Retailer CRM … enabled by ?Payments?

Question for the day: As a consumer goods Retailer, how do you build a CRM solution when you don’t know who your customers are?

Back in my Oracle days, Larry launched Oracle CRM. Quite frankly I was a little slow picking up “front office” back then. My areas of focus were: banking, supply chain,  online stores, B2B businesses…. in all cases we knew our customers (although not always our prospects). At Citi we were much more focused in online acquisition and tuning the marketing funnel, we were able to improve performance 2x-4x by looking at where profitable customers were coming from and the costs to obtain them. Running sales teams helped me appreciate how wonderful a tool salesforce.com is… and of course  my partner Peter Burridge (former CEO of Seibel Asia) and friend John Buchanan (founder/CEO of Retek) helped fill in many other “gaps”  in my retail CRM understanding: demand planning, config management, merchandising, inventory optimization, behavior tracking, …

Customer Relationship Management “CRM” still has not clicked for me.. it is not an obvious “bundle”. Given $2.4T in retail sales, and $750B in US marketing spend.. isn’t it amazing that there is not more “structure” managing the customer in retail? Why? I believe itss primarily driven by a lack of KYC (know your customer). Not KYC the way bankers interpret it.. but just a basic understanding of who shops at your store. I was in a forum with the CMO of Gap and she said “I get at least 2 calls a week from start ups and I have bandwidth to do 2 things next year… one will be with someone big like Google… the other with someone that will help me use my data to better reach my customers”.

How can Retailers get to know their customers? The traditional solution has been loyalty programs (Colloquy is a great resource for industry data), however we are begging to see some significant innovation as the business models of Square, Google, Amex, MCX are all starting to shift to address this problem.

Example was given by Ken Chenault and John Hayes last month. Amex has a pilot going with Loyalty Partners (which it acquired in 2011) in Europe. Retailers contribute their line item data to Loyalty partners and then they are able to couple it with issuer data for both analytics and targeted marketing/incentives.

Targeting individuals based on hard data (ie beyond the website you visited), and getting feedback on marketing effectiveness (actual purchases) is the holy grail of marketing.  Don’t think of Amex’s activity as payments, think of it as helping retailers execute a CRM strategy. Card linked offers, prepaid offers are fundamentally broken.. they only solve a yield management problem … while destroying brand and pricing. At the end of the day CLOs and PPOs don’t build loyal customers and reinforce price as the central decision point.

By helping Retailers know their customers, Square/Amex/Google are tackling a VERY BIG problem. These are not the only companies.. my bet is that we will see a wave of participants:

  • Banks work to extend payment networks,
  • Retail CRM providers extend software,
  • Loyalty systems (like Catalina) work to extend services, and
  • Retailers build new ad/payment data networks (MCX)
  • Advertisers extend to POS integration
  • …etc

This is a VERY VERY big wave with tremendous implications for big data, marketing, advertising, enterprise software, privacy…

What should we call this wave? Enabling retailers to know who their customers are?  Would you give up your anonymity for real value? Would you allow an advertising agent to take bids to reach you? Think of yourself as a professional athlete.. sponsors lining up..  What is the price of your loyalty? Is this where Amazon Prime is today?

If retailers and CPGs could focus marketing spend ONLY on relevant customers, just imagine the impact to other advertising channels.. no more free TV? no more billion dollar Olympics?

Happy Thanksgiving.

V.me: Issuers please give me your customers

16 Nov

Visa is an independent for profit company… they are on a tear with adjusted earnings up over 19% and the stock up over 40% for the year. Who are Visa’s customers? They are a network, created by banks.. but they only set rules.. historically they don’t have direct relationships with merchants or consumers; the issuing bank owns the consumer, and the acquiring bank owns the merchant. Their primary customer is therefore banks (issuing and acquiring).

With the CYBS purchase, Visa gained direct merchant relationships. CYBS at one time handled over 25% of eCommerce transactions. The “big 3” in online merchant services are now eBay (Paypal+GSI), Visa (CYBS) and Amazon. Visa is looking for ways to expand its network, services and revenue base. The expansion is very hard to do if you are dependent on your member banks, hence Visa is looking to establish a direct consumer touchpoint in line with Cybersource’s merchant capability.

