly messed up in this marketing space (within the US). If you had the CEOs of Verizon, ATT and ISIS in a room and asked “who owns mobile advertising”?.. ISIS would say nothing if both of the other CEOs were in the room.. They want it.. but no one will give it to them as they can’t execute with what they have in this space. Verizon would say “many partners”… Their preference would be to sell the platform akin to their $550M search sale to Microsoft in 2009. So VZ wants a $1B+ Ad platform sale… who would compete for that business? I digress.. but what is in place today looks much more like a rev share… Internationally there are carriers with their act together: Telefonica and SingTel (just bought Admobi).
Let me end this CLO diatribe with a customer experience view. Let’s assume I have 12 CLO players.. each partnered with a different bank/network. Also assume that all are heavily dependent on e-mail distribution. I have 6 different cards.. and will be getting at least 6 e-mails per week with basket level discounts. Now assuming that I can keep track of which offer was tied to which card.. and use the card. I’m still left at the POS with a receipt that shows none of these basket level discounts (as they are “credited” to my account after purchase).
Without POS integration AND Retail data sharing this will not work.. the customer experience is terrible, as is the campaign’s restriction on basket level discounts. The ubiquity of cards is attractive.. as is bank data on Consumer “Store preferences”…. But both work to the detriment of retailers. What consumers will see in CLO for some time is the generic 10-20% off your next purchase that will also be available in direct mail campaigns… Let’s just hope that someone can work the double redemption problem…
My read on this for Google is a little different. Google is positioning itself as a neutral platform.. it can do Retailer Friendly.. Bank Friendly… MNO Friendly.. Manufacturer Friendly… Each will have different adoption dynamics. Google’s objectives are likely: gain insight, be the central platform for marketing spend, be the most effective distributor of content, … . This offer beta would certainly seem to be a “bone” thrown to banks.. hey… here it is … good luck trying to make it work.
16 Jan 2012
GDOT Bank – Federal Reserve Authorization
GDOT bought Bonneville Bancorp for $15.7M + $14M Capital Infusion on 8 Dec 2011. Bonneville was a Utah licensed state bank and a Fed member (regulated by Fed). This is a very significant deal for several reasons:
- Sets a new regulatory guidepost in the creation of “national” bank with a pre-paid focus. See Bank Talk article on how GDOT was able to get Fed Approval, specifically around CRA responsibilities.
- Is essentially WMT’s retail bank for consumer services (WMT owns ~15% of GDOT)
- Model for future deals in State Chartered banks (particularly for retailers)
- Highlights need for reassessment of “pure play” banks in pre-paid space (ex. Meta)
- NEW PRODUCT potential in interest bearing pre-paid accounts targeted to the lower mass market
This is a brilliant move by the Fed, and by GDOT. The Fed is rightly concerned about the fact that the bottom 4 deciles of customers are no longer profitable for the big banks.. and there is an exodus. How does the US financial system retain customers in the lower mass? GDOT and WMT believe it is not through the typical branch model. Just as with Tesco in the UK, Retailers are proving to be excellent distributors of banking services. Retailers do not need to make their margins on bank services alone, in fact banking services improves the overall retail value proposition, brand and loyalty. The same holds for mobile operators internationally. Why should I pay for all of those branches and sales people if all I need are basic payment services?
I joined Citi in 2006 with the mandate to grow the retail business without growing the number of branches. Creating the ING direct competitors.. the HOOK was high yield savings. GDOT bank could be catalyst for a new retail banking model, with a HOOK associated with “payment”, retail convenience, loyalty and data use.
What are the core product innovations? Here is my list:
- Combining a GPR card with retailer brand and distribution (WMT). Banks normally have to seek charters that enable them to operate nationally (ex. Fed, the now defunct Thrift, …) when doing business in multiple states. Virtual GPR cards don’t have this problem as consumers are buying a banking product in another state.
- Stand alone consumer value proposition. GPR card that can earn interest on funds held on balance. GDOT/WMT also have a established a rate structure that is one of the best in the business.
