PayPals New Plastic

No Mastercard Logo on this one…

Quite impressed that they have pulled this together.. a new card network…

This is more than a decoupled debit.. although PayPal could choose to assume settlement risk through either ACH, stored debit card (or even ATM??).  Paypal has the facilities to provide lending via BillMeLater (previous post) or to a consumer’s other preferred lender (via stored card). They are completely in control of a much larger value proposition as well.. with integrated rewards and a 3 party financial network that will compete with Discover and Amex.

I’m very, very impressed.. this is a new product that could completely disrupt traditional credit cards. Not only in rewards, coupons and incentives.. but in interest rates for every single purchase. This could be the only card you carry.. Forget about the “pay by phone number”.. the product innovation here is much more interesting than how it is delivered (plastic, phone number, bump, …).

Paypal also has a new site (beta) a few screen shots of which are below.

This new plastic is currently only accepted at Home Depot. My understanding it that Chase Payment Tech will be a lead acquirer for this new Product… I’m sure Vantive, FirstData … et.al will not be far behind.  I will attempt a more thoughtful analysis later… thoughts appreciated.

Square passes $4B GDV

18 April

Updating my valuation and metrics from previous posts below

http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2011/02/24/do-squareups-square/

Last February, Square was running at 9k active merchants, and $2M GDV/day. Today (Mar 2012) Square’s GDV (annual run rate) is $4B which equates to $10M/day ($40-50k/day net revenue). 

Consistent with last year’s analysis, we can derive Square’s revenue and their “active” customer base

Rev = TPV * Transaction Margin

Transaction Margin = Merchant rate less processing costs = 295bps – 250bps = 45-20bps

Square FY12 Rev = $4B * 45bps = $18M  (top end)

 Active Merchants:  ~80-100k

Very impressive growth… They obviously have another source of revenue planned (ie advertising/incentives) if they can justify a $4B valuation…  I give some comparables in this previous blog. A $4B valuation would be $50k/ merchant.. wow.. quite  an acquisition cost. All of this is particularly ironic given IBM’s recent sale of their Retail Store Systems (RSS) division to Toshiba TEC for $870M. RSS has 14 of top 20 global retailers, $2T+ in retail sales, 20-40k developers (in retail IT teams), …

http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2011/06/29/squares-1b-valuation-its-not-a-payments-business-any-more/

Nokia, Apple, Android, Value Creation and Distributed Innovation

10 April

Description: http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2011/10/29/48158-131993377233806-Stephen-Rosenman.jpg(Cool title…? You can tell I’m an engineer)

I was catching up on some reading this Easter weekend and saw one of my old MIT Technology reviews lying around. Article was on Nokia’s new CTO Henry Tirri (Dec 2011). Question came to mind: to what extent does technology influence Nokia’s future success? Is Apple’s current success built on technology?  Of course, although any CTO’s job gets harder when their CEO is forming alliances that are 100% potential and 0% market traction…. Oh I forgot Elop also sold your own OS to Accenture so there is “no way back”. (For more background on Nokia/MSFT see this UK Guardian Article).

What factors will influence success in Mobile? Obviously it is not R&D, as Nokia’s 2.9B EUR ($3.8B) budget was roughly twice Apple’s $2B (see global 2012 R&D Spending report from Battale). Most would agree that Nokia lost in connecting the phone to the internet.. No amount of internal R&D could have led Nokia to build an equivalent network.. yet they did not fully realize the value that consumers could unlock … at least not much beyond e-mail. (RIM suffered from a similar myopia.. security vs usability locked into the corporate environment).  Nokia’s R&D engineers thus toiled away with features they could control and build.. That is what engineers do.. Nokia thought the battle was in feature/function.. and hundreds of specialized designs for many global “segments”. However the consumer opportunity that Apple discovered was not in hardware, but rather in delivering new ways to connect consumers to all things digital… particularly networks (internet, home, social, entertainment, …  and eventually office).

Will “Apps” be the key to unlocking the value of mobile?

In the press last month, we saw the analysis by Flurry that Amazon is kicking Google’s rear in App store revenue (89%), and that Google itself makes 5x more on IOS than Android.  Other recent research from groups like ABI Research reported that mobile app revenue was $8.5B with 39% due to in app purchases (Gartner says $15B). Personally I find both these numbers a little hard to believe, given Google’s Android revenue is $550M and Apple announced back in July that it paid developers $2.5B (cumulatively over life of AppStore). Best guess for Apple’s FY11 Appstore sales is somewhere around $1.6B (see my July Blog)

Total App Store ECOSYSTEM revenue from these Big 3 is therefore approximately

$1.6B + $1.42 (Amazon’s 89% of Apple’s) + $0.55B = $3.57B

Could it be possible that these big 3 contributed less than 50% of global App Revenue? Not likely (sorry Gartner/ABI). As an investor, I’m not keen on Apps as a long lived mobile environment outside of entertainment (subject of another blog). Suffice to say my view is that “apps” are only a temporary technology metaphor for connecting clusters, goods and data. Although not a fan of “apps” I am very grateful that the App environment exists, as it is driving much innovation within a “developer community” (per Platform).  Having thousands of brilliant engineers from around the world work to deliver value benefits us all.  Which brings me to the topic of distributed innovation.

