No more Stablecoin “rewards”

The OCC Just Dropped the Hammer on Stablecoin Yield: Why “Rewards” Are the New Front Line

Updated (Huge Impact to Tether and other non-US Stablecoin Issuers)

As a payments expert who has watched the “shadow banking” sector flirt with regulatory boundaries for years, today’s draft guidance from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) on the GENIUS Act implementation is my “I told you so” (60 day comment period).

The headline for all of us in the industry is clear: The OCC is officially shutting down the creative “loophole” engineering around stablecoin interest and rewards. For months, issuers thought they could bypass the statutory prohibition on interest by rebranding yield as “staking rewards” or “loyalty tokens.” Today, the OCC signaled that the game of musical chairs is over.

Why the OCC is Right to Act

Let’s talk about the elephant in the room: Bank Deposit Runoff. I’ve been hearing from colleagues across the spectrum (from small community banks to the Top 6) that the “4% yield” offered by unregulated stablecoins has been an absolute wrecking ball for traditional balance sheets. When retail and corporate depositors can sweep cash into a “digital dollar” and earn 400 basis points of yield with near-instant liquidity, the traditional bank deposit becomes a tough sell.

This isn’t just about competition; it’s a systemic risk. The Senate Banking Committee and the OCC have been flooded with reports of near-term liquidity challenges specifically linked to this runoff. The OCC’s primary mandate is the safety and soundness of the national banking system, and they cannot (and will not) allow stablecoins to act as a high-yield “vampire” on bank liquidity while avoiding the regulatory costs banks have to pay.

Guidance Recap on Yield – The Four Pillars of the No-Yield Era

The draft guidance is surgical in how it dismantles the “rewards” industry. Here are the four key points you need to know:

  • Broad-Spectrum Prohibition: The guidance explicitly prohibits permitted issuers from paying any form of interest or yield—whether in cash, tokens, or “other consideration”—solely in connection with holding or using the stablecoin. If you are getting paid just for having the coin in your wallet, it’s illegal.
  • Targeting the “Solely” Clause: The OCC is doubling down on the GENIUS Act’s language. You cannot pay yield for the “holding, use, or retention” of the asset. This is designed to kill the business model of stablecoins acting as pseudo-savings accounts.
  • The “Presumption of Evasion” Hammer: This is the most aggressive part of the guidance. If an issuer has a contract with an affiliate or a third party to pay yield, the OCC will presume this is an attempt to evade the law. The burden of proof has shifted: issuers must now proactively rebut this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence” that their arrangements aren’t just interest-bearing accounts in a trench coat.
  • The Logical Exceptions: To be fair, the OCC isn’t trying to kill commerce. Merchants can still offer independent discounts to customers who pay with stablecoins (just like a cash discount). Additionally, white-label issuers can still share profits with their corporate partners, ensuring that “B2B plumbing” isn’t accidentally caught in the crossfire.

The Bottom Line

Stablecoins were always intended to be a settlement innovation, not a high-yield investment vehicle that destabilizes our core banking infrastructure. By eliminating the “rewards” arbitrage, the OCC is forcing stablecoins to compete on what actually matters: speed, transparency, and utility.

For those of us in the regulated banking world, this is a massive win for financial stability. The “wild west” of 4% digital yields is ending, and the era of the **Digital Dollar as a tool” is finally beginning.

Presumption of Evasion – How Will It Work?

The OCC will automatically presume a permitted payment stablecoin issuer is violating the prohibition on interest or yield if a two-pronged arrangement exists:

  • Issuer to Third Party: The issuer has an agreement to pay interest or yield to an affiliate or a related third party (this would encompass staking).
  • Third Party to Holder: That same affiliate or related third party then has its own arrangement to pay interest or yield (in cash, tokens, or other consideration) to a stablecoin holder solely in connection with holding or using that stablecoin.

Defining “Related Third Parties”

To ensure comprehensive coverage, the OCC defines related third parties to include:

  • Any person paying interest/yield to stablecoin holders as a service (acting on the issuer’s behalf).
  • Any person involved in a white-label relationship, where the issuer produces stablecoins under the partner’s branding.

Rebutting the Presumption

Issuers are not completely barred from these arrangements, but they must proactively prove they are legal. To rebut the presumption, an issuer must:

  • Submit written materials to the OCC.
  • Demonstrate to the OCC’s judgment that the arrangement is neither a prohibited form of interest nor an attempt to evade the prohibition.

Key Exceptions

The presumption and general prohibition are surgically targeted and do not apply to:

  • Merchant Discounts: Merchants may still independently offer discounts to customers who pay using stablecoins.
  • B2B Profit Sharing: Issuers may share profits derived from the stablecoin with a non-affiliate partner in a white-label arrangement, provided those profits are not passed to the end-holder as yield.