- WMT’s integrated value proposition. International transfers ( WalMart owns part of MGI they are 30% of MGI’s TPV), International Banking (Mexico, Canada, GDOT, …), StraightTalk prepaid mobile, … they have all the components to deliver value. Can they bring it all together?
Banking is a network business.. the GDOT opportunity is to build the network quickly through key retailers (as physical distribution). What other innovations can they bring to market? At the top of my list would be instant credit (Paypal BillMeLater does this through a WebBank a Utah ILC). Or real time transfers to any bank (using $0.58 Fed wire…).
Today, MSBs are restricted in both offering interest on accounts and the length of time they can hold a balance (escheatment). There will be some regulatory scrutiny by the State Regulators on how cash in/out is performed at the physical retail outlet, and what constitutes a “bank”. From the Retailer’s perspective, the GDOT card is a product which can be bought (buy $100 GDOT reload), with cash out from ATM or through a Mastercard purchase. GDOT is a licensed MSB in 39 States (according to their 10-k) with a network of 50,000 cash in/out locations. Previously GE Money was the US bank for the WMT MoneyCard. A single state licensed bank owned by an MSB network may face some state regulatory scrutiny. GDOT can probably address by keeping as separate legal entity with its own BOD and capital.
If I were thinking of starting the next PayPal… I would skip getting MSB licenses in 47 states and start looking for a Utah bank I could buy.
What to look for:
- Retailers following this model (including ISIS, Amazon, …). Particularly retailers serving lower mass market
- Salary d0miciliation (direct deposit) onto a card
- Future of GE Money. GE has been looking to sell Mark Begor’s business for some time. It is subscale, and WalMart is its largest US customer. My guess is that WMT had to develop fall back plans in case GE did sell the business. I would not be surprised to see GDOT bank be the primary bank behind the MoneyCard.. but it hasn’t happened yet.
- Pre-paid processors and platforms looking to create their own brands.. or change their relationships to retail branded banks
- MSBs moving toward a state bank license. Issue is cash in/out. MSBs that require their own branded physical distribution will keep MSB license… those that are virtual will move to GDOT model.
- Consumers making switch to a “new” banking model centered around payments.
- Semi closed payment networks with integrated loyalty and incentives.
- New Payment Banks which make money on marketing and data (not interchange). See Googlization
For those interested in a Utah Bank.. please call my favorite Utah Banker.. Crawford Cragun..
Your thoughts are appreciated. As always sorry for the typos and the brevity.
2011 has been a rough start for mobile payments. Early bets in the space are running out of cash, and established industry players are placing $1B+ bets to compete with new MNO ecosystems.
10 January 2011
I learned my lessons on the Valley hype cycle early (from the source). In 1997, at the ripe old age of 32, I joined GartnerGroup with the goal of participating in a great research and advisory team. Well… that lasted about 11 months. I learned that there was no research and their business model never broke away from its roots as a division of McGraw Hill. It was all about reporting, writing, buzz and sensationalism (with a very few exceptions .. Schulte/SOA). It was great fun listening to buyers of IT talking about new products issues and then meeting with the software vendors (with more information on hand then their product heads had) to watch them watching them turn green. But fun aside, I wanted to go run a business…. not become an industry analyst (this blog serves as an outlet for my minor competencies here).
The Gartner experience reinforced the importance of marketing in creating new products, of creating “buzz”. After all IT periodicals and research firms must fill their pages with something every week. Of course ISVs and start ups are happy to oblige… Buyers and Investors must be able to cut through the fog and assess business viability, valuation and risk. My data indicates that mobile payments is at the top of the hype cycle. I read the Nov 2010 Javelin report on mobile with great amusement: $7B in P2P mobile transactions in 2010!? I would be very surprised if the number broke $100M. Obviously the $7B number is driven by Javelin’s methodology, perhaps a mobile payment includes when I get an SMS message that my bank paid a bill….