In my very first blog (2009 Googlization of Financial Services),  I outlined both the alert service that Clairmail built for Visa, and the advertising/offer engine they had put in place. Neither the alert service nor the ad service had taken off as issuers were not exactly thrilled with expanding Visa’s services or opening the door to Visa’s efforts to communicate directly to consumers. Clairmail has since been acquired by Monitise ($173M in March 2012).  Monitise is the entity that build “Visa Offers” and initially was “the mobile horse” which Visa intended to ride … until they upgraded to Fundamo. Now Monitise seems to be focused on the offers product… (See Visa Mobile Strategy). Visa wants to get into the card linked offers business (Visa Offers, FreeMonee, Monitise,…), and has had the technology working for sometime, they also want to get into the wallet business. (see Battle of the Cloud)

Neither of these services are to the best interest of issuers, which is why we see a hodgepodge of small banks without the resources to properly digest the strategic impact, or build the technology themselves in this recent V.me “50 bank pilot”. Let me be crystal clear on what I believe Visa’s strategy is:

  1. establish direct consumer service
  2. start with eCommerce (autofill) functionality to speed checkout and improve conversion
  3. add alerts to give consumers knowledge of card transactions
  4. add incentives/offers in 18 months (they already have built the service)

This is why Visa hates the Google service.. it steps all over their plans online.. as well as at POS (not in scope for this blog).

Take a look at V.me terms and conditions. They have done a great job in obfuscating their strategy in this document, as it clearly states that issuers have control

These Terms do not amend or otherwise modify the cardholder agreement or any other terms and conditions of your Issuer. In the event of any inconsistency between these Terms and your cardholder agreement with your Issuer, these Terms govern as to the relationship between you and Visa solely with respect to V.me and your cardholder agreement with your Issuer governs as to the relationship between you and your Issuer. You are responsible for ensuring that your use of the Services complies with your cardholder agreement with your Issuer.

Visa Alerts is the service where banks should start to become concerned. For the first time, visa is creating a list of consumer names, emails (above) and mobile phone numbers. Alerts will start with card usage, and then they will morph into incentives and offers based on spending patterns. These incentives will be offered completely separate from the issuers. In the V.me privacy policy “We share some information, but not your full card number, with merchants you pay with V.me” and “We may contact you about your V.me account, service updates, and new V.me features”.

I’ve got news for the V.me participating banks.. why don’t you just give Visa your customer list and give them permission to use it as they want? You have just given Visa much more.. They can now act on transactions they see on the switch.

I see Visa quickly expanding the service beyond eCommerce to physical commerce primarily around offers and alerts. You will be able to redeem offers across any card stored in your V.me wallet.  This means that V.me will work without eCommerce merchant adoption… and could be a stand alone offers platform. Of course they don’t want to lead with this… but it is indeed where Visa sees the best margin.

Banks.. get serious about this. Why would you want to let Visa step all over your brand and start delivering services to consumers directly? This is the start of a major tipping point for Visa… the Top issuers are fuming… but Visa may be able to build consumer adoption ahead of banks pulling the plug on it.

There is certainly no reason to worry.. take a look at the participating merchants https://www.v.me/shopping/  not exactly a whose who of online merchants. Why is this? well my merchant friends are also aware of Visa’s efforts to do the incentive business and the last thing they want is another entity switching consumers to the lowest cost provider. V.me on an eCommerce perspective is fine.. but what Visa doesn’t realize is that Google, Paypal an Amazon all have this today. (ex Google has autofill in Chome browser and Android…). If Visa has trouble signing up its own CYBS merchants.. what issues do you think they will have in signing up with those on GSI?

New Blog location

blog.tomnoyes.com

This blog will still remain active, as the archive of 390 past notes.. new postings will be on both sites for the next few months.. but at start of the year all new posts will only go on above.

I’ve moved the blog over to Amazon EC2 in an environment I can control. Quite frankly I was a little frustrated over the layout restrictions and limitations on putting in Google Analytics.

You can start signing up now.. your feedback is always appreciated.

Future of Retail Banking: Prepaid?