Non US Stablecoin Issuers

OCC Stablecoin Guidance – TETHER and Non-US Issuers. For non-US entities like Tether (UST), the OCC’s draft guidance effectively creates a “comply or exit” ultimatum for the US market. The GENIUS Act and this implementing guidance do not just regulate US banks; they create a powerful extraterritorial gatekeeping mechanism that targets the very “offshore” models Tether has historically used.

Here are the specific implications for Tether and other non-US issuers:

  1. Any non-US entity wishing to have their stablecoin offered to US citizens must register with the OCC as a Foreign Payment Stablecoin Issuer (FPSI)
  2. Requires the issuer to be subject to a foreign regulatory regime that the US Treasury deems “comparable” to the GENIUS Act.
  3. Requires foreign issuers to hold their US dollar reserves in US-regulated financial institutions
  4. Explicitly states that if a foreign issuer has an arrangement with any affiliate or third party to pay yield to holders, it is presumed to be a violation.
  5. By July 18, 2028, it will be illegal for any US-based exchange or wallet provider to “offer or sell” a stablecoin unless the issuer is an OCC-permitted or registered foreign issuer.
  6. Freeze and Seize Requirements – RT OFAC/FINCEN. The guidance clarifies that for a foreign issuer to be “registered,” they must demonstrate the technological capability to comply with US lawful orders (e.g., OFAC sanctions or court-ordered freezes). While Tether already does this manually, the OCC is moving toward requiring more formalized, auditable processes that match the standards of US national banks.

The Hammer

As a former banker, I’ve had to deal with compliance both in the US and the 35 other countries in my purview. I say this not to brag, but to talk about the lashes on my back. I honestly don’t think many Fintech’s have experienced working with the OCC, particularly as they begin a new expanded area of responsibility (they are learning on the job and will question everything). 

The OCC isn’t just issuing a “slap on the wrist” for yield-bearing stablecoins; they are integrating GENIUS Act enforcement into the same high-stakes oversight framework used for national banks. If an issuer fails to rebut the “presumption of evasion” or is caught paying prohibited rewards, the OCC has a formidable arsenal of remedial measures:

1. Formal Cease-and-Desist (C&D) Orders

This is the OCC’s bread and butter for stopping unsafe or unsound practices. A C&D order would legally compel the issuer to immediately terminate any “rewards” or “staking” programs. For payments experts, it’s important to note that these orders are public and can include “affirmative actions” that force an issuer to restructure its entire affiliate network to prove no yield is being “leaked” to holders.

2. Civil Money Penalties (CMPs)

The financial hammer is heavy. Under the GENIUS Act framework, the OCC can levy daily fines for violations. While specific tiers depend on the “intent” and “harm” caused, penalties for willful violations in this space can reach up to $1 million per day. For an issuer trying to “arbitrage” a 4% yield, the cost of the fine would quickly evaporate any profit margin from the underlying reserve assets.

3. Revocation of “Permitted Issuer” Status

This is the “nuclear option.” If an issuer chronically ignores the prohibition on interest, the OCC can rescind their approval to issue payment stablecoins entirely. In a post-GENIUS Act world, losing this status makes the stablecoin “unauthorized,” meaning digital asset service providers (exchanges and custodians) would eventually be legally prohibited from offering it to U.S. persons. It is a total lockout from the U.S. financial system.

4. Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) Directives

The draft guidance actually proposes revising 12 CFR Part 6 (Prompt Corrective Action) to include stablecoin issuers. This creates a tiered intervention system. If an issuer’s compliance or capital levels drop due to risky yield schemes, the OCC can:

  • Limit the issuer’s growth or transaction volume.
  • Restrict payments to affiliates (effectively killing the “evasion” loop).
  • Force a change in management or the board of directors.

5. Heightened Supervision and “Individual Minimums”

The OCC can unilaterally increase the capital requirements for a specific issuer if they believe their “rewards” programs create extra liquidity risk. By forcing a firm to hold a larger capital backstop (beyond the standard $5 million floor), the OCC makes it economically unviable to continue paying out yield to holders.

11 thoughts on “No more Stablecoin “rewards”

  1. Don’t tokenised money market funds pose a similar issue to banks? There is some added friction but you should be able to convert USDC into a tokenised MMF easily and vice versa reducing friction and enabling deposit auto sweep.

    • Question: Could tokenised money market funds have the same effect? If you can easily swap from USDC to USYC and vice versa, doesn’t that pose a similar issue for deposit flight?

      My Response. Short answer Genius act defines tokenized MMF as securities, and Stablecoins as non-interest bearing instruments.

      Tokenized money market funds (such as BlackRock’s BUIDL, Franklin Templeton’s BENJI, or Superstate’s USTB) are investment vehicles designed to pass the yield generated from underlying short-term government securities directly to the token holder. By contrast, payment stablecoins are designed purely as a medium of exchange and settlement. Under the GENIUS Act, stablecoin issuers are strictly prohibited from paying any form of interest or yield to holders.