Javelin’s methodology obviously does NOT include looking at financial statements. If it had (and the $7B number were real), we would not have seen the continued bloodshed in the space. 2011 has been a rough start for mobile payments. Early bets in the space are running out of cash, and established industry players are placing $1B+ bets to compete with new MNO ecosystems. An industry status of early movers here:
- QCom pulling plug on Firethorn
- Citi/SKT exiting MMV
- Obopay’s CEO out, burned through $130M of capital, $4M in REV for 2010, exiting US market, Nokia to lead India (Obopay takes operations)
- Monitise (Visa’s primary bet in this space) had revenue of less than 5M GBP
In every case above, there was complete failure in a value proposition. For Example, Obopay charging $0.50 to send money. The key lesson learned (over and over) is: small companies cannot LEAD development of a payment network. The industry is replete with examples which substantiate this point(see list here). Payment networks are 2 sided, and compete against well entrenched competitors with deep pockets. Payment networks must start with delivering value to 2 parties (ex PayPal Consumer to EBAY). Going at consumers alone (p2p) or as a bank partner alone (Monitise) will not drive volume. As Clayton Christensen asks in Innovator’s Solution: “what problem are you solving”? Moving money through a phone does not create value.
To be clear, there is a very real potential for mobile payments (and NFC) to be the driver 100s of new companys. But their business models must deliver value today (example NFC to unlock doors), or serve in a supporting role to new industry ecosystems. This supporting role requires a FUNDEMENTAL change in how valley firms typically operate: Start Ups must learn to work with and support multiple large companies and ecosystems. Supporting ecosystems is a B2C model.. NOT a direct to consumer model. This supporting role has new risks, as VivoTech (one of my favorite companies) has learned. Small Companies which support emerging ecosystems are challenged to influence their overall shape and value proposition. Further, if transaction volume is low, there is minimal revenue or pricing power without a clear value proposition (see Google/Boku).
New ventures operating within NFC ecosystems have prospect of attracting 30-50% of the $6B in mobile venture capital. Investors should be wary of hype and tag along investing as risk profiles are unique (ie NFC ecosystem play vs. consumer mobile app). Look hard at the talent running the company (see investors guide). Social networks are much different than payment networks. Payment networks require alliances, regulatory/risk acumen, understanding of history, experience and relationships (see key skills). Banks can win in the move to electronic payments. The top 5 US banks are in a much better position to influence ecosystem development (see lessons learned) than the mid tier, however the mid tier is in a much better position to partner (ex. Barclays US in Discover).
Deal of the Week
From a valuation perspective, the latest “head scratcher” in mobile payments is Square’s $27.5M raise at a $240M Valuation. From VentureBeat:
Rabois acknowledged, but he pointed out that Square is already achieving impressive growth without paying for traditional advertising or other promotions. He said Square is processing millions of dollars in transactions every week, and that it’s signing up 30,000 to 50,000 new merchants every month. Rabois said many of those merchants were previously cash-only, but they were attracted by Square’s ease-of-use (the card-reading device plugs into iPhones, iPads, and Android phones) and low financial risk
I estimate they are doing about $20-$30M TPV per week (5k users $5k/wk) this translates into revenue run rate of $6M/yr … which would equate valuation of $240M to 40x REVENUE. Square may have 30k downloads of their iPhone app /wk, but does that translate into transactions. This valuation is NOT based upon financials, but upon the people involved in this company. Existing investors took a bigger stake.. they have every right to set the price. This makes complete sense, particularly if they are looking for a Revolution Money kind of exit.
Citi just went live with Cashedge’s POP Money service. Citi is now the leader in mobile payments for both retail (this service) and card. Congrats to the Citi team for getting this done.
28 October 2010
Citi just went live with Cashedge’s POP Money service. Citi is now the leader in mobile payments for both retail (this service) and card. Congrats to the Citi team for getting this done.
You may ask why does POP Money position Citi above Chase’s QuickPay? The answer is network and integration. With Quickpay, it only works if you are a Chase customer or you go through the registration process. With POP Money, Cashedge can deliver direct to account distribution to every one of its 100+ enrolled banks, as well as manage risk in transfers to accounts at its largest retail bank customers (Citi, BofA and Wachovia all use Cashedge for external transfers). The customer experience is also integrated into online banking and the funds transfer process.
