Clearxchange – Bank Strategy Perspective

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28 May 2011

As I related in last week’s Post, Clearxchange (let’s call it CX) evolved out of the online/mobile payment groups at Wells and BAC.  I also described how bank’s will “Win in Payments” along with a high level view on internal bank dynamics which drive Debit/ACH vs. Credit payments strategy, as well as the fragmentation that is occurring in “unprofitable” payments like ACH, carrier billing and P2P… etc.

Consortiums are not the most nimble of creatures. Banks also have the tendency to follow the lead of the big 3 (BAC, WFC, JPM) in all things retail. BAC/WFC are well positioned to execute in CX, and certainly have a sufficient customer base to make CX work. Their addition of JPM (and associated QuickPay) and the creation of a separate entity also aligns well with getting something done quickly. Developing CX within an existing bank consortitum could have taken much longer than 2 years to get a common bank service built… This “build it and they will come” approach is how many of today’s bank services get their start (visa, interlink/debit/ , clearing house, …).

Unfortunately, CX does not have a sustainable “stand alone” business case. Because it was completed within the channel organizations, business strategy (with the LOBs) was not well coordinated with the other LOBs (exception is JPM, the top bank in payments strategy). I’ve actually made 5 CX payments on launch day already. In BAC, just go to internal transfers and fill out the form on the left (did you receive a transfer). I clicked yes as it did not require an accurate answer in the Ts&Cs..

The service is very solid, but I do wonder what the retail wires group must think. Most bank services today allow for transfers to and from accounts I own at other FSIs (we call this A2A). Now I can transfer money to anyone via mobile with no fee (p2p). What about P2B and impact on Debit? For example, eBay purchase? Or how about at a store? If I can send money to a person with no fee.. what prevents cannibalization of Debit? Because of Durbin making Debit “almost free” is there an incentive to create a new payment network?

My sources tell me that there has been very little planning around CX (outside of JPM) to answer these questions. Not only were people with the big 3 banks scrambling to explain the service internally, their CEOs were getting called by peer banks about why their bank had not been asked to join? While banks are not free from anti-trust concerns.. payments is a network business that requires broad participation. The CX announcement comes at a rather sensitive time for them, as Jamie Dimon chairs The Clearing House meetings, there is little doubt that TCH has also served a forum for coordination on all retail payment “industry matters” like Durbin.  Can you imagine working with JPM, BAC and WFC in TCH meeting on retail debit strategy.. then hearing they have a new service rolled out without your knowledge? Not the most polite thing to do.

It certainly was not Jamie’s fault (my favorite bank CEO by far.. fellow Citi alum).. but rather the poor “payments” coordination within banks. In my previous blog Bank’s Need Payment Councils, I laid out how these bank teams had worked historically. CX is a fantastic idea.. and it could even evolve into a profitable service if banks can improve the way the coordinate internally. This is a CEO level decision.. no one wants to tell the CEO that he needs to create a cross LOB council to coordinate payment strategy.. The Citi approach is much more “get a guy to own it”.. like Wayne at Citi, Vin at Chase, or Steve at WFC. But decisions that impact multiple LOBs are very challenging to coordinate across the organization.. CX is the manifestation of just such a dynamic (better to get something done.. then work in a bank committee that never makes a decision).

I’ve been getting called this week on “what is the CX strategy”? The answer depends on who you talk to. BAC has a number of debit/retail payment initiatives.. and there are certainly overlaps..

–          New Visa Debit with BAMS/First Data

–          Visa Money Transfers (directly competes with CX)

–          CX

–          Internal Payment Warehouse (3 yrs in making)

–          Cashedge (A2A money transfers)

–          Pariter (On we w/ WFC)

–          NFC Credit w/ Visa and Device Fidelity

–          …

If banks have trouble coordinating internally.. the situation certainly does not improv

e when 20+ of them get together to set a strategy. Of course this “least common denominator” is why today’s existing payment network is both rigid and resilient. What the banks really need is a firm “platform” vision for payments that they own. For example, what if I broke payments into 3 broad categories: pay before, pay now, pay later? Having multiple products that compete in these categories is a sign of a good healthy market.. having multiple networks process the payment is NOT (only some of which are bank owned). As a side note, there is little reason to doubt that there will be SUBSTANTIAL consolidation surrounding the 6 major debit networks (Visa, Pulse, Star, NYCE…)

My top idea for CX to drive a little incremental revenue?  2 years ago, Metavante (now FIS) negotiated a PayPal deal that would provide for revenue sharing for eBay merchant payment.. PayPal collects 3%+fees and would share 30-50% with FIS. Why would the banks not want to do this? The original plan had more to do with this happening over bill pay.. but a transfer probably makes more sense.  Either way, the banks should jump on this kind of opportunity. My #2 idea.. well I’m only telling my customer this one.. (my poor attempt at a tickler).

