Payments 2020 – MVP Continued Domination?

What is the top performing industry group? MVP outperformed FAANG over last 4 yrs by 34 points.. will this trend continue?

I’m back to blogging after a 5 year hiatus… The CEO thing is rather all consuming. Glad to have an exit so I can get back to my fellow payment geeks. 

What to blog about first? Given we are in new decade I thought about writing some grand predictions.  But rather than look forward, we must spend a little time in the past, as the past 10 years have been JUST AMAZING in payments. I’m calling this blog series “payment growth vectors” where I hope to recap what has transpired in payments (history) to provide a trajectory for evaluation of the future course.  

Continue reading “Payments 2020 – MVP Continued Domination?”

Token update – TCH + 2 Big Banks and Paypal

I’ve been writing about this token stuff for over 5 yrs. Wow.. This is an update to my June 2013 blog – Tokens: any volunteers ,  SRC- W3C and Tokens and the Trojan Horse.

First my bias.. I may be naive.. but as I stated in Tokens and the Trojan Horse

Visa and Mastercard provide a level playing field for Issuers and Merchants (with few exceptions). Per my blog Payments Civil War, V/MA are a fantastic creation that have experienced profound success (and growth). As I outlined in the Changing Economics of Payments, the beauty of the V/MA model is that it creates incentives for millions of businesses to invest billions of dollars. For investors, the attraction of V/MA is that it is scale free.. with minimal effort required to add volume. While there are MANY more logical ways to deliver payments.. there are none with more profitable incentives for investment.

Tokens are an enormously powerful control point for the payment networks. 9 years ago the banks were working to “build a new Visa” within an initiative launched by The Clearing House. The idea was to create a new scheme that “wrapped” account numbers with another number (token) and avoid network routing (see wrapping). The networks smartly came down and issued clear guidance, if you wrap my card number with another number …. It is still a Mastercard/Visa.

TCH has been seeking a partner for tokenization since Paul Gallant led the 27 bank consortium 8 yrs ago.  Can you imagine the sales pitch (as I reviewed in the Trojan horse) “give me all of your customer information, I will lock it up.. and give you one of my keys for you to access it”. Google, Apple and Amazon have all smartly said no. What is the remaining “big” eCommerce Cards on File (COF) home? You guessed it PayPal.

While I’m not 100% sure about this.. it is the only group left AND two of these banks told me this week “Paypal is the only one that can move merchants effectively”. I was shocked … paypal can move merchants more than Google? They responded “Google has the best technology, but they just can’t sell merchant more than adwords”.. wow.

Thus my best guess is that 2 of the top banks are working with Paypal as the processor/gateway  to move “W3C” in the direction of the TCH tokenization service. The head of the W3C WG wrote me on twitter

Quite frankly my head is spinning. W3C is a browser standard.. how can Paypal get their TCH tokens in? I haven’t figured this out yet, but what I do know is that the complexity is enormous. We have 3 different token services

  • Visa VTS/MA MDES (Apple is primary customer)
  • Google (see Blog) – had no choice but to develop a new custom “standard” by which the encrypted FPAN flows to the merchant acquirer
  • TCH – Paypal + ??

And also multiple new eCom standards

To read what is happening you must therefore take a matrix view.  Obviously Google is moving with their own token service and W3C. Paypal seems to be moving with TCH and W3C.  Apple with network tokenization and ApplePay.

My head is spinning. I must say I did buy Paypal stock this week. I’m just floored that top tier issuers are innovating with Paypal.. focus, partnerships and execution are moving them into the bank friendly category.

Payment Data.. Banks are NOT the problem

Loss of Anonymity in Payments and the threats to Banking, Retail and Consumers

Compelling WSJ article yesterday on Facebook and Bank data. This article doesn’t begin to touch the extent of the problem. When it comes to data, there 2 very very distinct camps. Those that care about consumer data and their role in managing it, and those that don’t. 

Banks and payment networks care and are “squeaky clean” compared to the rampant data sharing going on within marketing (retailers directly to the big ad publishers). While Cambridge Analytica brought about changes to 3rd party data sharing the entire ad industry has DRAMATICALLY increased direct first party data sharing. In other words many large retailers are sending their real time SKU level purchase data (for all customers) directly into the big Ad Platforms.