From a network perspective, PayPal is the only other company which could surpass Cashedge in number of “links” to deposit accounts (~30M, ~20M respectively). The key difference is Cashedge is a bank service provider and has much better risk controls for P2P transfers (as opposed to online purchases of goods). As a bank service provider, it is also integrated into key bank risk infrastructure (ex. Early Warning’s DepositChek).
It would seem that Bank of America and Wells are intent on following Chase down the road of building a home grown system. Quite a shame, as Cashedge is a bank friendly vendor helping to keep banks at the center of emerging payments. The bank battle is not a technology one, it is against non banks and customer mindshare. Citi clearly recognizes this, keeping control of payments and delivering value while minimizing execution risk. I hope BAC and WFC will move in same direction, doing your own thing may satisfy the NIH folks.. but creating a bank owned service which can be used by any bank customer means that you will eventually need to integrate to POP money… at some point.
Manuel’s US CitiGold strategy is an excellent approach. Citi’s international retail franchise is a star globally: an affluent bank strategy with minimal branch footprint. Citi’s breadth of products and expertise was an original goal of the Sandy Weill’s supermarket. While loosing significant wealth talent and capability at the top end (with SSB’s $2.7 spin out), Citi still retains products and capabilities globally to serve the affluent segment in the US (just as it does internationally).
27 July 2010
- Financial Times – July 27
- Business Week – July 27
- Previous Blog – Citi “Bank of the future”
- Previous Blog: Citi – Branch Strategy and Bundle
- WSJ – Citi to cut back to 6 Metro Regions
Admittedly I’ve been critical of Citi’s recent NA efforts (Bank of the Future, Bundle, …), but I’m a big fan of Manuel and the new Citigold strategy described in the FT Article above. This blog is addressed to companies looking to partner w/ Citi (insight into the labyrinth), as it is one of the most complex organizations to understand globally. If it makes you feel any better, its hard for people inside the organization as well.
For you outsiders.. Banamex is not a poor stepsister to anyone in retail. As a proof point, in Citi’s most recent quarter (2Q10) LATAM alone provided 2x the earnings of Citi North America. The BOD (and most in Citi) consider Manuel to be a banker’s banker, and in Citi’s Banamex franchise excellence attracts excellence. Over the last 3 years retail strategy has been stunted by the churn of executives in its top ranks, the loss of Ajay Banga was a particularly hard blow. Manuel’s experience combined with that of the LATAM team (and BOD support) position him well to “turn around” Citi NA; an audacious goal that will enhance Manuel’s position as successor to Vikram.
Under Teri Dial, thousands of man hours were spent by every Citi retail (and card) executive planning for “bank of the future”. While customer servicing, touch screens and iPhone apps are important.. you first need to get the customer into the store and sold on your products (in person or remotely). Bank of the Future was an effort that frustrated Citi’s cadre of excellent business leaders; an empty strategy that gave no near term focus to BAU.. nor a “profitability” for the “future” end state.
Citi’s international retail franchise is a star globally: an affluent bank strategy with minimal branch footprint. Citi’s breadth of products and expertise was an original goal of the Sandy Weill’s supermarket. While loosing significant wealth talent and capability at the top end (with SSB’s $2.7 spin out), Citi still retains products and capabilities globally to serve the affluent segment in the US (just as it does internationally).
Manuel’s US CitiGold strategy is an excellent approach. Citi is already an affluent bank (as shown in 2006 Comscore data below), maintaining average balances twice that of their nearest competitor (my rule of thumb is that the average BAC customer has twice the products, and the average Citi customer has twice the balances).
Re: US CitiGold, the international team has long questioned why the US continued to push sand up hill in a mass market focus given its minimal branch footprint (#9 as stated in WSJ article above). A new affluent focus will drive marketing, product and most importantly sales.. Citi DOES have unique capability, internationally it also maintains a great brand, let’s see if it can dust itself off for a premium US debut.