Happy Memorial Day

– Tom

Square will “do better” than PayPal? Yeah.. and Pigs Fly

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May 25, 2011 (Updated.. I was 25% off on TPV)

TechCrunch Today (Square has 95% chance to do better than PayPal)

TechCrunch – Square Register (May 24)

Keith Rabois has been around payments a long time..  and given his PayPal background….  his views shouldn’t be ignored. $1B TPV sounds like a big number, but equates to only $3M in revenue (275bps take rate, 30bps margin). PayPal has a 330-390bps take rate (230bps margin) driven by its 3 party model (both merchant and consumer have accounts). Yes, that’s right… Paypal makes 7x+ more revenue for every dollar processed than Square. So for Square to surpass PayPal, they need $700B in TPV… (in their current revenue model). Given that total US Credit Card TPV is $1.3T (Visa $781B , MA $515) that seems a little unrealistic.  (for more detail see http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2011/02/24/do-squareups-square/).

So what is “do better”? Number of accounts? Square is sitting on about 20k active customer accounts.. this is a long way from PayPal’s 100M..

The new Square register is a decent idea.. but Square is NOT competing in a vacuum. During PayPal’s early days there was a problem that needed a solution (CNP). PayPal delivered a strong value proposition.. a 3 party payment platform for online purchases. Solving this problem was critical for commerce (on eBay) to take place. The online payments problem, which PayPal solved, was a roadblock to delivering commerce value.

What are the problems that Square is attempting to solve?

  • Help Visa drive credit card volume
  • Help small merchants accept cards
  • Help small merchants communicate to consumers (Square registers)?
  • Provide Consumers a Wallet on their phone?
  • Help a Craig’s list seller use a card next time they sell something?

Square has done a great job in consumer experience, across all of their applications,  but their challenge remains value delivery. Chase and Visa have billions of reasons for sustaining CREDIT card TPV, but this is NOT a retailer friendly value proposition. As I’ve stated, the challenges of increasing card usage with small merchants is not a technology problem, it is a business (value proposition) issue. Square is doing a great service to many small merchants in bringing down the cost of accepting the card, and improving the consumer/merchant experience.

What is their opportunity?

Retail Sales in US is about $2.4T (excluding Auto, Gas, Resturants). This is certainly a larger market than the $176B spent in US eCommerce. What is your guess on % of merchants that do not currently accept cards, and their categories? Take a look as the US Census data, and I would say total sales for “square prospects” are around $100B.

Take a look at the recent Micros/Verifone announcement as an example. Existing POS and terminal manufactures are not sitting on their hands. Who would want to invest in Square? What kind of platform are they building? This is not a group which will rally the industry, but rather spur it to action (or isolate it to individuals/small businesses).

We will soon see mobile value propositions that contain payments.. but payments are just a supporting mechanism of a larger commerce related value proposition.  Square is making card acceptance nice and neat for small merchants.. this is a good niche opportunity. I will shave my head when Square “does better” than PayPal.. I give this a .0005% chance..

Clearxchange

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25 May (updated)

WSJ: Bank launch Clearxchange

Banks take back mobile momentum!! Everyone else.. stay away from P2P because this team will own it.

BAC, JPM and WFC launch Clearxchange .. a mobile pay anyone service.  This is a very solid idea by the 3 top US retail banks… after all why should PayPal route funds between banks? Banks have always had the capacity to make this work, but have lacked the structure (and business case) to pull this together. Their real risk was banks loosing the “directory battle” (referred to in my previous blog on Chase QuickPay). The last Bank driven initiative of this scale was Spectrum in 1999 where banks decided that acting together in electronic bill payment was the right thing to do..

A short history on this initiative. WFC and BAC got together and created Pariter Solutions a few years ago for “on we” clearing of ACH and images. Pariter initially received the charter to also move toward developing “on we” clearing for mobile/online P2P transactions, but this was pulled late last year as Pariter was having challenges executing against its core mission. Subsequently BAC and WFC got together and created Clearxchange to develop a common “directory” and online/mobile application infrastructure for P2P routing (ACH processing is TBD, but likely to be handled by host organization with clearxchange as a 3rd party sender).