  1. Google Offline Conversions API
  2. Facebook Offline Conversion API
  3. Agency Example
  4. Gartner CDP Magic Quadrant

What enables retailers to identify consumers and send this data to Ad Platforms? Historically, only retailers with loyalty card schemes could do this, but recently Payment cards have transformed to become the virtual loyalty card used to accurately identify consumers (without Bank/Network permission). This is shocking, as Payment cards have a solid track record for protecting consumer identity (ie anonymity in payment), with payment anonymity a core “feature”. Within the 4 party network schemes only issuers could identify the consumer, enabling issuing Banks maintain the critical role of Identity broker (see blog). As former banker this makes my head spin, as the Payment Card Industry (PCI) has invested BILLIONS to protect transaction data.. Only to have it pour out from a hole.

Example

Today, when a consumer uses their V/MA card to purchase the retailer creates an “anonymized ID” and stores the transaction set internally (at ~50% of the top 10 retailers) with the entire inventory of items purchased. There are few rule or privacy issues here (IMHO), as general trends and loyalty are measured.  However, retailers are voluntarily sending this transaction data (mapped to consumer ID not PAN) directly to the big Ad Platforms. The ad platforms then map this activity to the “anonymized ID” customer behavior it maintains (ex preference for soccer and CNN.com). Issues with this model:

  • Replacing the PAN with another Anonymized ID SHOULD NOT cause it to run under a different “rule set”. If ANY card information was used in the mapping, it should run under network rules
  • Neither the issuers, the networks nor the consumers have permissioned this data sharing.
  • Banks will never have a data business if data plays in this way
  • Retailers are giving away enormous consumer insight and strengthening the pricing power of Google/FB
  • The value of the “raw data” will diminish. Once reliable predictive models and preferences are established (ex Tennis player that likes Lacoste) I no longer need the raw data
  • Data is the “new uranium” we must work to control dissemination or it will destroy those touching it.

Obviously data is following the path of least resistance to centralization points that can act on it efficiently (covered in my blog Equifax, FB and Dangers of Data Centralization). However the ABILITY to act on data is different than the rules which data should act within. Transaction data was developed with VERY thoughtful rules and controls. For example, when a party submits a transaction or request the counterparty is known as is the legal agreement under which the “transaction” operates. Trust developed as a result. Trusted data must be managed.

Russ Schrader (Commerce Signals GC/CPO and Executive Director of the National Cyber Security Alliance) put together these 3 simple rules of thumb when thinking about data use:

  • Right to have the data
  • Right to use the data
  • Right to share the data

To be clear my goal is NOT to create a government imposed GDPR in the US. Rather I want Banks and Retailers to have a data business, and create great new consumer experiences.

Yes I have a bias here, it is what I built my company around (see Federated Data®). Data centralization is the v1.0 architecture of data science. Sure you can learn great things if all the data is mashed together but the value of data is based upon use. If you can’t control use… you can’t control the unique value that is unlocked (or the rights) within a given use.

Bank/Network Actions

Let me be clear.. banks must have a role in data! The economics of payments are changing. Banks must protect their ability to deliver value beyond the transaction. Banking is a commerce function and Alipay has shown what the future holds for “commerce orchestrators” .. payments allow them to become banking orchestrators as well (see WSJ and Ant Financial).  There are both offensive and defensive actions that must be taken. 

  1. Defense. Change the rules to protect your data ensure every party “in the network” is operating on your data with permissions. Your data is playing in the market today.. and you don’t even know it. Banks have permissioned and distributed their data to marketing, loyalty, and shared market insight vendors. While individual transaction data may not be distributed by your partners, consumer level models are built and shared (see Banks as a Data Business). Typical network rules allow for merchants to use card information for the purpose of “loyalty and marketing” these rules need to be tightened up as the rights to share this data with many parties was never part of the original intent.
  2. Retailers are not big enough to force change within the ad world. You are..  Ensure that all data operates within the simple rules above.
  3. Banks must collaborate in data. As a top 3 bank told me “… we have learned some very hard lessons in data, no one bank is big enough to go it alone. What we should have remembered is the success with V/MA. Even though we compete with [Banks] a common network allowed millions of businesses and consumers to work with us consistently….” and another “ The real threat to banks is the Alipay. We need a common data network with common rules. Banks have a role to play in creating great consumer experiences however there are only a very few of them we are poised to lead”.  
  4. Take on the roles of transparency and consumer champion.
Retailer Actions

Retailers have a right to payment data. While big data can create great new insights if we centralized and analyzed all conversations, there is a downside. Digitally, every interaction you have with a consumer is a conversation. Brands must manage who gets to take part in these conversations and build insight from them. If your downstream data “partners” mis-use your data your customers will go to Amazon (which doesn’t share data with Google and FB).  You must create great consumer experiences, but you must balance against consumer privacy and your rights to the data.