Open/Distributed Innovation

Open Source is a model most of us are well familiar with. (further reading… I ran across a very nicely done paper from 2 MIT students: Implication of Open Innovation and Open source to Mobile Device Manufacturers).  Given that mobile, advertising and payments are all networked businesses… it seems  business models supporting distributed innovation will advance at a faster pace than those where only a single entity controls the entire product or supply chain.  For example, Amazon, Samsung, Motorola, LG, HTC, Verizon, ATT, Vodafone, .. all make much larger investments in the Android platform (than in IOS). (I would love to see an analysis of combined capital investment in android platform)

However, this distributed innovation hypothesis is NOT playing itself out (ie Apple). Apple’s 1Q12 showed iPhone revenue alone was $24.4B, which is bigger than all of MSFT revenue combined.  Analysts have shown that Apple now garners 75% of mobile handset profits, with only 9% of handset market share.  So while Samsung alone has outsold Apple in Units this quarter (41M vs. 32.6M), and Android just topped 50% market share (vs Apple’s 30.2%).. Apple’s handset business PROFITABILITY dwarfs that of all of the competition (COMBINED).

So… What are the factors of competition today? Can someone else change the game?

Most would agree that Apple has won through a focus on design and customer satisfaction. Nothing looks as good, or works as reliably as an iPhone. It brings a consumer’s digital life together; it is also the channel by which we stay connected when we are not at home. Description: C:UserstomDocumentsPersonalblogmobile_os_satisfaction.gifApple’s unique ability to control design and manufacturing quality has obviously provided many benefits (which customers have proven willing to pay a premium for).

The big downside in distributed innovation is complexity, there is a need for a “channel master” or chaos reigns. Many Android users witness this chaos when an app won’t work on a new hardware/OS combination.. Distributed innovation is not something that established businesses are good at. It has proven most successful in product PLATFORMS where the pace of change in each component is changing at a rate where no one company can make the capital investment to remain competitive (ex. Moore’s Law, PC architecture through present day). Intel played a very important role in this process, as it worked outside the scope of the CPU in areas such as: Intel Architecture Lab (IAL, developed common standards like PCI),  stimulated external innovation (developer training, testing, Intel Capital), industry marketing, patent/licensing. Intel defined what the PLATFORM was.. something that is common sense to us today.. but rest assured it was not given to them, rather it was something that they stepped into and took leadership of.

As we look for where the form of mobile competition may change, it would seem to be outside: hardware, software and network bandwith. With respect to hardware, features have recently begun to surpass “good enough” . Samsung’s Galaxy Nexus is an excellent example of how focused hardware innovation has enabled them to surpass the iPhone’s capabilities. If hardware is good enough, and not the primary factor of competition, it must be software, services or data that will drive competition in the next phase…

If platform is decided on software only.. then software platform with most open standard and most users (ANDROID) should dominate as any connected devices (handsets and everything else) have lower cost and more ability to “specialize”, particularly if intelligence is in the network (not the device).  But software is currently not the point of competition either… If not DEVICE software.. then what?

Stage 4 – Shift from Integrated Platform to Value Orchestration

Keeping with the assumptions above:  hardware becomes “good enough”, platform/software become “ubiquitous”, patents are widely shared (ok this is a joke.. checking if you were sleeping), and the mobile phone transforms into the networked device “bridging” the virtual and physical world then value (and profitability) will shift from platforms executing transactions to entities coordinating interactions.  This interaction of entities is what I refer to as Value Orchestration, certainly not a concept I developed. A January 2001 Harvard Business Review Article: Where Value Lives in a Networked World put it this way:

In more general terms, modern high-speed networks push back-end intelligence and front-end intelligence in two different directions, toward opposite ends of the network. Back-end intelligence becomes embedded into a shared infrastructure at the core of the network (cloud), while front-end intelligence fragments into many different forms at the periphery of the network, where the users are. And since value follows intelligence, the two ends of the network become the major sources of potential profits. The middle of the network gets hollowed out; it becomes a dumb conduit, with little potential for value creation. Moreover, as value diverges, so do companies and competition. …. In a connected world, intelligence becomes fluid and modular. Small units of intelligence float freely like molecules in the ether, coalescing into temporary bundles whenever and wherever necessary to solve problems.

