Monthly Archives: July 2010

CitiGold in NA – Kudos to Manuel

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27 July 2010

Admittedly I’ve been critical of Citi’s recent NA efforts (Bank of the Future, Bundle, …), but I’m a big fan of Manuel and the new Citigold strategy described in the FT Article above. This blog is addressed to companies looking to partner w/ Citi (insight into the labyrinth), as it is one of the most complex organizations to understand globally. If it makes you feel any better, its hard for people inside the organization as well.

For you outsiders.. Banamex is not a poor stepsister to anyone in retail. As a proof point, in Citi’s most recent quarter (2Q10) LATAM alone provided 2x the earnings of Citi North America. The BOD (and most in Citi) consider Manuel to be a banker’s banker, and in Citi’s Banamex franchise excellence attracts excellence. Over the last 3 years retail strategy has been stunted by the churn of executives in its top ranks, the loss of Ajay Banga was a particularly hard blow. Manuel’s experience combined with that of the LATAM team (and BOD support) position him well to “turn around” Citi NA; an audacious goal that will enhance Manuel’s position as successor to Vikram.

Under Teri Dial, thousands of man hours were spent by every Citi retail (and card) executive planning for “bank of the future”. While customer servicing, touch screens and iPhone apps are important.. you first need to get the customer into the store and sold on your products (in person or remotely).  Bank of the Future was an effort that frustrated Citi’s cadre of excellent business leaders; an empty strategy that gave no near term focus to BAU.. nor a “profitability” for the “future” end state.

Citi’s international retail franchise is a star globally: an affluent bank strategy with minimal branch footprint. Citi’s breadth of products and expertise was an original goal of the Sandy Weill’s supermarket. While loosing significant wealth talent and capability at the top end (with SSB’s $2.7 spin out), Citi still retains products and capabilities globally to serve the affluent segment in the US (just as it does internationally).

Manuel’s US CitiGold strategy is an excellent approach.  Citi is already an affluent bank (as shown in 2006 Comscore data below), maintaining average balances twice that of their nearest competitor (my rule of thumb is that the average BAC customer has twice the products, and the average Citi customer has twice the balances).

Re: US CitiGold, the international team has long questioned why the US continued to push sand up hill in a mass market focus given its minimal branch footprint (#9 as stated in WSJ article above). A new affluent focus will drive marketing, product and most importantly sales.. Citi DOES have unique capability, internationally it also maintains a great brand, let’s see if it can dust itself off for a premium US debut.

This new affluent US focus will not be without challenges, from both existing banks and new start ups (like Bill Harris’ SafeCorp Financial).  However, Citi’s capabilities uniquely resonate with several high end demographics that are already customers of its other lines of business (CEOs, Investment bankers, hedge fund managers, expats/international executives, CFOs, …). Internationally CitiGold services normally started with clients of the institutional side and expanded to the expat community. My guess is that Citi’s decision management team would say that the ability to sell CitiGold in the US (absent these connections) is not well established. On the execution side we will probably see many more relationship managers (wealth lite) pop up in the branches that do exist, and focused marketing efforts outside of mass media. Affluent is about brand and service.. which does align with a few of the CitiForward initiatives.

On the innovation side the “Citi Forward” concept has been around the table for quite some time. Evolving over the last 4 years and piloting itself in Citi Australia.  This is all good stuff: integrated financial management tools, comparison and cross selling. However all of this servicing will not bring you customers if the products are not competitively priced, limited marketing and no sales team (discussed in my previous post – Citi/Bundle). Hope to see Manuel empower a strong US retail head with a focused strategy that will empower them to take the reins of all technology and innovation activity. Citi has fantastic technical capability, but the business needs to focus it (particularly after the bank of the future mess).

Chase QuickPay and Quick Deposit

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25 July 2010 (Updated 20 Aug)

Chase has a stellar eCommerce and mobile team in both their retail and cards organization, and they are poised to deliver tremendous payment innovation across both of these business units. This innovation has been “in the works” over the last few years, and Jack Stephenson (PayPal’s former head of strategy) is fortunate to have  joined at a time where both the payment platform and team is gaining traction. This month the JPM retail team has delivered new capability in its iPhone versions of QuickPay and Quick Deposit products.

QuickPay Overview:

QuickPay is a JPM’s money movement “pay anyone” service that provides registration for both Chase and non Chase customers. Chase was very late to the money movement game, rolling out its first QuickPay service in 2008 (whereas Bank of America and Citi have been providing this since 2002  through CashEdge). From a strategy and organizational perspective, JPM is well known for their “preference” to develop applications internally. It may have taken some time for JPM to complete the QuickPay internal build, but in the current release it has surpassed the domestic capability (and usability) of all other banks. JPM is now the leader in retail online payments.