  1. Maintain control of your data supply chain. Both WHO is using your data and HOW it is being used. Create a mission control that allows you to see what data is shared with Whom, for which Use under which legal agreement (a shameless plug for our service)
  2. Rather than sending out raw transactional data that improves pricing leverage of Goog/FB build a CDP and enable your own targeting. Make partners bring their insights to you, or ask you to append a propensity score for a specific campaign.. not raw data for all of your customers. This is what Commerce Signals enables. 
  3. Hold all marketing partners accountable to performance against a common benchmark. This does not mean a measuring against a panel of 8M location based “presence” participants. But leverage your transaction data to measure performance consistently. This means Google and FB must be measured against your metrics.. Not report their own. Mark Pritchard of P&G is the most vocal advocate of this approach

For more information, please see my previous blogs

Rewiring – Part 2: Walmart+Goog, Amazon+Whole Foods, …

I’m taking a rather abbreviated approach to blogging today.. as most of my key points have more detail in my other posts. I’ll just link to my old posts and focus on a few new thoughts. Continue reading “Rewiring – Part 2: Walmart+Goog, Amazon+Whole Foods, …”

The Ledger.. and a new SWIFT Killer?

Money 2020 was a little short on big announcements. My #1? Visa/Chain announcement. Chain will open its entire platform (software core) to developers enabling distributed innovation (ie investment) by hundreds of start-ups and bespoke networks looking to connect.  My #1 bet is that the first focus area for Visa/Chain will be in replacing SWIFT.  For those not familiar with the intricacies of global commercial money transfer via SWIFT see my youtube video.

SWIFT is a global messaging network that enables all member banks to communicate in common language, it handles no funds, nor does it manage settlement. Swift sends standard messages to banks to settle funds. In the SWIFT model the instruction is normally sent by the originator of the payment to a beneficiary. Originating banks can determine which set of correspondent banks to use (think routing control).

Visa and Mastercard are also messaging networks (see Structural Changes in Payment, and Real Time Payments). The short summary of these blogs:

  • Real time gross settlement (RTGS) is only possible if all parties have funds in a common settlement entity.
  • Fedwire, NYSE, ..have real time settlement as all “members” have funded accounts for a net settlement (think daily margin calls)..  but all other US payment networks are messaging only, with settlement handled as a (daily) back end process.

0201_cio_ledg_g_20160201185005

The idea of Blockchain “replacing” SWIFT is not new, Ripple has been working with Santander, Bank of America and others (see Finextra). Ripple is both messaging, and real-time gross settlement system (RTGS in XRPs). Ripple’s messaging is called the Ripple Transaction Protocol (RTXP) or Ripple protocol, it is built upon a distributed open source Internet protocol, consensus ledger and native currency called XRP (ripples). Think of Ripples as a private bitcoin. One of the most common criticisms of Ripple is that Of the 100 billion XRPs created, 20 billion XRP were retained by the creators, who were also the founders of Ripple Labs.

Chain on the other hand is blockchain infrastructure (great WSJ article) open for innovation. Chain powers distributed ledger(s) for multiple uses. Think of Chain as enabling each bank to have a local copy of a indisputable record… an incorruptible and infallible accounting ledger. Fund transfer certainly needs such a record, but for “accounting” to be effective there must be trust and settlement. Note that Ripple handles this settlement problem (XRP ownership ledger) trust, but has issuess in conversion to the “common XRP currency”.

Trust among financial intuitions is historically managed by networks and operating rules. For example there are operating rule for NACHA, Visa, Mastercard, … etc. Operating rules also are governed by laws and regulation (ex WHO can transact, how are transactions reversed, how are participants certified).  I would argue that a payment network’s greatest asset is Trust among parties (and devices, form factors), with each participant governed by complex sets of rules, terms, certifications, operations, standards.

Important to note that Blockchain doesn’t require trust to properly record transaction, but rather rules to take action upon the ledger’s data. In other words, it is technically feasible to give a copy of the transaction ledger to every participant (who owes what to whom every day). However it is very hard for banks to take action on the ledger’s data (Transferring money – ex net settlement) without a trust/settlement network. The common ledger is a must improved messaging approach, that still requires a operating rules (Trust) and a Settlement Approach.

Mastercard’s acquisition of Vocalink (the UK’s Settlement network) enables them to lead in commercial (and debit) transactions for both UK and US. This is a brilliant move, but certainly much more of a traditional technology/architecture approach. The challenge with Vocalink is that innovation is constrained by existing customers and services.