Nov 7 2012 (updated for typos)

Warning.. long monotonous blog. Sorry for the lack of connectedness, written over 7 days and my editor is rather slammed. You have been warned, so don’t complain….

Summary

  1. The competitive dynamics surrounding a “transaction account” (ie DDA) are shifting. For example, Retailer banking/prepaid products (Wal-Mart, Tesco, ..) offer significant fee advantages to most lower mass customers. Three party networks like Amex and Discover have unique advantages when combined with Retailers distribution/service capabilities. This means prepaid has become a disruption: a new good enough product…
  2. Net interest income is 64% of total US retail bank revenues, yet the bottom four deciles of mass market customers are no longer profitable. Given that the transactional account is the #1 factor for retail bank profitability, what are implications if banks loose it?
  3. There is a high probability for disruptive value propositions in Payments, as advertising replaces merchant borne interchange.  Payments and core banking will become a “dumb pipe” business unless Banks create value and assume a larger orchestration role. POS Payments are the central feature of a transaction account, if banks loose this relationship they will be in a poor position to orchestrate.

Does anyone else have trouble keeping up with state of the art? Who is doing what? My method of keeping up with change is to immerse myself in a given area for a day or two. It also gives me a reason to call my friends and colleagues.  This week the theme is retail banking. I’ve spent too much time thinking about payments and how it relates to mobile, advertising, …etc.   I thought I would dust off my banking hat and think in terms of a banker.

Retail Banking

I’m struck by how odd retail banking is. Why are banking services not more simple? Why do I have a separate savings, checking and card account? Why not one account? if the account runs in a arrears I pay interest and if it runs in credit the bank pays me interest? Why does a bank take 3-5 days to move money? How on earth do the banks afford all of those stand alone branches when I visit them perhaps once or twice a year?  Why all of the regulation? What does my bank do for me? What problems do retail banks solve? Can someone else solve these problems more efficiently?

There is certainly no single answer. Retail banking serves many demographics, from the college student to the billionaire. Historically retail bank relationships were very important relationships, as banks only lent money to people they “knew”, based on the deposits they had. Younger consumers need to borrow, older consumers …  savings. Banks focused on things like college student accounts to lock in that relationship as early as possible. Today’s modern financial markets provide for the securitization of loans, thereby spreading risk among various investors willing to assume it. Does a banking relationship matter anymore? to Consumers? to Banks?

I’m struck by how little change has occurred (in the US) on the liabilities side of the banking business? Quite frankly US consumers are treated like idiots who sacrifice “protection of capital” over risk. We now have an entire agency working to protect US consumers from banks.. (BTW what is predatory lending?). Other markets let consumers take on risk.. and hence have many more choices, and innovation, in savings. For example, I’m very fortunate to have worked with so many fantastic people over the years. The great thing about running Citi’s channels globally is that each and every country had a somewhat unique competitive and regulatory environment. It was like running 27 different banks. There were many different strategies for deposit acquisition, for example:

  • In Spain we had a 10/2 product that paid 10% interest on deposits for the first 2 months.. then went to 1%.
  • In Japan Citi leveraged its global footprint, and the poor local consumer rate environment, to create foreign currency (FCY) accounts which allowed consumers earn higher returns by assuming currency conversion (FX) risk in uninsured accounts.
  • The UK is perhaps the most competitive retail bank environment in the world. Consumers in the UK can switch banks almost as easily as changing shoes, it was thus essential to enable consumers to switch quickly and then get them into other products quickly. Take a look at today’s UK savings rates from MoneySuperMarket (8% on a fixed $30k deposit) vs the US (1.05% bankrate.com).  Rate differences on this scale helped fuel the carry trade in Japan.

In the US, it is well known (inside the banking community) that banks are highly discouraged from competing on rates. Not that it matters, this amazing study by the Chicago Fed (Chicago Fed – Checking Accounts What Do Consumers Value – 2010) shows that US consumers are rate inelastic.. and care much more about fees. You have read this right, consumers don’t care about interest rates on their deposits.. which is certainly NOT intuitive. Perhaps rates are all so close to 0% that 5-10bps doesn’t matter. Or perhaps  because the average US consumer does not save at all, and those that do have their money in another place.