Chase was an early leader here.. QuickPay delivers all of the functionality of Clearxchange… plus some. At one level, I view clearxchange as building what Chase (and Cashedge) already have.  Chase has agreed to participate in directory sharing, so that Chase customers can send/receive to Clearxchange customers.

I’m a very big supporter of ClearxChange’s bank led P2P model, banks must own this for this service to take off. Remember, retail payments are a money looser for banks, the WSJ article did an excellent job describing the dynamics.  By taking the lead, I would hope other banks also participate directly with ClearXchange or through Cashedge’s PoPMoney service (described here in blog).

Moving money via ACH is technically simple, the real challenge is in risk/fraud management. On this level, there are only 2 organizations with substantial fraud management skills in cross bank P2P: Cashedge and PayPal. Both have 10+ years of ACH history.  In the last few years banks have collaborated in developing shared fraud models (can’t really discuss specifics for obvious reasons) that now allow them to substantially reduce risk without prior transaction history. The long term objectives of CX are rather vague (bank control of ACH rails, and balance retention in DDA). Their short term plan is to move consumers to a  “push” model, where funds are sent from a bank authenticated log in. Banks want to be the starting point of a transfer. This positions them as the trusted intermediary, with benefits in fraud and cementing consumer behavior. This is a significant announcement with over 3 years of planning behind it.. but scope is narrow.

The push (ACH Credit) P2P model, where customer initiates transfer from their bank, has a poor history (search on “Paybox success”). The historical issues here have nothing to do with technology, but rather business model: simple and free funds transfer is not a great business. I’m very curious to see what CX’s revenue model looks like.. At one level I do laugh.. just 5 years ago, the only top 5 Bank to allow online transfers out of the bank was BAC. I ran online and payment services at Wachovia (now part of WFC) which included all the online payment operations. The other bank retail heads were very reluctant to launch online transfers because of the risk of deposit run off.. or rate hopping. … wow have things changed.

Every year the banks delayed this service was another year that PayPal could develop a directory of mobile phone numbers, e-mail addresses and ACH information…  this is the real battle… retail payments are a terrible business when viewed as a stand alone product.. but are essential to retail banking.  (See Banks will win in Payments).

The only “cons” I have for ClearXchange are:

  • It involves a technology build.. and clearly Chase and Cashedge have already built these functions. The banks should have gotten together and bought Cashedge.. particularly since BAC is Cashedge’s biggest customer.. they could have been running with this for 2 years
  • The structure. Why not put this in The Clearing House?  or Early Warning Services?  another bank owned consortium does not make sense given their charter unless they plan on involving non-banks
  • BAC, JPM, WFC.. will you please walk away from Visa Money Transfer.. they are attempting to walk all over what you are building here. My guess is that your Visa relationship managers are not talking to your P2P teams..

Visa’s Mobile Strategy: Portfolio Manager

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Visa’s Mobile Strategy: Hedge your bets

I frequently write this blog just to provide a little structure for my own thoughts. While I attempt to avoid “stream of consciousness” writing.. my efforts are not always successful. Top of mind today is the question: what on earth is Visa doing and why? Any time you see a major company come out with a press release with no customers, or proof points it bears a little research. Last week I wrote on Visa’s mobile wallet announcement (or non-announcement). Why would they do this?

Here is a short inventory of Visa’s (and Visa EU) mobile “related” announcements over last year

Clearly Visa has been thinking about mobile for quite some time (listen to Bill Gajda). As I’ve stated many times the great thing about a (well designed) global network is resiliency.. it is resistant to failure.. the challenge in running one is the same: resistance to change. Every network evolves around delivering value to the core constituents (nodes) who are CURRENTLY using the network.  Networks also evolve around a business and revenue model, as a network matures value evolves out from the process of coordinating transactions to managing interactions (HBR Where Value Lives, Jan 2001)

modularization takes hold, the ability to coordinate among the modules will become the most valuable business skill. Much of the competition in the business world will center on gaining and maintaining the orchestration role for a value chain or an industry. … Connected by networks, different companies can easily combine their capabilities and resources into temporary and flexible alliances to capitalize on particular market opportunities. As these “plug-and-play” enterprises become common, value shifts from entities that own intelligence to those that orchestrate the flow and combination of intelligence. In other words, more money can be made in managing interactions than in performing actions.