This orchestration hypothesis seems to have proven itself in PCs as margin shifted away from the integrated manufacture to component “performance” differentiation (ex. peripheral price/performance) then again to software finally transforming again to orchestrators and “connected” businesses that orchestrate network value (like Amazon, Facebook and Google)…. as hardware evolves into a commodity like business.

The long term investor risk for Apple is that it will not be able to shift to a value orchestration role, and its handset business (while excellent) will no longer garner 75% of industry profits. Where will the high margin businesses develop? If we take a network view, opportunities to create value exist in interaction between clusters (ex. Retailer to consumer, Facebook community to Retailer) and within a cluster (ex Supply chain, healthcare , …etc.).  Within this cluster matrix, l like to take a Clayton Christensen view: “what problems are there that the mobile phone can solve”? which each “opportunity” assigned 5 key measures:

1) TAM (Consumers, $ Volume, Growth, …)

2) Disruptive innovation measure – price/performance (ex. Mobile targeted advertising vs. Coupons)

3) Information Control. Who owns it, how is it obtained, accuracy, privacy,  (impacts pricing power)

4) Key Alliances and stakeholders

5) Execution risk (ex. Compete with Facebook vs. Building a mobile application for a retailer)

Much of Value orchestration is dependent on data. Consumer data is highly fragmented in the physical world, do consumers/clusters want it consolidated? What are the benefits? Where is it stored (node or cloud)?  The HRB quote above painted a picture where “small units of intelligence float freely like molecules in the ether, coalescing into temporary bundles whenever and wherever necessary to solve problems”. Perhaps it is my time as a senior director within Oracle that has ruined my views on data.. but if it floats freely …how on earth can anyone organize it? Doesn’t someone need a directory? for at least one side? How can intelligence be “self assembling” in business?

My firm belief is that we will start a mobile “boom” that will dwarf what we have seen with either the internet, PCs or the industrial revolution. How big? Will at the top of my list for calculating the basis of a “New Mobile” TAM is marketiDescription: C:UserstomDocumentsPersonalblogUS Marketing Spend.JPGng.. With the US alone accounting for over $750B .. how much of that spend is targeted?

Because mobile is at the intersection of both virtual and physical, the network is larger.. it touches every consumer, every business and every “cluster”…  it is therefore many orders of magnitude more complex.  In this dynamic environment, small companies are much better positioned to deliver “focused”, simple orchestrated solutions between clusters.

Examples of Cluster ochestration:

  • Machine-machine interaction (mobile to open hotel room door)
  • Person-Person interaction (health history, alergies to Doctor)
  • Consumer-Retailer interaction (ex Mobile marketing in brick and mortar retail)

As intelligence develops, it will aggregate (ex Google/Facebook). I covered this topic back my December post Building Networks “The network forms around a function and other entities are attracted to this network (affinity) because of the function of both the central orchestrator and the other participants”.  Given that each node and cluster is resource constained.. they maintain connections to a finite number of “efficient” orchestrators/networks. Early networks build very substantial momentum..

Summary

Wow.. this went on too long..  They say a blog over 2 min of reading is a looser.. hey.. you get what you pay for.

Given the mobile device’s unique ability to serve as a point of convergence between the virtual and physical world, a Stage 4 evolution will take place where handsets are cheap and ubiquitous and networks are high speed dumb pipes (both low margin businesses). This Stage may be the leverage point where Apple’s competitors gain differentiation. Perhaps if they had some cash.. and a few bright people they could respond. 🙂

There are certainly many scenarios where stage 4 could evolve from. Orchestration requires both back end “cloud” infrastructure and localized intelligence. Both entail a complex interaction of: data, distribution, platform, cluster relationships, business intelligence, control, regulation, trust, … to deliver value. Companies like Google, IBM, Oracle, Facebook…   should be able to succeed in the central function.  If any of them agree with this blog.. they should actively endeavor to build “interfaces” and standards by which small companies can deliver the localized intelligence.. much the way Facebook has started giving some access to data.

Sorry for size

Comments appreciated.

Back from Asia

Back from AsiaDescription: C:UserstomPictures2012 NZMilfordSound and MtCookmtcook small2.jpg

23 March 2012

Just getting back from 4 weeks in Asia.. During my time there, I met with Capital (institutional investors, PE, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Banks, VCs), Companies (MNOs, Handset Manufacturers, card networks, retail) and Comrades ( my old teams from Citi and Oracle).