Retail Bank Profitability. Net interest income (2011, represented more than 64% of total US bank revenues) is the rate spread between borrowing short and lending long, or more broadly the differential between asset yields and funding costs. Net interest margins (defined as net interest income over average earning assets) were 3.6% at year-end 2011, just 11% higher from the 20-year low of 3.2% in the last quarter of 2006.

From DB Research

As low rates persist, loan-to-deposit spreads fall as prices adjust, and longer-term securities, held as assets, roll over to lower-yielding securities (the same holds true on the funding side, of course, helping to extend the positive impact of falling interest rates into the future). The net impact on banks’ net interest levels may be negative, though. In previous recoveries, this effect has been offset by increased loan volumes, allowing banks to return to sustainable growth levels. Furthermore, as an economy recovers, banks may quickly benefit as short-term assets roll over at higher rates

To summarize: Bank net interest income is important (64%), and falling. Banks have had a key revenue source taken away from them (Debit interchange) and are also facing another merchant led suit on credit card interchange. Bank brands and reputations are on a steady downward trend. Consumers don’t care about rates, but react strongly on fees. … A new regulatory agency to protect consumers is just now forming and looking to make its mark. What are banks to do?

Transaction Account

What is the purpose of a bank provided transactional account today? Well certainly our mattresses are a little less lumpy, and the relationship factors have largely gone away. So what is left? Transactionality?

The banks have long recognized that the transactional account is the #1 factor driving a consumer relationship. Virtually every other banking product and service hangs from this account. Most retail banks view direct deposit (internationally known as Salary Domiciliation or Sal Dom) as the key indicator of the transactional relationship. Consumers have limited “energy” to connect to more than one network (as outlined in followed my previous blog on Weak Links). 

This financial supermarket concept, authored by Sandy Weill and John Reed, has not exactly been a slam dunk success. Nonetheless every retail bank starts selling with a checking account, even if nothing else is attached. What are the key factors influencing the selection of a transactional account?

  • Why are deposits important to banks?
  • Driver of overall relationship à Customer Net Revenue
  • Liquidity ratio ->Risk ->Agency Rating -> Capital Costs
  • How do consumers select a bank?

The public compete data above is completely consistent with previous proprietary studies I’ve commissioned. Consumers tend to pick their bank based on how convenient the branch and/or ATM is.

Is there something fundamentally changing? What if consumers don’t visit a branch… or no longer use cash? Are there new value propositions? Where will consumers (and their deposits) go?

Recent market developments/Announcements

The Amex Bluebird product is revolutionary in terms of fees. It is the lowest cost reloadable card in the market today. Beyond the product, I’m even more impressed with WalMart’s business strategy here. They seem to be willing to break even on payments/banking in order to win the overall consumer relationship and increase foot traffic and loyalty in their stores. Take a look at the suite of products offered by WalMart. While banks are pushing out the bottom forty percent of mass consumers, WalMart has made a bet that it cannot only serve them, but do so profitably.

There are many different types of pre-paid cards (more below), however most are not regulated as bank accounts. In almost every geography, consumer deposits (interest bearing, insured) are regulated because they drive both bank liquidity (which drives lending and cost of capital) and profitability. Remember before capital markets existed to securitize assets (loans) retail banks could only lend to the extent of their balance sheet (deposits). Consumers put their money with banks in order to earn interest (the carrot) with the downside of fees on usage (the stick).  In the US consumers are beginning to ask themselves “is the carrot big enough”?

In emerging markets many banks have a poor reputation, additionally access to legal resources are limited, as are consumer protections. How would you feel if you showed up to your bank for a withdrawal and your bank said “sorry your money is gone” and you had no recourse? This dynamic has propelled other banking models in emerging markets. For example my friend Nick Hughes and his Vodafone/Safaricom team created MPESA in Kenya which provided enormous value to consumers. However MPESA caused an apoplectic reaction from the banking regulators as 10% of Kenya’s GDP sat in a non-interest bearing Vodafone owned settlement account. MPESA therefore impacted bank liquidity (IF the funds would have gone into a bank account as opposed to just M1/cash). Visa and MA have worked hard to try to make prepaid the underlying account for mobile money in emerging markets, to very little avail. The problem is not connecting people to the V/MA network.. and giving balances to an approved bank. The problem is first transferring money to entities currently not on any network, then paying a very small number of billers.  