Why is it so hard for Visa to change? Visa’s history is that of a bank owned consortium and although they are a public company today, their legacy and network was built around a bank centered model.  The banks were very thoughtful in constructing Visa and its rules, to attract smaller banks the majority owners (Chase, BAC, WFC, C, USB) created a structure to ensure no single bank could take advantage of the network, and a rule making process that was optimized for “stability” not “adaptability”.

For those outside of the payments business, Visa operates like the NFL League Office. It cannot make rules in a vacuum, nor does it own the teams, the network rights or the ticket sales. Innovation teams in Visa are more like “advocates” and “evangelists”, they can not force change on their member banks, but rather paint a picture on what is possible. The Visa “franchise” thus has tremendous difficulty adapting to a new game just as if the NFL would have a challenge in coordinating a new sport like snow boarding. Although the fan base may be the same.. and the team owners are interested in generating additional revenue.. it’s a stretch for their network to adapt.  This dynamic correlates to why Visa failed in eCommerce and companies like PayPal and Cybersource excelled.  Both POS and CNP were payments, but the environment of the transactions were very different, particularly in fraud and required new “rules”. To stick with my NFL analogy, both POS and CNP required fraud services to surround transaction authorization.. just as both snow boarder and football player need safety equipment.

So what is Visa’s strategy? Internally, they know they missed out on eCommerce.. but it wasn’t their fault, they were bank owned until 2008. What they see is a new wave of mobile that will effect all of commerce (US $4T .. excluding Auto) not just eCommerce ($176B). They can’t afford to miss this boat.

The problem is that Visa’s existing, bank centered, network is rigid and ill suited for more than POS payments. The mobile revolution at the POS will be much more than payments, particularly as both the POS and the Mobile phone are each able to coordinate across many different networks. Technologies like NFC will also provide much greater potential for authentication and authorization separate from any single network (note I didn’t say payment).

The biggest challenge for Visa to overcome is value delivery. With the prospect of Durbin killing upwards of 20% of overall revenue (70%+ of Debit Rev) Visa is “squeezed” between preparing for a new world order driven by a new network (not yet profitable) and driving its existing business growth (moving along at a respectable 15% clip). The TOP ISSUE with Visa’s mobile NFC Payment is VALUE. Banks are looking to drive NFC to drive CREDIT volume (as opposed to Debit). This is why certain retailers with narrow margins (ex Grocery) are not supporting NFC (See my blog on BestBuy’s experience). The ISIS consortium in the US was leading with a “debit like” payment product that received strong interest from retailers.. with prospect for very low interchange. Alternatively, bank and Visa led schemes have the merchants paying for the “privilege” to take NFC.

If Visa’s mobile efforts were removed from the revenue pressure of the parent we would undoubtedly see Visa work to establish a new, more cost effective network built around Debit (See my previous blog on the “evolution” of debit networks) and they have worked to some extent on this with VMT. Or even build “new mobile rails”, as they attempted to do with Monitise and are now rumored to be investing in Fundamo for same (targeting emerging markets).

As it stands today, Visa is playing the role of a portfolio manager and evangelist. Selectively supporting and investing in mobile initiatives in an attempt to leverage their network. This is a “services” approach to their existing network. The structural challenge is that new services on Visa’s existing network equates to lipstick on a pig (or a snowboard on a running back). How can Visa deliver value to a POS transaction when it is forced (by issuers) to be credit only (250-350bps). To be perfectly clear this is NOT a technical challenge, it is a business model challenge. Bank/Retailer/Card relationships are very strained right now. A good example is “coupons”, Visa has their own coupon service (referenced in PR above) and has every technical capacity to offer a great experience. Visa could actually deliver a killer app in this space if retailers would only give up line item detail on what was actually purchased. The technical capacity for Visa’s network to deliver “level III item detail” has been in place for many years. Do you know how many merchants give up this information? Almost none.. (example Office Depot has it on their Chase co-branded card). Merchants trust neither the networks, nor the issuers with their price list or customer information. Visa is not able to “pay” for this information as it does not own the customer and cannot leverage this either. This all goes back to why Visa took 3+ years to roll out the offers service in the first place.. it had to get issuer permission for each consumer.

Every network begins with delivering value to at least 2 parties. My bet on mobile payment is based on a history. A history where banks (and Visa) have demonstrated poor competency in retaining their role as intermediary between consumer and retailer. A new retailer friendly network, that conveys much more than payment information is needed.