Non-Chase customers can register for QuickPay before or after receiving funds. For non customers, registration for QuickPay is similar to PayPal (or CashEdge’s PopMoney), with the QuickPay wallet currently constrained to single linked checking account. Chase customers have a streamlined enrollment process and the QuickPay functionality is integrated into their existing online experience (demo above). This differs substantially from BAC, where the same capability to transfer funds exists but the usability is very poor. BAC is missing a substantial opportunity to capture beneficiary phone/e-mail information, an unnecessary miss since the capability exists (BAC is Cashedge’s largest US customer but has not yet signed on with CashEdge’s mobile POP money service).  Beneficiary information is critical to maintaining an accurate directory.. the key element in any payment system. Chase’s QuickPay maintains e-mail, phone and other information which gives it a head start in the directory battle (subject of future blog).  Given Chase Paymentech’s role in acquisition (for card, paypal, …) you can see potential for further directory synergies internally.

Quick Deposit

The articles above provide a great overview of the new iPhone App, with Chase following in the footsteps of USAA’s Deposit@Mobile. Application is from Mitek Systems and it is just super, and for small merchants this may become the payment method of choice (when compared to card):

Merchant benefits:

  • No transaction costs (savings of 150-350bps)
  • Usability and simplified enrollment
  • Same day availability of funds
  • Fits existing consumer behavior pattern (checks)
  • Legal protections/enforceability (paper checks vs. electronic signature)
  • Instant verification, risk and fraud management
  • Leverages bank imaging systems and processes (regulatory and consumer receipt)
  • Notification/receipt to consumers

JPM Business Case

  • Check imaging (op expense)
  • Small business acquisition (Customer Net Revenue for SME = $3-$5k)
  • NRFF for non-customers (NIM on settlement funds held)
  • Future “directory” business case, cards growth
  • Prevention of DDA Account Number Breach

The JPM Quick Deposit application was reportedly built in-house, other Vendors such as EasCorp’s Depozip provide similar functionality. As for the success of this application, NetBanker reported USAA’s recent numbers for Deposit@Mobile. (update 20 Aug, my friends at BAC tell me that they have been trialing the Mitek application for almost 3 years now, fine tuning the app and the support process and are set for launch any day) .

Given that the audience for this blog (investors, start ups and innovators), you might ask why it takes 2 years for a bank to roll out this type of innovation. An excellent question! The iPhone app itself is the easy part, perhaps consisting of less then 20% of the overall budget. The “hard work” is in integrating it into existing systems and risk controls. For example, the primary value proposition, for QuickDeposit, is improving check acceptance and funds availability. At the teller line, banks have tools like DepositChek which allows the bank to determine if information on the check is correct and the account is in good standing (stopping check fraud before the check image gets into the system). These same tools must be integrated into the online and mobile process to reduce risk. I’ve picked this particular example because it is a tool unique to bank entities (not available to non-banks). In addition to the technical integration costs, banks have become very prudent in testing, and accessing impact of new functionality to call center support costs. Given the wide availability of both of these applications, it is essential that they are intuitive to JPM customers.

These applications are a great retail success. I understand that the JPM cards team is also poised for a major release in mobile soon (with multiple alliance partners). Well done JPM!

Enroll for QuickPay – www.chase.com/QuickPay

Overview of Quick Deposit  – www.chase.com/quickdeposit

Thoughts appreciated

Visa Payclick

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30 June 2010

Summary on Visa Payclick: “Partnering with banks” is very challenging…. do banks want Visa to deliver a “bank friendly” PayPal competitor.. or would banks prefer to create something they can control? View Payclick today as an Australia “test market” of something Visa intends to grow, with an initial consumer focus on digital goods.

Visa just launched Payclick (www.payclick.com.au) with plans to expand globally. I see this service competing more with Bango (see http://www.bango.com/) and payforit (www.payforit.com) than PayPal. There is no way for a consumer to withdraw funds placed in the wallet, or to be paid..  (it is not a wallet), it allows for the addition of current account funds through BPAY integration (note BPAY is a bank owned consortium in Australia providing common services like telephone and online bill payment). Allowing multiple funding instruments provides for a lower cost of funds, and BPAY penetration is over 80% in online customers. However the inability to credit the wallet, while  simplifying risk and fraud operational challenges, limits the consumer value proposition and the addressable market. Given these wallet restrictions, Visa has chosen an initial market focus on teens buying digital content… this narrow market focus may provide Visa the opportunity to “kick the tires” on the system before expanding it (geographically and demographically).