Why are consumers defecting in the US? Ernst and Young just published a phenomenal global study on this subject. The result of their analysis was that consumer confidence in banks is degrading. E&Y outlined a call to action by banks: reconfigure your business models around customer needs. My hypothesis is that consumers have reached a tipping point where they view banking services as commodities… In the UK, this is already well established.

Prepaid

I haven’t spent much time thinking about prepaid cards so I thought it was time to refresh myself, particularly in light of MCX and the prospect of retailers acting as Banks.

From the US Fed

Prepaid cards offer much of the functionality of checking accounts, but that does not mean the underlying economics are the same. A typical prepaid card in the data is active for six months or less, a small fraction of the longevity seen with consumer checking accounts. As a result, account acquisition strategy and the recovery of fixed and variable costs are likely different than for checking accounts. …. prepaid cards with [direct deposit are uncommon but] remain active more than twice as long and have 10 times or more purchase and other activity than other cards in the same program category. As a result, these cards typically generate at least four times more revenue for the prepaid card issuer

Similarly Pre-paid cards also face a complex web of regulation (See Philadelphia Fed Paper 2010), across 31 different types of cards.

31 types of cards? Did anyone else realize the diversity here? Wow… For the sake of this blog, let’s focus on reloadable (GPR) open loop cards (references to prepaid below are on this card type only). It would seem that GPR pre-paid is following the general disruption pattern of serving a lower tier of the market at a more attractive price point. According to Mercator, In 2009, consumers loaded $28.6 billion onto prepaid cards. By 2015, prepaids will hold $168 billion.

Last month’s WSJ ( Prepaid Enters Mainstream) outlined this dynamic

Traditional leaders in GPR pre-paid have been Green Dot, NetSpend, . The Durbin amendment exempted most prepaid cards. This means that pre-paid is largely example from the Durbin interchange restrictions… (with several conditions). Thus the business case for pre-paid is rather strong, and Banks themselves are assessing if they can make this the new “starter” account (ex Chase Liquid). However Three Party Networks (Discover and Amex) have a significant advantage.

From Digital Transactions, March 2012

While the Federal Reserve’s rule implementing the Durbin Amendment has its greatest effect on traditional debit cards, it affects prepaid cards too, especially its provision that banks’ prepaid cards can avoid Durbin price controls only if cardholders can access the funds exclusively through the card itself. That provision thwarted banks’ efforts to make prepaid cards more like demand-deposit accounts and led them to scale back or end bill payments through prepaid card accounts.

But American Express and Discover are not subject to Durbin’s controversial provisions, Daniel and Brown noted. Both companies are so-called “three-party” payment systems that function both as merchant acquirer and card issuer. In contrast, Visa and MasterCard debit and prepaid cards are part of “four-party” systems in which the issuer and acquirer are usually different companies and rely on the Visa and MasterCard networks to route transactions among them. The Durbin Amendment exempts, or “carves out” in industry parlance, three-party networks from its provisions, including interchange regulation.

“There’s no restriction on what AmEx can pay itself” for prepaid card transactions, said Brown. Thus, AmEx and Discover have a new opportunity to grow their prepaid businesses, the attorneys said.

Clearly Discover (DFS) and American Express (Amex) have an opportunity to “Kill” prepaid cards, what are they missing? Physical distribution, service and reach in the mass market. These are the very things that retailers like WalMart can provide, and in fact economically benefit by providing them.

As you can tell, regulations are driving the business models here. Most large US retailers leverage a fantastic team of attorneys from Card Compliant that specialize exclusively in prepaid cards (run by my friend Chuck Rouse). WalMart’s move to Amex is brilliant both from a regulatory and business model perspective.  

Today’s pre-paid dynamics may be the tipping point by which 3 party networks begin to overtake V/MA in growth. A trend that will accelerate when other business models require “control”. This next phase will be centered around merchant/consumer transaction data, which will begin to unlock the advertising revenue pool, which is almost 4 times larger than that of payments.