While stuck here in SFO (on my last leg home) I’m thinking about how to structure 5-10 blogs (as well as 4 weeks of expenses).  One of the reasons I write this silly blog is the act of writing seems to help me to structure my “raw data”(as well as having a community of great folks like you to give me feedback).  My primary goals are to identify: where investments are being made, business model innovation, and true market opportunities. For obvious reasons I don’t always highlight the gaps (in detail) as this is where I invest or look to get something else moving.

The Asia market is exciting and complex. I have to admit it was much easier staying on top of it when I had 10-20 people in each country competing locally (who could distill what I needed to know). Given my current focus on Early Stage companies, I’m particularly keen to stay abreast of the Asian “start up” economy as well as the local venture community.

What makes Silicon Valley so vibrant?  US Market Size, Human Talent, Companies, Capital, Regulation, Tax, Infrastructure, Legal, … The first item, US Market Size, continues to dominate my approach to Early Stage companies. This US is such a unique place.. $14.6T GDP, $4T in Retail Sales, $705B in Marketing Spend, 608M Credit Cards in the grasp of most of its 311M citizens. A start up could take just 1-2% of the US market (in any given area) and have some kind of sustainable success.. In the ROW… it would take 10-20% of the local market. This “market size” factor heavily influences the approach of local companies (specifically), and innovation (in general), within Asia.

Following the hypothesis for products originating in Asia: they must capture a very substantial share of the local market to become sustainable. Existing domestic institutions are better placed to both make the capital investment… and “shepherd” the product launch. This dynamic has existed for 100s of years, a form of “organized” innovation by a market leader. These market leaders are also organized into networks of suppliers as we see it in Japan/Keiretsu, Korean/Chaebol, … As you can imagine, large companies typically don’t innovate much beyond their core products. After all their managers must seek a place in the organization if the initiative doesn’t work out.  Today’s WSJ had a fantastic article that further detailed how this “innovation dynamic” created a destructive force in Japan’s consumer electronics industry.

WSJ Today: How Japan Blew Its Lead in Electronics

Previously I also wrote on Europe’s attempts to “standardize” payments infrastructure actually ended up killing all innovation in the area (note… Europe is NOT one market when it comes to banking and payments).

http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2011/03/08/payments-innovation-in-eurpoe/

Investors – Start in the US.. then expand

Thus most VCs correctly direct start ups to focus on the US for initial product launches (for now….). The key exception: China.   Most of you know my blogs are generally focused in 3 networked businesses: Banking/Payments, Advertising, and Mobile.  Starpoint’s general investment thesis is that the mobile phone will be key to linking all three of these networks… to become the point of confluence between the physical and virtual world (commerce, advertising, social, payment, …).  I have so many stories on China that I wouldn’t know where to start..  The 30 second summary:  You can’t compete without Guanxi , the opportunity is insane, the regulators are tough, US VCs can’t “experiment” in China and local partners are hard pressed to see what value you have to offer them in a domestic market.

Asia Blogs

Here are my thoughts on future blogs

  • China Market Dynamics.. Payments and Commerce
  • DoCoMo and the Japan NFC consortium
  • NFC bets in Asia – Transit Focus
  • Handsets – Future of commodity hardware?
  • SingTel’s Amobee Bet
  • US Start Ups: Penetrating Asia (picking resellers)
  • Emerging Markets – Payments/Regulatory Update
  • …?

Card Linked Offers Update

,,,,,,,,

27 March 2012

We see in the press that Google/MA have gone beta with Card Linked Offers, and Bank of America is  about to go live with “BankAmeriDeals”. I last gave an overview of this space back in November in my Card Linked Offers post. For those that haven’t seen it, there is also a must read blog by Reed Hoffman in Forbes on the subject: The Card is the new App Platform.

Here is my blog from 3+ yrs ago – Googlization of Financial Services – outlining data flow. My purpose is mentioning this blog is not to show how smart I am (as an alternate view is already firmly established), but rather to highlight how much my view on the opportunity has changed over the last 3.5 years. As I tell all of the 12 start ups in the CLO space.. if Visa couldn’t get this to work what makes you think that it will be easy for anyone else.

There is a CORE business problem I didn’t realize back then.. merchants don’t like cards and are VERY reluctant to create ANY unique content (offers) where card redemption is REQUIRED.  Further constraining the “capabilities” of CLO is lack of item detail information within the purchase transaction. IBM is the POS for 80% of the worlds to 30 retailers. Take a look at the 4690 overview here, notice what incentive solution is integrated? This was a 5 yr project for Zavers…

A story to illustrate my point on retailer reluctance. As most of you know POS manufactures like IBM, Micros, NCR, Aloha are implementing POS integration solutions similar to what Zavers has done. Most of the CLO companies above are paying the POS manufactures to write an “adapter” that will work within their POS and communicate basket detail information. (ISIS is rumored to have a 200 page Spec for this POS integration as well).  There is a very big difference between having integration capability, and a RETAILERS agreeing to use it (ie share data).  There must be a business value proposition for retailers to move… and I can tell you with a great deal of certainty.. Retailers don’t like the BANK card platform.