Re: Expansion.  I understand that Visa is “in flight” with expanding the AFT/OCT transaction set (See Patent) which is the heart of the Visa Money Transfer service. My global card contacts tell me that Visa is attempting to get issuers on board with credit push in an updated issuer agreement (see Visa Money Transfer Overview – Issuer presentation). The “incentive” for issuing bank to accept new agreement is a $0.50 revenue share. Banks are not biting on this (subject of another blog on Visa and card remittances).. hence my guess is that the Payclick service has “visions” for being bi-directional.. but not until issuers sign off on accepting OCT transactions.

We should not assess Payclick based solely upon current functionality, given Visa’s substantial investment here there must be plans for additional transaction types. The CYBS acquisition gives Visa assets to develop something much more comprehensive. For example, with the CYBS could serve as an acquirer for Payclick as a “light” tool for small merchants selling digital goods in mobile market places and app stores.  On the consumer side, Visa has a steep hill to climb in creating a value proposition which would drive consumers to store card information with Payclick (particularly given the competing payment methods above).

Risks I see for Visa in Payclick:

  • Initial target demographic is well served by both Bango, Paypal, iTunes Wallet, prepaid card (for my teen), payforit (UK), MNO billing, …
  • “Send only” functionality will not create critical mass in either consumers or merchants
  • Banks will not bite on OCT transaction set and service functionality will not be able to expand
  • Visa will loose focus after core innovation team departs
  • CYBS can acquire and service… but it will take serious marketing dollars to create a new consumer brand… as well as a solid value proposition.

Add these risks to Visa’s existing “dynamic” with  retailers (a group that is not favorably inclined toward assisting Visa nor any card network) in creating another payment type  (issues w/ interchange, compliance, fraud, payment system integrity, ..). Since Visa’s IPO,  Banks are no longer in control and also view Visa’s efforts through a new competitive lens. Banks also like the idea of having their own brand on payments. Thus, Visa is stuck managing a complex 4 party system with limited ability to create an innovative value proposition which all parties can agree on.

Visa is facing head on competition from “unshackled” teams like PayPal. In fact PayPal just launched mobile instant checkout today .

Feedback appreciated

Emerging Markets: MMU Revenue Challenge

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4 June 2010

Subject: In this post I attempt to estimate “critical mass” financial numbers for a mobile money to the unbanked (MMU) service to be sustainable.

I’m a few weeks late in publishing this, it just slipped off my radar. Attended the GSMA Mobile Money Summit last month in Rio. Great people in attendance, although the event itself leaved much to be desired.  The MNOs had a focused set of meetings on the opening Monday covering “how to work with regulators” which is certainly a key to success. I was struck by the volume numbers in country pilots.. they are so small.

Safaricom released earnings at the beginning of the month. This data coupled with the data from the Mar 2010 Gates foundation report provides insight into the challenges faced by new payment mechanisms in other emerging markets. Market approaches will surely be tested as other countries attempt to replicate the MPESA success. It has taken 3 years, and some very unique market conditions, for Safaricom drive this service into profitability. 

Summary

  • MNOs must reach around 8M users (or around $300-500M per month GDV) to break even
  • Bill Payment is key to driving payment volume in emerging markets
  • Without a regulatory partnership everyone looses. Phillipines wins prize for best bank, MNO, regulatory partnership in the world.. if you want an example of success talk to Rizza at GCASH.

Safaricom Revenue Data

Safaricom Annual Report shows MPESA “Total Annual Revenue” of 7.56B KES ($93M USD, 9.48M users) for the year. Gross Volume is not published.. but there is other “anecedotal data” to give more color:

  • transferred a cumulative Sh405 billion since launch
  • US $320 million per month in person-to-person (P2P) transfers
  • US $650 million per month in cash deposits and withdrawal transactions at M-PESA stores (Gates foundation)
  • Average Sh1.8 billion a day ($670M per mo total). In Earnings release. (does not align w/ number above)
  • Grew from 5M to 9M users in 2009
  • Interest from $1B+ settlement funds is not included in either Vodafone nor Safaricom’s earnings. Understand there is agreement between CBK and other parties to use for infrastructure, education and microfinance.
  • Note: The Gates foundation numbers on P2P and Tran volume seem high.. I’ve never had them before

Calculation

  • Given growth of 100%, assume average 2010 (May-May) volume GDV of 320+650/2 = $485M USD
  • Monthly revenue of $93M/12 = $7.75
  • Take Rate = 7.75/485 = 160bps (seems about right)

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