      To your point, this guidance does appear to be a boost for Tokenized MMF. Because tokenized money market funds offer yield while offering the same blockchain transferability as stablecoins, they can drain low-cost deposits away from banks and into the asset management sector. Asset managers like Federated Hermes and BlackRock view this tokenization trend as a potential “huge boost” to money market fund inflows, capturing capital that might otherwise sit as deposits on commercial bank balance sheets.

      The challenge for Tokenized MMF is use as a form of payment, for example commercial terms w/ stripe.

  2. Not sure a US regulator can prevent a foreign entity from issuing a USD stablecoin?

    2 predictions:
    1. enough money is at stake that clever and LEGAL ways to structure deals without a US nexus will arise.
    2. Leading law firms will make a mint sorting this out.

    My response
    Agree on inability to enforce, but the foreign financial institution (FFI) would face an amazingly complex web of US restrictions (and reporting requirements) relating to US Citizens (chart below). This is why most banks outside the US avoid any non-commercial US accounts. For the individual holder, IRS reporting of foreign accounts is also a known flag for audit (historically).

  3. Foreign Stablecoin Issuers

    OCC Stablecoin Guidance – TETHER and Non-US Issuers. There is also a monumental impact for non-US “Foreign Payment Stablecoin Issuer (FPSI)”.
    1) any non-US entity wishing to have their stablecoin offered to US citizens must register with the OCC as a Foreign Payment Stablecoin Issuer (FPSI)
    2) it requires the issuer to be subject to a foreign regulatory regime that the US Treasury deems “comparable” to the GENIUS Act.
    3) requires foreign issuers to hold their US dollar reserves in US-regulated financial institutions
    4) Rule explicitly states that if a foreign issuer has an arrangement with any affiliate or third party to pay yield to holders, it is presumed to be a violation.
    5) By July 18, 2028, it will be illegal for any US-based exchange or wallet provider to “offer or sell” a stablecoin unless the issuer is an OCC-permitted or registered foreign issuer.

  4. So, the OCC is protecting bank balance sheet stability and indirectly entrenching the networks and making agentic commerce more difficult to occur off network. This seems like an overwhelming win for the networks, and i want to tie it to your blog refuting the Citrini piece. Please correct me if my understanding is wrong, but it seems like the OCC just severely diminished the incentive for consumers to maintain a digital wallet funded with stable coins for use in agentic commerce. This acts as a new point of friction to transactions seeking to go off network if consumers have no incentive to fund a stable coin wallet. I would think that an agent can still do a fiat to stable coin exchange when seeking out the best deal, but this would be a debit transaction where the total savings is at most 0.06-0.07% – not much incentive to build an ecosystem around this? I would stretch this to say that this increases friction for adoption of consumer staking on a defi blockchain which would function as the provider of credit that seeks to eliminate the more meaningful interchange 1.5-2% interchange commonly quoted.

    • I appreciate the pushback. You’re touching on the “what could have been” vs. the “what is.”

      If that 4% yield had stayed, we likely would have seen an entire ecosystem—agentic commerce, DeFi-lite, retail wallets—funded and driven by that out-of-compliance yield. It was a powerful customer acquisition tool. But there was no LEGAL ambiguity in the GENIUS law with respect to rewards. Congress drew a hard line, and the OCC is just making sure nobody crosses it.

      The reality now is that stablecoins have been relegated to being “just a rail.” The “sugar high” of easy yield is gone, and with it, the primary incentive for a consumer to bother with a stablecoin wallet in the first place.

      As for alternative credit, I’m becoming more circumspect about it. It’s a steep uphill climb. For any credit model to succeed now, it has to create enough of an incentive on its own to warrant both the credit issuance and the rail usage. Without a 4% head start, the technical and financial utility of the product has to be fantasic for it to overcome the friction of moving off-network. BNPL has a far better chance.

      In the short term, the networks definitely have their moat. But these networks are SUPER efficient, with their 5-10bps of network fee running lower than ethereum gas for a stablecoin payment. The disruption will have to be a lot more clever—and a lot more efficient—than just offering a better interest rate.

      Enough thinking for one day. Let’s see how the market reacts to the draft.

      • thank you so much for the thoughtful reply! (to be honest, i thought i was agreeing with you.) I am trying stress test what incentives exist for an agent to go off-network, and, IMO, this just stonewalled a critical loophole in terms of incentivizing the consumer (and ever developing a viable credit alternative). I was operating exactly in the “what could have been”. I think the networks are more likely to see the moat entrenched, but any question can do damage to the stock multiple. I currently see one alternative, a BNPL consumer Account to merchant Account, essentially like any other issuer seeking a closed loop network (AXP/Discover), but ultimately consumer paying this back on network.

        Anyways, seems like the networks deflected another arrow.

    • In general it helps establish stablecoin as a rail, not a consumer value store. As such, I think it impairs Stablecoin’s opportunity with consumers, and keeps the existing consumer adoption hurdle (why go through the hassle and not use my card). I don’t have specific company views. Tether is certainly insulate as it uses USDT for cryto settlement. Circle would seem to be the most impacted.

Please Login to Comment.