I emphasize BANK for a reason.. I was with the CMOs of 3 large retailers a few months ago. When asked what their payment preferences where, they answered without hesitation: Store Card. This is their most profitable product used by their most loyal customers (think private label). Do you think for a moment that a Retailer would deliver “incentives” to customers that are not in this group..  Remember, these PVL loyal customers also hold a number of other bank cards, and there is not much in the way of customer matching between data sets. I think you get my point.

As I stated previously, all offers businesses are highly dependent on targeting. Targeting is dependent on customer data, relevant content, effective distribution (SMS, e-mail, an App), campaign management (A/B testing, offer type, target audience, …). Campaign management is very dependent on feedback.  There are very few companies that can effectively TARGET and DISTRIBUTE.  The current group of CLOs is partnering with the banks to solve the targeting problem (example Catera/Citi, Cardlytics/BAC, …). This is further EXASERBATING the poor Retail adoption. Why? Here is what a CMO told me:

“Tom, lets say a consumer just shops at Nordstrom.. the card network and bank see that I just completed the transaction and now market to them … the advert is “go to Macy’s and save 20% on your next purchase”… Given that they can only offer basket level incentives this is how it must work… Tom do you know what will happen? The customer will return what they just bought and go to Macy’s and get it. How is this good for Retail?”

From an Ad Targeting/Distribution perspective, Mobile Operators certainly have an eye on this ball (mobile phone). But only a few companies like Placecast can actually deliver it for them. MNOs are truly messed up in this marketing space (within the US). If you had the CEOs of Verizon, ATT and ISIS in a room and asked “who owns mobile advertising”?.. ISIS would say nothing if both of the other CEOs were in the room.. They want it.. but no one will give it to them as they can’t execute with what they have in this space.  Verizon would say “many partners”… Their preference would be to sell the platform akin to their $550M search sale to Microsoft in 2009. So VZ wants a $1B+ Ad platform sale… who would compete for that business? I digress.. but what is in place today looks much more like a rev share… Internationally there are carriers with their act together: Telefonica and SingTel (just bought Admobi).

Let me end this CLO diatribe with a customer experience view. Let’s assume I have 12 CLO players.. each partnered with a different bank/network. Also assume that all are heavily dependent on e-mail distribution. I have 6 different cards.. and will be getting at least 6 e-mails per week with basket level discounts. Now assuming that I can keep track of which offer was tied to which card.. and use the card. I’m still left at the POS with a receipt that shows none of these basket level discounts (as they are “credited” to my account after purchase).

Without POS integration AND Retail data sharing this will not work.. the customer experience is terrible, as is the campaign’s restriction on basket level discounts. The ubiquity of cards is attractive.. as is bank data on Consumer “Store preferences”…. But both work to the detriment of retailers. What consumers will see in CLO for some time is the generic 10-20% off your next purchase that will also be available in direct mail campaigns… Let’s just hope that someone can work the double redemption problem…

My read on this for Google is a little different. Google is positioning itself as a neutral platform.. it can do Retailer Friendly.. Bank Friendly… MNO Friendly.. Manufacturer Friendly…  Each will have different adoption dynamics. Google’s objectives are likely: gain insight, be the central platform for marketing spend, be the most effective distributor of content, … . This offer beta would certainly seem to be a “bone” thrown to banks.. hey… here it is … good luck trying to make it work.

Durbin: Not so Bad… No change in PIN Debit

Fed just rolled out the final Durbin caps

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20110629a.htm

$0.21 + 5bps + $0.01… effectively leaving PIN Debit untouched for an average $38 transaction. What changed? Economics behind Signature Debit.. Sig Debit is dead…

From the Fed

Interchange fees. Networks reported that debit card interchange fees totaled $16.2 billion in 2009. Of this interchange-fee revenue, $12.5 billion was for signature debit transactions, $3.2 billion was for PIN debit transactions, and $0.5 billion was for prepaid card transactions. The average interchange fee for all debit card transactions was 44 cents per transaction, or 1.15 percent of the average transaction amount. The average interchange fee for signature debit transactions was 56 cents, or 1.53 percent of the average transaction amount. The average interchange fee for PIN debit transactions was significantly lower, at 23 cents per transaction, or 0.58 percent of the average transaction amount. Prepaid card interchange fees averaged 40 cents per transaction, or 1.28 percent of the average transaction amount.