Visa for you to execute in this space, spin out Bill Gajda and team to build a new network. You certainly have the capital and intellectual horsepower to do it.. Don’t think of mobile as a service on VisaNet.. We will know this is moving when we see PayWave Debit volumes taking off.

Analysts.. lets start making Visa publish transaction volumes for NFC, VMT, eCom, Offers.. shining the light on this investment “hole” will help them in the long run.

Coupon Overload?

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Best Bank Coupon Service? Bank of America wins hands down

FSIs and Card networks have finally gotten in the coupon/rebate game..  sort of. Most have implemented along the lines of what I wrote about 2 years ago (See Googlizaiton of FS). Exception is Bank of America.. they have the best bank service by far.  Merchant level incentives (ex 15% off your next purchase) seem to be the focus of Visa and Amex’s LevelUp service. Cardlytics provide a generic white label service along these lines to over 50 banks today (with much better usage than Visa/Amex). From my previous blog above, the general flow:

1. Customer registers for service (credit card, mobile, ..) Accepts terms that allows for delivery of x advertisements  per month

2. Card Network acts as agency, coordinating merchants, promos and marketing spend

  • Merchants pre-pay for campaign settlement account
  • Cardlytics develop target promo and bid criteria: customer location, demographic, event transaction, …
  • A campaign function sits at “Network Switch”, listens to transaction traffic
  • Card transaction events are triggered based upon card registration status
  • Event gets sent to campaign engine.  AD triggered based upon criteria (Example. Shop at EXAMPLESTORE in next 5 hours and get 20% back)

3.  Redemption/ notification – Redemption server monitors transactions at Switch or at Bank Issuer Auth server

  • If Card transaction is for registered card it is sorted
  • Redemption engine finds that it Ad was sent to it, determines if transaction at EXAMPLESTORE meets threshold
  • If it is met, Campaign engine kicks transaction to MerchantAdvert service which bills merchant for AD and debits account for 10% credit plus fee.
  • Engine issues 10% credit to customer’s card account
  • Engine debits merchant account for fee + redemption amount
  • Notification message sent to customer that their card account has been credited for purchase and 10% discount.

Good news for merchants is that they pay only for purchases. Great CPA here. But a very poor customer experience.. getting credit either directly to your card.. or in Amex’s new program to a separate pre-paid card. Other limitation is that there can be no item level discounts.

Quite frankly I like Bank of America’s service much, much better. They are light years ahead of the other banks thanks to the efforts of people like Joe Giordano. Today, Bank of America customers can click on a coupon in coupons.bankofamerica.com and when you go to the grocery store, the discount item comes right off your bill. The company behind this is Zave Networks. Just fantastic stuff. Zave was the only company in IBM’s booth at the National Retail Federation (NRF) show. Given that IBM has 19 of the world’s top 20 retailers using its POS;. it is little wonder that IBM has embedded Zave in their OS.

Having run the online channel at 2 of the top 5 banks, I have a little idea of customer behavior and preferences. Banking customers visit frequently and may be able to have uptake of incentives, card customers have terrible online usage.. (1-2 times per month).. which is why the card companies are launching mobile services in cards so aggressively: they are trying to establish a new mobile behavior (ex mobile alerts on balances). The card coupon/incentive approach seems to have substantial risk, particularly when considering the poor customer interaction (on credit card), together with the very narrow market for incentives (apparel, restaurants), the competencies of the bank teams groups (campaign management) and customer preferences for debit.

Colloquy.com estimates that Banks and travel related industry spend about $48B per year on loyalty. Banks are running coupons programs primarily out of their existing “rewards” groups… with the hope of juicing rewards, as they reduce costs. With Debit interchange going down to $0.12 you can see the importance here.. either no rewards program at all, or one that is funded by another source. With Credit, loyalty programs are the primary customer driver both for card selection and use. Bank driven loyalty programs typically focus on redemption, not on the front side of selection. In other words, banks do not touch a customer prior to a purchase, but incent them afterwards.

From a retailer’s perspective what is the value of participating in a bank run a loyalty program?  Segments like apparel may gain traffic, but do you want your bank sending you an SMS ad for 10% off a nearby retailer/resturant everytime you pump gas? Possible, but more likely you will use the offerings from Google, Apple, Microsoft integrated with maps and comparison pricing. 10% off what? What do they have that I need? Most retailers are not big fans of banks, or their “incentive” plans. There are exceptions, particularly in apparel and restaurants (note restaurants are not considered retail). Overall this is less than $5B of $750B in US Marketing spend. I give the bank led initiatives about 6 months. When Google, Apple and MSFT come in with much richer services and focused teams. How many banks do you know with an campaign management group? … exactly. Visa had a tough time expanding into eCommerce (hence the CYBS acquisition), what makes them think they can run an advertising agency?