Chain/Visa has the opportunity to disrupt the commercial payment landscape, particularly when viewed in combination with Visa’s existing card network and a new settlement system. For example, most Visa transactions were settled at end of day through JPM Chase (every Visa member had settlement account).  For cross border transactions, Visa’s settlement “hubs” have correspondent relationships.

If Visa created a new Chain settlement infrastructure, or had member Bank support to leverage current infrastructure, it could quickly replace SWIFT with a far superior product which would offer transaction clearing times in 24 hrs (vs the 2-7 days with Swift). The biggest unknown is what part of Visa’s current operating rules could be leveraged to create this new settlement infrastructure. For the economic opportunity see this Fed Study

PIN Debit at the POS

Most of you have read that Walmart, Home Depot and Kroger have launched new litigation against Visa for “PIN” and Debit.  This issue is so complex it makes my head spin… For those unfamiliar with some of the basics see this article, my prior blog on PIN debit consolidation,  AT Kearney, Digital Transactions: PIN Debit Claw Back and Pinless PIN Debit. Continue reading “PIN Debit at the POS”

Acceptance – Part 1

I haven’t written much on acceptance over my 9 yr blogging career for one simple reason.. I was never “in” that side of the business. Given how much is going on in here I can’t leave it out any longer. Acceptance at the POS is a big topic, I see the following areas: Continue reading “Acceptance – Part 1”

Changing Economics of Payments

2 Dec 2015

Happy ‘After’ Thanksgiving everyone, I’m coming out of my tryptophan coma and thought I would go for a mental stretch. This is a pretty big topic, and I won’t do it justice. Thanks in advance for your comments and perspective. [Note I’m not naming the titles of my reference blogs and used only URLs.] Continue reading “Changing Economics of Payments”

ChasePay Thoughts (Don’t sell Visa Stock Just Yet)

09 Nov 2015 Updates

  • I did a Morgan Stanley call this week with Smittipon Srethapramote, ChasePay was a central topic. Evidently Chase is positioning this as a way for CPT to gain volume. Value Prop: we will clear ChasePay transactions at 0bps. Given that ChasePay and MCX don’t exist yet it may be a little pre-mature to take a bet against First Data. What is actually happening is that MCX retailers will be switching ChasePay transactions to Chase. So.. CPT may gain a few merchants.. and a little bit of incremental volume.. but it will be at 0bps. Also remember that FD has Citi, BAC and WFC as customers.. and they can do anything that CPT can do.
  • Problems with a merchant switch. The merchant switching on debit is outlined below.. not much issue here given Durbin’s requirement for dual routing. In essence debit can not be treated as PIN debit and routed directly to issuers/retail banks. However there are BIG problems with ChasePay as credit IF IT IS A VISA ACCOUNT.
    • ChasePay as a Credit must be routed through Visa and then to Chase’s ChaseNet. Merchant switching does not appear to be allowed. In other words ChaseNet Credit in an “on us” would only work if MCX merchants moved 100% of volume to ChaseNet.
    • ChasePay at MCX must be an approved card present method (CHIP or NFC). QR code is not an accepted method therefore it would be treated as CNP. Now Chase could set new unique rules on this transaction that would enable them to own the fraud, but they would need to own the acquiring as well. To own the acquiring they need more than just a “switch” from the merchant for ChasePay transactions only.
    • Tokens, VDEP and MDES. Chase is prohibited from discriminating against wallets in the new VDEP/MDES rules. Chase cards will be in ApplePay, SamsungPay and Android Pay. So consumer confusion will abound.. but also the advantages (liability shift, ubiquity, consumer experience) will make ChasePay on MCX hard to gain traction.
    • Creating ChaseNet as a new Visa. The issues above could disappear if Chase was able to create a completely new 3 party network (per section below).  But Chase has many hurdles to cross, as merchants AND CONSUMERS would both have to accept the terms of the new network and forsake the benefits of Visa. Chase is nibbling on the periphery and trying to enable a new semi closed network within an open 4 party one.
    •  Chase can deliver 0 bps payments anytime it wants to with any card it owns today. Issuers have always held this pricing flexibility. Now acquirers will pass on their fees, but this is only 20-30bps.
  • Chase has created a Visa war plan and I don’t understand why. Chase is the only major bank pushing The Clearing House to develop a token facility, they were also a driving force behind Early Warning’s purchase of ClearXChange… which is well positioned to be an EXTRAORDINARY new debit network.