Visa’s Wallet Strategy – Part 2

,,,

18 July (Updated from 17 June 2011

). Corrected significant error on scope of Visa Wallet. It is much more than an autofill (point 4 below)

Previous Blog: Visa’s mobile portfolio

I’ve been thinking about Visa’s wallet strategy this week. From my last blog (Visa Digital Wallet)

… a non-announcement, a rebranding of what CYBS and PlaySpan already have. Too many teams are angling to create the wallet (mobile, online, …), and not enough focusing on the value of what is in it. Google, Apple, and RIM will win the mobile wallet wars. I guess I can’t blame Visa for trying.. however it would have been nice if they could have been successful at eCommerce to start with. 

Here are the questions I’m trying to answer:

  • What is their investment thesis?
  • What assets are they trying to leverage and what opportunity do they plan to attack?
  • What is their strategy in attacking the opportunity?
  • How will the banks react/support this strategy?

For those that haven’t read my blogs for 2 years.. let me restate a few points that I’ve made previously:

  • Visa has a very big hole in their earnings with Durbin.. not only will they loose substantial debit revenue.. they could be loosing debit forever… as member banks assess whether signature debit makes sense to continue… and create a centralized bank switch for PIN debit (ala SVPCo or TCH). Merchants and consumers both prefer PIN today. I don’t believe Visa has adequately described this debit driven financial risk to the investment community.
  • Visa is attempting to fill the debit void with new transaction types, services and “cash replacement”. The top 2 prospects are G2P payments (payments by a government to people.. from pensions to welfare) and “mobile payments”.
  • There are 5 classes of mobile payments: 1) mobile initiated bank payments (ex. Monitise, , Cashedge, send your bank a message to transfer funds as in bill pay). 2) mobile commerce payments – digital  (ex iTunes, PayPal, BilltoMobile, Boku, Bango, …), 3) mobile commerce payments – physical goods (ex Square, Amazon, Visa Wallet, PayPal, Bango, ..) 4) Mobile phone as a wallet – Physical device at point of sale (ex, NFC Google Wallet, 5) Mobile Money for Unbanked (MMU) (ex MPesa, GCash).
  • Any initiative above is profitable for Visa only if: it replaces cash/other electronic (ex G2P), drives a transaction into higher margin product (Debit to Credit), increases number of transactions (customer use), or increases use of processing services (ex CYBS). Monitise obviously did none of these.
  • The big issuers are not fans of Visa’s moves in mobile and innovation. Visa is beginning to walk on toes and create “universal services”, many of which overlap with the large issuers have competing plans (alerts, offers, mobile, P2P).
  • Visa’s wallet value proposition (and solution) go something like this: Here is an API for your online banking.. consumer clicks on Visa Wallet and their card(s) get automatically stored in our digital wallet for use at any merchant site.. and a new Visa wallet account is created. Bank, you benefit by increased card transaction fees (use) and enable your customers to pay for digital goods with their Visa card in a one click service that delivers better consumer experience. Issues are that Visa has not signed up any of the top issuers and are also very dependent on PlaySpan’s existing consumer base. Most merchants don’t like the idea of helping out banks.. or Visa.. In order to change consumer behavior, and drive usage, a value proposition is needed.  Are consumers doing digital goods payments today? Yes.. what does Visa do for merchants that BTM, Zynga, PayPal.. and others don’t? Options: 1) Use our CYBS processing, 2) use API only and “form fill” to leverage your existing processor, 3) Liability shift and reduced interchange for attempted VBV use. This last one has not be covered significantly .. may delve into with future blog.
  • Visa is attempting to evolve its debit network from “debit” to bi-directional (see my VMT blog) with the OCT transaction set. This would enable it to compete with ACH and deliver services like P2P with little bank involvement.

What is Visa’s investment Thesis?

My guess is this “ replace the debit hole by leveraging our existing customer footprint into new transaction types, expand card acceptance and create customer stickiness with new products and services that work in every channel

Assets to Leverage?

  • Consumer account holders. I don’t call them Visa customers because they are not.. they are customers of the issuing bank. If a bank wants to rebrand their portfolio (to Mastercard, Amex, or a new white label) they are no longer Visa card holders.. Visa holds no consumer agreements. … BUT they want to..
  • Payment Network: Acceptance and services (Bank, merchant, consumer).
  • VBV Agreement where liability shift and interchange reduction possible (for ecomm/mcom CNP transactions)

A rather short list. Note that prior to CYBS, Visa held very few merchant agreements… it was the acquiring bank and processor that held the merchant agreement.

Strategy to attack the G2P and Mobile Opportunities?