Sorry Amex, Visa, Cardlytics, FreeMonee, … Card driven models will have a very short life span. Exception is BofA both because of the bank (deposit) driven model and because of the item level integration with a partner (Zave/IBM) that knows retail. BAC will likely continue reign as  king of debit.. and even gain momentum.

Visa Digital Wallet

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So what does Visa plan to do that PayPal doesn’t do already?

http://venturebeat.com/2011/05/11/visa-unveils-new-digital-wallet-for-electronic-commerce/

I look at this as a non-announcement, a rebranding of what CYBS and PlaySpan already have. Too many teams are angling to create the wallet (mobile, online, …), and not enough focusing on the value of what is in it. Google, Apple, and RIM will win the mobile wallet wars. I guess I can’t blame Visa for trying.. however it would have been nice if they could have been successful at eCommerce to start with. If they had CYBS and PayPal would have never developed. I see little hope for them doing any better in mobile. They don’t own the customer and can’t really deliver any value.. but hey.. they have a tremendous number of nodes that they want to use.. too bad that the rules are so heavily driven by banks.

CYBS is a great company, in 2009 it processed one out of every 4 purchase transactions online, with over $120B in GDV. Small and mid size merchants flock to them because they are a one stop shop with great service. CYBS and PayPal both came to exist because card networks were incapable of helping either issuers or merchants manage the unique transaction risks associated with CNP transactions… as well as support for taking a card online. Visa has spent enormous sums trying to create improved authentication approaches (remember Verified by Visa?).  Their problem was not just technology and user experience, but business model. In the UK, VBV received substantial traction when merchants signed on to the liability shift. But then the issuers were left holding the bag for a broken technology with a merchants also suffering from drop off in completed purchases as customers saw a pop up ask for their PIN..

Rather than go through this terrible learning experience yet again they did the right thing and bought CYBS. Of course there were other synergies as well…  They now have an eCommerce acquirer. So the model is somewhat like DPS.. Get member banks to sign up their merchants, Visa gets a service fee, banks get a new revenue stream… ? Have you spoke to a happy Visa DPS customer?

Take a look at the banks that have signed on here. From the announcement: Barclaycard US, BB&T, Card Services for Credit Unions (CSCU), ICBA Bancard, First Financial Bank of Ohio, Nordstrom, Pentagon Federal Credit Union,  PNC Bank,  PSCU Financial Services,  Regions Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Scotiabank, TD Bank Group (US and Canada) and US Bank.

Notice anyone missing? Top 5 issuers? Banks with significant merchant business?  What I would really like to see is the growth projections of this new service vs. what CYBS/Playspan would have done normally.

Digital Goods. Let me digress in an example. Why was Playspan so successful? Many reasons, but for one it had a substantial in store presence for gamers (with no bank account). Guess how much Playspan had to pay the card distributor? 15%. Will be interesting to see how Visa integrates a digital wallet with a cost of funds of 1500bps and then evolve to letting this same wallet be used for eCommerce. This may be why Visa is emphasizing card funding.. but guess what.. gamers (digital goods) don’t thrive on this model.

As a consumer, will I create a visa wallet to pay for goods? Why should I? What is in it for me after the bank has scaled back my loyalty programs and hit me with new fees.. ?

As a merchant will I switch to CYBS? Only if CYBS offers great service..

I just don’t see the value here.. someone please enlighten me. I do give Visa credit for dumping a VBV 3.0 strategy in favor of CYBS. What I love best is Visa taking out 2 great companies.  Now another round of start ups can develop to provide cutting edge service to retailers. The last great innovation from Visa was Debit.. well it wasn’t really from Visa.. … this does not feel like Debit.

I look forward to next 12 months when we will see 2 large issuers pull the Network brands off of their debit cards. In 5 years Visa will be left with credit only.. They do need a growth business.

ISIS: Antonym of Nimble?