As background, back in 2011 I told Gordon and Todd that they didn’t understand the dynamics of MCX. They believed they would win MCX because of relationships.. my prediction has turned out to be accurate. I said that I went in as Google and offered MCX 0bps payments with a potential of PAYING MCX to take GoogleWallet and MCX still said no . The margin in payments is in the long tail. The driver of ANY INVESTMENT here is in changing consumer behavior OR in delivering services beyond Payment.  Chase certainly has no credibility here. Payments and banking are ENABLERS to commerce.. they are NOT THE CENTER (see blog Tilting the Networks… a MASSIVE Change)

My top questions/unknowns

  1. Will ChasePay Credit be a Visa Card. If not will they acquire both consumers and merchants?
  2. Does chase believe that a ChasePay credit can run on 2 networks at once?
  3. Does Chase believe merchant based switching/LCR is permitted under its Visa Agreement
  4. What volume does Chase believe it will obtain through this product (BEYOND 0bps payments).

 

29Oct

This quarter Chase has been a favorite target of my blog (ex What should JPM do). Coming out of money 2020 it looks like my timing was pretty good. branding nascar

I just don’t get it…. WHY!?

  1. Why would JPM want a consumer to pay through ChasePay in MCX and not use their Visa card?
  2. Why would any consumer want to accept new terms of a new network (ChaseNet) to use their account in new wallet (CurrentC) with another new network (MCX). Why not just use your Visa card?
  3. Why would I want yet another acceptance brand when Visa’s network fee is so incredibly small (5-15 bps). Branding at the POS is beginning to look like a NASCAR

Back in March 2013 I wrote 2 blogs: Visa’s Golden Goose on the Menu, and JPM/V Scenarios… Which one is it? This was only 4 months after Charlie left JPM and took the top job at Visa. Most of you know I’m very high on Visa now (see Tilting the Networks a MASSIVE change).  As I’ve stated before, the story (all pure speculation) is that Chase was furious with Visa in 2011 and either buying discover or moving their entire portfolio to Mastercard or buying Discover. JPM’s BOD found out about this and threw out Saunders/Buse, hired in Charlie and gave JPM everything they wanted in a DFS purchase (thus bi-forcating VisaNet).. hey but what do I know.. (go ask the CFOs of DFS and MA.. ). Visa must feel pretty screwed over here.. after giving JPM everything they wanted, JPM still looks to create their own brand, product and network.

Value of OPEN

JPM looks caught in a “I want to be AMEX” moment… at a time where Amex itself is looking to re-invent. The value of OPEN is huge.. and it is unfathomable that the largest issuer in Visa doesn’t see it. (See Building Networks and Openness)

The funny thing is that JPM’s efforts are only crystalizing other banks to work MORE CLOSELY with Visa. Quote from top 3 issuer “FU*^& Chase, makes me want to work with the existing networks even more…”. Now we know why Visa worked with Citi on Costco and not their “friends” in Columbus. MCX will not allow any network branded cards in their wallet.. and ChasePay certainly gives chase better interchange than ACH.. but do I really want to encourage a new acceptance method that is at a lower cost? I would if I’m facing prospect of 0 fees.. but is JPM really that circumspect on the value and behavior of Visa card use?

For the model of interaction, looks like I was close in estimating what the product would look like

2013

MCX JPM

2015 (post Money 2020)

ChasePay flow

 

Chase Pay? An account with two identities?

chasepay Options

I must admit to total confusion to ChasePay.. Hopefully the community can help in the comments. The only way this can bypass visa (see blog on wrapping) is to have it run under completely new rules. Will a consumer really understand that a single account runs under 2 different rule sets? On my Apple Phone with CurrentC installed what do I use at an MCX merchant that accepts NFC (ex CVS)? Or worse if Chase does indeed allow Chase cards on SamsungPay they have created yet another conflict with MCX (because of MST mag stripe emulation).

Chances of ChasePay Success?

The MODEL above makes complete sense for PayPal, Amex and MCX. To be clear I am very very high on MCX.. but this product? Perhaps Chase cards have a loyalty I just don’t know about. Or there is something missing in my assumptions. There are 3 models of ChasePay Interaction

  1. ChasePay within MCX Wallet
  2. ChasePay within the Chase Mobile App via MCX QR Code Directly (I think this will be prime)
  3. ChasePay presented via NFC/MST (ex Samsung Pay??)

Will Consumers accept new terms for a new product operating in a new wallet with a new network? Is that really innovation? Innovation is NOT ABOUT rewiring your assets, it is about designing a great experience for the consumer.

Sorry for the short blog, spent all my time drawing the pictures.