Visa probably sees the lack of NFC handsets and POS terminals as a deciding factor in delaying any push here. The $600M-$800M in NFC GDV is too small to impact more than 5% of the Durbin hole. I believe they have initiatives lined up against the following business drivers

1. Increase number of transactions (customer use)

  • Increase merchant acceptance locations: Square, CYBS, Visa Wallet
  • Increase Consumer Use: Visa Wallet, Visa Money Transfer, Marketing,

2. Replaces cash/other electronic (ex G2P)

  • Fundamo, Playspan, Visa Wallet, ..

3. Drive transactions into higher margin products (Debit to Credit),

  • ?NFC? It would seem this is a “stage 2” plan.. They first need to get consumer’s using the wallet in high volume/frequent transactions. After they get usage.. they can migrate.. It may even line up with another partner like Apple who isn’t quite ready for NFC anything. Visa actually doesn’t seem to like the idea of a card in the phone wallet.. a wallet they don’t control.. they want the card in a VISA Wallet.. a Visa Cloud wallet that they do control..

4. Increase use of processing services… I not going to touch on this now..

Visa’s wallet strategy is a two pronged approach. Consumers will have accounts “auto created” by their issuing bank (at least the ones that implement the wallet API) and

( Old Content 17 June) all by implementing a simple form fill API where Visa’s wallet pre-populates all of the consumer information and payment items on a merchant’s checkout page.  

New Content (18 July)

Visa is looking to build a consumer footprint to compliment its CYBS online merchant footprint. To be clear, Visa is looking to grow its eCommerce processing business AND create additional lock in (stickiness) with Visa Issuing banks. Visa will first ATTEMPT to roll out this service first with all CYBS merchants… then get additional merchants to either convert to CYBS or at least Add Wallet as an additional payment type. Chase PaymentTech is expected to take a lead roll.

Value proposition to Merchant

– Merchants will be given a fairly attractive option to reduce CNP interchange with 2 Components: Attempted VBV verification (Visa can reduce merchants rates for attempted 3DS verification) and #2 reduced interchange in volume discounts with key partner banks like Chase.

– Processing Package (cost). Expect Visa/CYBS to aggressively price for non-CYBS merchants

– Single Wallet for online, mobile and perhaps even physical goods

Value Proposition for Banks

– Lock in to Visa (I can’t really think of another one)

This is not a bad strategy… IF the world were standing still.. and if Visa had a positive reputation with merchants.  The value proposition here is all built around convenience. It is a good plan.. but merchants have many other options and they know that accepting a new Visa product has always proved to be a Faustian Bargain (aka deal with the Devil).

As a side note, I saw Square’s COO today in a conference. His quote was something like “Square is much more than about swipe.. I wouldn’t have invested if that were the case”. None of us know what this grand plan is.. but obviously it must involve merchants.. and I would hope a better profit margin (from 20-30bps). After he spoke a CEO came up to me and said “the major processors love square (and Chase PaymentTech). Now there is a place for all of the sub prime merchants to migrate toward…  Can Square monetize a base of merchants that were outside of the ISO focus and processor interest? They are not doing it today..  How could they possible morph their value proposition into something with higher margin?  Keith certainly seemed to imply that Square had a merchant incentive/Groupon/foursquare model in mind. A deal of the day only redeemable at a square merchant? Hmm.. seems like a little bit of a stretch.

See related Visa Press Release here (RightCliq)

Thoughts for the week – June 9

June 10 2011

I read a fabulous survey of acquirers in Digital Transactions today: Forget PayPal And Google. Acquirers Are Most Worried About Visa, MasterCard. My favorite quote?

55% of the respondents agreed with the statement, “Larger issuers and acquirers will increasingly seek to disintermediate the card networks in the years to come,”

So much to write on this week.. so little time. So here are my abbreviated views:

PayPal going after Google.. core issue really seems to be that PayPal’s culture is changing and working for card execs is a big change from working in a young growth start up. Hence the original “valley” team is running for the exits. PayPal is upset at the exodus.. but they should probably look in the mirror for the cause.

Visa paying 22x revenue for Fundamo. Visa is hyper aggressive in mobile.. and they should be. But they have done a very poor job of articulating their strategy to the market. The only way to hold them accountable for progress is to get them to be very specific on transaction volume in emerging payment types. What is their NFC GDV? Mobile Transfer (VMT)? Offers? Active Wallets? PayPal excels here and hence has much market credibility because they are transparent with their numbers. How can investors hold Visa accountable for the investments they are making.