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ISIS – The Antonym of Nimble

Last week’s announcement that ISIS is abandoning plans for its own payment network (NFC Times) is not a surprise. This blog has covered ISIS since 2009 (before it had a name). Now we can add ISIS to the great names in mobile payments: PayBox, Obopay, Firethorne, Monitise, Enstream, …

It turns out ISIS was a Desert.. why have they failed?

  • Business Strategy based on “Control” instead of value.
  • Consortiums are not nimble, MNOs are not nimble, and a consortium formed around a poor business strategy will not be able to adapt without a very strong and experienced CEO.
  • Existing networks and ecosystems did not align with (or support) ISIS initial strategy.
  • Building a new network is an expensive undertaking.. building one without a value proposition is impossible

From my perspective the tipping point that killed ISIS was their inability to exert control over the secure element. Their entire business plan was dependent on this. When RIM announced its SE architecture 2 weeks ago, with Apple likely to follow.. it became perfectly clear that ISIS could not control and provision wallets, cards and applications that access the SE (related blog).

Mobile payments are still firmly in the hype stage. Until a real consumer value proposition develops that leverages the handset’s unique assets, consumer’s data, payment, retailer integration in a way where multiple parties can “participate” it will remain a niche. Getting excited about NFC is like getting Satellite radio in your car.. sure it’s cool and all cars will eventually have it, it may even improve your life.. but there are plenty of alternatives and many people have no need of it at all.

That said, there are many useful software products that could use this technology to deliver real consumer value. Most innovations are either targeted to either the top end (cutting edge performance) or to the bottom end (lower cost) of requirements. NFC adoption will take place within multiple solutions targeting the “top end”, each of which has a strong network effect component. Solutions will succeed either by delivering the most value point-point or through network scale. Payments are but one core service that NFC must deliver on.

From my previous Blog

Globally, MNOs are looking for a platform where Operators can benefit from interaction between consumer and merchant, with flexibility to deal with a heterogeneous regulatory environment. The competitive pressures on Visa/MC are much different then they were 5 years ago (when both were bank owned). The network fee structures and rules were written with banks and mature markets in mind. …

All of this leads to the case for a new “Mobile Payments Settlement” network, a network which will alienate many banks. I expect to see Visa roll out the initial stages of this network in the next 2 months with an emphasis on NFC. Quite possibly the best kept secret I have ever seen from a public company. I’m sure many Silicon Valley CEOs are crossing their fingers (with me) on this, as a “new wave” of innovation is certainly close at hand that will drive growth (and valuations).

Why Visa, Apple and Chase are Square

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Visa formalizes mobile swipe security.. ” Visa’s guidelines lay out some of the more important security measures that should be taken, including encrypting all account data at the card-reader level and in transmission between the acceptance device and the processor.” just like the Verifone CEO said.. 

Why did they do this on same day as announcing Square investment. All of these non-compliant doggles. What is Square’s Plan?

http://www.visaeurope.com/en/newsroom/news/articles/2011/visa_europe_releases_mobile_ac.aspx

http://www.businessinsider.com/visa-square-investment-2011-4 

Why is Visa, Chase and Apple all aligning on Square?

1)       Apple does not have NFC in iPhone 5

2)       Chase is taking a portfolio approach. This one is a bet against NFC..  They also have plenty of bets in NFC

3)       Visa knows it cannot control NFC and is taking a 3 pronged card focused approach to mobile marketing independent of NFC. Too much to say in this short Blog

Amex: Payfone and Serve

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Updated 7pm Eastern (last paragraph on AML)

Amex: What are they “Serving” up? Marketing Hype

NFC Times: Amex Mobile Checkout Service

Jim McArthy, Visa’s Global Head of Product gave an excellent overview of the market in his analyst call last week (see here). His quote on Serve  “Virtual pre paid card” from Revolution money… I completely agree. Serve is a small evolution for revolution money.. and for background see previous post.

What about Payfone? Well the only unique thing about Payfone is its clearing network, most likely Roamware’s inter-carrier settlement network. Roamware, Mach, Belgacom BICs , … etc have agreements with most carriers globally to allow for roaming access, payment and clearing (aka SS7, B-ICI). I love Roamware.. a tremendous company growing at 500%+ per year with a stellar team. IPO should be happening this year. None of their growth is dependent on this Payfone thing.. but it is a good idea.. ON PAPER.