This new affluent US focus will not be without challenges, from both existing banks and new start ups (like Bill Harris’ SafeCorp Financial). However, Citi’s capabilities uniquely resonate with several high end demographics that are already customers of its other lines of business (CEOs, Investment bankers, hedge fund managers, expats/international executives, CFOs, …). Internationally CitiGold services normally started with clients of the institutional side and expanded to the expat community. My guess is that Citi’s decision management team would say that the ability to sell CitiGold in the US (absent these connections) is not well established. On the execution side we will probably see many more relationship managers (wealth lite) pop up in the branches that do exist, and focused marketing efforts outside of mass media. Affluent is about brand and service.. which does align with a few of the CitiForward initiatives.
On the innovation side the “Citi Forward” concept has been around the table for quite some time. Evolving over the last 4 years and piloting itself in Citi Australia. This is all good stuff: integrated financial management tools, comparison and cross selling. However all of this servicing will not bring you customers if the products are not competitively priced, limited marketing and no sales team (discussed in my previous post – Citi/Bundle). Hope to see Manuel empower a strong US retail head with a focused strategy that will empower them to take the reins of all technology and innovation activity. Citi has fantastic technical capability, but the business needs to focus it (particularly after the bank of the future mess).
It seems as if AT&T has pulled together Verizon and Sprint to form a new venture to focus on pre-paid.
Mobile Ad start ups… watch out… the big fish are coming …
It seems as if AT&T has pulled together Verizon and T-Mobile to form a new venture to focus on pre-paid. The large US Card Issuers are now aware (and quite suprised) of the move . It is doubtful that this new US entity (NewCo) will reach as far as Canada’s Enstream in mobile platform collaboration, but the focus of this initiative is mobile payment (NFC and P2P) and mobile advertising.
MNOs see a “Google like” future in mobile advertising, as they attempt to monetize their tremendous customer knowledge. For those that have ever purchased online advertising, we know that the biggest challenge in justifying spend is to move beyond “cost per click” to cost per customer acquisition or purchase. This Ad-Purchase disconnect is particularly true when purchase is made in the physical world. Mobile has the potential to bring together these two worlds, but a “key” is needed. MNOs and Banks see this “key” as a a common payment instrument available to all customers. NewCo is therefore planning to control (issue or manage) a common pre-paid card which will serve as this transaction key and give MNOs the remaining tool necessary to coordinate focused mobile advertising.
Given that NewCo doesn’t yet have the CEO in place there is probably much left open (with respect to business plan and services). At a minimum I believe they will act as issuer, and create common services to address mobile advertising and payment.
Message for VCs and Start-Ups:
- Assess risk of current path vs. supporting this new “collaborative” MNO ecosystem.
- Investments “tied” to this new ecosystem will have different risk profile, particularly in navigating more complex environment.
- Mobile advertising “pure plays” which do not touch financial transaction will be at a significant disadvantage. Ecosystems are forming based upon: Platform, Service (ie search), Network, Payment Instrument and bank.
- Adapt.. A “dynamic” strategy which will keep your IP “in play” is necessary.
- Winners will have the right talent that can navigate with the “big fish” and the right BOD that can help you evolve your strategy.
- Think Global. Ecosystems will likely evolve differently globally, particularly in Asia.
- Using financial information for advertising will touch privacy and regulatory issues. Regulated entities (Banks, MNOs, Payment Networks) are best positioned to deal with these. However, large MNOs and Banks have poor track records in “innovation” and moving collectively.
In short, it remains to be seen whether MNOs will be able to take on role as “orchestrator” of mobile advertising, or just a provider of location, reputation, authentication and transaction services. How MNOs monetize these services will be driven as much by their ability to execute as investor expectations and competing models.
Will Citi/MasterCard beat AT&T/Visa to market with a US NFC sticker rollout?… Regardless of who is first out of the gate, I think it will be a win/win for both institutions as significant marketing money is necessary to get this moving. Citi has the upper hand w/ numerous NFC pilots, established card marketing and 55M card accounts. MasterCard will likely leverage the Blaze Mobile application.