My favorite Visa division? PR! These guys are masters.. did you notice that the Fundamo announcement was coupled with a sustaining investment in Monitise. Just last year Monitise was their emerging market strategy. This goes along with the Square investment on the same day that Visa rolled out new mobile security standards (which Square did not comply with but are “committed to”.. going forward)… You can’t make this stuff up.

Google wallet. Great product, great team… no further comments. Funny that ISIS didn’t see this coming or they could have saved a bundle on building a wallet of their own.. humor is amplified by fact that google/android will be only mass produced NFC handset over next year or so.

Clearxchange. Finally! A bank initiative with some legs. I really like the fact that the top 3 banks are getting together on this. P2P is a no win for any non-bank.. I wish that they just bought Cashedge as opposed to building it themselves.. but hey getting 3 banks to agree on something is close to 8th wonder of the world.

Square.. Billion dollar valuation!?. See the electronic transaction article above for more detail… I wrote a blog showing that PayPal is 7x more profitable per transaction than Square. Talking to several Square employee prospects I understand that they want to get the MSB licenses to enable ACH funding.. my eyes squint on this one.. they are a TPPA… they don’t have  consumer solution.. they are a merchant solution. Perhaps they have some new secret sauce I’m not privy to.. BANKS.. this is what happens when you let an acquire capture customer contact information and why you should shut them down (see related post).

NXP Reports that they anticipate 100M+ NFC chips in next year.. WOW!! Given that Apple is not in this game.. RIM and Samsung/Android will have a great new market for devices if this projection holds. (see NXP CEO quote)

Verifone building a new business plan to support enhanced POS terminals. This is not a terrible plan.. on paper. But most merchants view the payment terminal as a nice little processor controlled device that enables them to stay away from all those nasty PCI compliance issues. Doug’s earnings chat last week indicated he was building a business around keeping these new devices fresh with applications (on the Payment Terminal). I wonder what IBM, NCR and Micros think about this? Or even the store CIO? Most stores at least actively manage their cash registers.. can you imagine creating a whole new IT team to manage version control, release planning and testing on the terminals.. Heck this is why retail stores freeze these things.

Durbin.. banks are down in the dumps this week as $12B in debit revenue goes down the tubes.. the final rate may be above $0.21.. but its not a win for the banks. There are some very big investments being made by the banks to further reshape products. In this I completely agree with the Electronic Transactions article above.. I see consolidation of the 6 debit networks.. and at least 2 banks experimenting with their own branded ATM/Debit card. Why should Visa get any cut of the $0.21?

Rumor mill .. instant offers..?

Update June 9

Visa Acquires Fundamo for $110.. Visa.. if you want to keep these things confidential … best not to do a road show before the announcement. Nice of you to throw Monitise a few crumbs in the PR as well ..

Strategically Monitise is set up to serve mature markets and existing customers. Fundamo will focus in emerging markets. This actually makes some sense..  Fundamo is a great little company. Hope Visa can leave it alone so they don’t kill it.  I’m sure Visa wants to integrate the remittance/VMT service in there.. and would love to take part in the upcoming “wave” of G2P payments.  Of course global banks have the real edge here.. more thoughts on this later.

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Many rumors floating around about the big card network based in California.

1) Instant offers. Merchant.. if you send us all of the line item detail in level 3 we can send your customers instant offers. Funny I should hear this rumor today.. I just got an SMS text from Visa on my offer of the day: 15% off Rocky Mountain Chocolate. Yeah.. great deal… I DON”T EAT CHOCOLATE

What is the merchant’s upside? reduced interchange? Nope… issuers get to set that.

I get the “privilege” of Visa talking to my customers directly? Yep.. I also get the honor of giving both Visa and the issuer my detailed pricing information!! As a merchant do I really want Visa and the banks to hold my price list? Remember I’m a banker.. so my friends (if I have any left) whom are  reading this are probably saying “Tom will you please shut up”.  My hope in writing this is that many banks will just skip the hassle of participating in yet another failed initiative. This business model does not work.. it is not retailer friendly and Visa has NO EXPERIENCE in running an ad network or communicating to consumers BEFORE the sale.

To summarize, there is nothing wrong with Visa’s technology here.. but this is not a technology problem. Retailers will give their consumer data up very selectively.

Rumor #2

Visa  has a new strategic relationship with Fundamo.. My friends in India and ME tell me that Visa and Fundamo are making the rounds together. What about poor Monitise?

Rumor #3

Obopay is a partner in Visa Money Transfers.. Another marketing announcement with no business value.

All of these seem to further the impression that Visa is pushing many strings up hill in the hope that something sticks in mobile. My recommendation from my last blog holds.. Create a new company and let your innovation group spin out. You will not be able to effectively deliver innovation in your current 4 party model. You must establish a new payment network which you can control…. perhaps you should think about buying Discover…