While all the technical and architecture pieces are there to make Payfone viable (example all of Roamware’s carrier agreements), NONE of the carriers are anxious to let another brand and another service ride on their rails. Remember Inter Carrier Settlement (ICS) is for phone charges.. one of the biggest carrier headaches in mobile billing is customers calling to complain that Zong put a premium SMS on their bill for some gaming top up.. of course it was actually your 12 year old that did it.. The US carriers got fed up with this and all committed to billtomobile (see related post), I just had dinner w/ Paul Kim Tuesday.. tremendous executive. The summary of this post is that Billtomobile killed the Boku/Zong models.. and created commonality across US carriers. Carriers take almost 40% of premium SMS fees.. can you imagine a physical goods merchant paying 40% interchange.. ? on a Pizza?

The picture I’m trying to paint is that carriers love digital goods, they have committed to billtomobile (in the US) and are just starting to “think” about expanding on the $25 limit and physical goods. What makes Payfone think that any carrier on earth would let them lead this? This is NOT a technical problem for the carriers.. they already have all of the capability to turn on mobile payments to any merchant. They have the wallets as well. Not only would this create mass customer confusion.. it would also impact carrier led initiatives for NFC at POS.

Most of my contacts are just shaking their head at this one… Payfone? Not in the US.. no way. The carriers have complete control to shut this down. If Payfone would have just spent a little time with the MNOs they would have seen the flaw here. The only option I see for them is to give this thing to Roamware and let the carriers brand it and attempt to integrate it within their current wallet plans OR focus on merchant acquisition for billtomobile payment.

UPDATE

ICS/SS7 has well defined transaction types (SMS, Data, voice, …). Payfone does not just “throw” a transaction on the SS7 network without either the sending carrier and the recieving carrier agreeing to the transaction. There is first an “authorization” process before any transactions are even allowed. Example: does this customer have an international plan? are they a pre-paid? what is their limit? Voice only?

Recieving carriers can deny payfone transactions. Of course a sending carrier may be successful in “masking” the transaction so that they look like a voice charge.. but this would certainly fall afoul of both regulators and the ICS agreements. Remember this is money transfer cash out, which will ALSO be covered by numerous banking/MSB regulations. As with any money transfer business, KYC is required on both sender and reciever in most jurisdictions. Who maintains regulatory responsibility for KYC? Carriers? NO WAY.. is Payfone doing a KYC on its senders? RECIEVERS? Again, this is the beauty of PayPal.. both senders and recievers have registered and accepted terms.

There are few short cuts in payments.. this solution is technically elegant, but complicated when taking into account carrier plans and regulatory issues.

eBay/GSI Acquisition

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Yes I am behind on the blogging….  I started putting this one together 2 weeks ago and it seems like ancient history.

PayPal + GSI Commerce

31 March 2011

Business Week Article: Why eBay wants GSI

GSI Commerce – Investor Presentation – Business Overview

eBay Presentation on Acquisition

This week has seen quite a few major announcements, with eBay’s $2.4B GSI (NASDAQ:GSIC) acquisition leading the pack. M&A activity in payments, advertising and Commerce (both online and mobile) is really heating up. I’m seeing substantial deal activity and active shopping.

Independent of price paid, I like eBay’s move here. GSI is a fantastic company providing turn key services to bring key brands online. GSI was the largest retail customer of my old company 41st Parameter. As you can see from footprint slide below, their capabilities are much advanced from Cybersource.. from hosting your site to selling and shipping your goods. Brands like NFL.com depend on GSI for everything and they solid customer satisfaction.

 

From eBay’s presentation:

  • Extends eBay Inc.’s reach with large brands/retailers …
  • Brings together complementary capabilities in a manner which strengthens GSI and helps our existing core businesses
  • Extends our open commerce platform capabilities

With this move I see a three (and a half) horse race for global eCommerce “turn key”: Amazon, eBay and Rakutan (buy.com).  Visa is the other half horse with the CYBS acquisition (primarily focused on payment). Amazon is far ahead in hosting (EC2), distribution, product selection, merchant services (large merchants), digital goods (books, music, apps, ..), consumer share of wallet, … etc.  eBay/PayPal has a few advantages in payment and small merchant services.

http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2011/03/10/paypal-to-drive-growth-at-pos/

Did anyone read John Donahoe’s Harvard Business Review Interview? He did a great job providing an overview of their strategy. GSI is increasing services to existing customers, and enabling faster expansion of fixed price goods. The POS initiative is an attempt to expand scope beyond the virtual world into the highly competitive merchant acquisition business. In 2010, US ecommerce was roughly $165B w/ 12% CAGR, while POS represents about $4.2Trillion.