8 April 2009
As a friend told me this week “if you put an NFC sticker on a bicycle.. is that mobile payment?” Sure a sticker on the back of a phone is not necessarily “Mobile payment” but NFC has taken so long.. who cares? Lets just get started!
Will Citi/MasterCard beat BAC/Visa to market with a US NFC sticker rollout?… Regardless of who is first out of the gate, I think it will be a win/win for both institutions as significant marketing money is necessary to get this moving. Citi has the upper hand w/ numerous NFC pilots, established card marketing and 55M card accounts.
Although Citi is first out of the gate, Visa has put together a much more impressive array of services which will work for any card and any bank, with more thoughtful “integration” (See FirstData/Device Fidelity/Monitise).
“Let the NFC games begin”.
Note to NFC times:
This US initiative did not originate in Citi’s growth ventures, but rather with US Cards (likely led by mobile guru Kurt Weiss).
18 March 2010
Good article.. just a little “too kind”. Citi learned that 2,000 customers found Obopay to be a neat way to give kids their allowance. Of course Citi had higher hopes.. but a sender pays model has rather poor incentives in kick starting a “new network” and consumer behavior (See Citi is out of Obopay). For those in the industry looking for lessons here, Paybox learned them the hard way in the EU. Obopay’s failure is nothing new.. changing consumer payment behavior is hard. Obopay added a few extra challenges as it attempted to execute a payments business plan with an inexperienced team.
Mobile P2P payments is firmly in the Gartner “hype cycle” stage within developed countries.. The short term future for NFC (at the POS) is quite exciting, particularly with AT&T/Visa’s pending pre-paid card. Within emerging markets, Mobile payment is a game changer for MNOs and the unbanked. The ability of any US tech companies to compete within this emerging market opportunity is TBD as NGOs and MNOs throw substantial resources at the problem.
Interesting to see Obopay start positioning as check (i.e. cash) replacement service. So would you pay $0.25+1.5% of your transaction so that you could provide convenience to a merchant? Me? I think I’ll tell the merchant to take my check.
Hey if the first business strategy doesn’t work… move on.. Jack Dorsey’s square model is focused in a good space (not too keen on his solution though). Obopay.. back to the drawing board.
Spoke to most of the top 5 US banks this week. Neither Obopay nor Firethorn will have any traction at the top US banks.
2 March 2010
Spoke to most of the top 5 US banks this week. Interesting to note that Firethorn is out of all of them.. even in the model where Firethorn paid one of the majors $1M to take the application and integrate it. As of the latest QCOM 10-Q we can now see that total Firethorn revenue was $3M for the 2009 YEAR! Wow.. no wonder Len lost his head for buying this thing and making it a separate division.
QCOM and Firethorn have a new product planned: SWAGG (www.swagg.com). Good luck trying to figure out what this thing is.. could this be associated with Visa/ATT? (Youtube here). There seems to be a pre-paid debit card associated with it (from Dr. Jacobs CES presentation). Hey QCOM is one of my favorite companies… the people there are absolutely brilliant. But the Firethorn team is adopted.. and therefore the genes do not extend here. They need a top exec to drive this thing.
On another note, Obopay showed up to at least one of the top 3 banks last month (BankX) touting its mobile payment solution. Undoubtedly with “millions” of subscribers (actual estimated at less then 20k). Always interesting to see spin here, they also reportedly told BankX that Citi’s departure was only temporary. Other banks should ask them to get specific.. very specific.. (probably not the US and there is no commitment on use).
From compete.com (Hard to spin facts..8,000 unique visits last month .. estimate only 20% use the service)
The “big secret” in mobile payments is that there aren’t any… (with very few exceptions). Those exceptions usually deliver “payments” as part of an existing value proposition (see MNOs will rule in Emerging Markets). Banks know that changing consumer behavior is a 20 year effort. Card based payment schemes have particularly high hurdles in emerging markets due to interchange rates and rules that are ill suited for low value payments by unbanked. Toward this end countries such as India are contemplating the development of new domestic payment networks.
Thought for the day