Payments and core banking will become a “dumb pipe” business unless Banks create value and assume a larger orchestration role. POS Payments are the central feature of a transaction account, if banks loose this relationship they will be in a poor position to orchestrate. 4 party networks are very, very hard to change.

I see a battle where 3 party networks work to branch into orchestration and advertising, and existing orchestrators (ie Apple/Google) integrate legacy dumb pipes (payments and telecommunication) to deliver value to the consumer. What do consumers value today? This is the call to action for bankers… who are not always the best at creating alliances.

Here is one idea, focus on trust and helping consumers solve problems they don’t face frequently. For example,

  • Make financial planning easier and less of a sales job.
  • Help manufactures and retailers connect to target consumers.
  • Become a buyers agent?
  •     Help navigate the college application and loan process,
  •     Help  buy a new car for the lowest possible price…

I know this is not a clean finish.. but that’s all the time I have.

References

Thank you Kansas City Fed for the fabulous brief from the: CONSUMER PAYMENT INNOVATION IN THE CONNECTED AGE. Bill Keeton and Terri Bradford were nice enough to invite me, but unfortunately I couldn’t attend. In my last visit to the KC fed we spoke about future payments types, but we also spent quite a bit of time discussing where mass market consumers will go if banks view the bottom 4 deciles of retail banking as unprofitable (according to proprietary McKinsey Study).  Today I thought I would pull together a compendium of my learnings on retail deposits, MSBs and pre-paid… the “transaction account” by which payments flow.

Google Wallet Goes Plastic

2 Nov 2012

Android Police published a story on Google’s forthcoming plastic pilot yesterday.

What do we know? Very little beyond the photo above.. If the story does pan out, it could be a tremendous win for retailers, consumers and even banks. The only loosers? NFC and carrier led payment initiatives.

Solution overview:

  • Everything that Wallet 2.0 does today on NFC, only now you can do it with a swipe of plastic
  • In today’s NFC wallet, consumers scroll through their list of cards to choose the plastic they want. The picture from android police outlines how this will be the same for physical plastic “want to pay with a different card? Just open the app and choose another way to pay..  just as you can today only now there is no NFC dependency.
  • New for consumers? well a cool looking black card.. all of your tickets, incentives, coupons in one place (in the cloud). Don’t worry about loosing your offer e-mails..  Google also has POS integration working at 10+ grocers so your coupons automatically come off on the paper reciept.. and in the cloud. No one else has payment and incentives put together like this.
  • New for retailers? Integrated advertising.. look at performance of local search, adwords, offers, coupons across google properties.

Business Strategy Changes

  • Expand beyond NFC phones to any Android handset (and IOS according to article)
  • Allow offers to be redeemed on plastic
  • Allow Google to compete for payments business with retailers and consortiums (ie MCX)
  • One wallet for eCommerce, mCommerce, and a plastic card for POS. This is exactly what PayPal is doing with its own physical plastic, and American Express plans to do in SERVE 2.0.
  • Expand Google wallet into IOS? That will certainly crimp Apple’s plans here. Google will establish itself as both a payment network AND and Ad network
  • No more TSMs. Google will see the transaction data for every card used in the wallet. Just as Amazon, Apple, PayPal see every transaction for eCommerce.

My guess is that Google will proceed with a small scale pilot, just as it did with Wallet 1.0.

Why do retailers win? (see related blog)

Google will be in a position to drive the lowest cost payment (perhaps better than 0bps MDR) AND allow retailers to drive marketing to their consumers online and via mobile.

Why do consumers win?

With Google, use any card you want, use any phone you want … consumers get to CHOOSE.  (In ISIS the only card you can load today is a Visa credit card)

More to come this weekend.

Google sorry that some idiot spoiled your release plans.. but this is super stuff… I always wanted a black card.

My biggest questions?

  • Will Google integrate a direct ACH connection.
  • Who is the network?

Don’t Wrap Me

26 Oct 2012

Today when you use iTunes, PayPal, Amazon or Google wallet do you think about which card in the back end your purchase will go on? Most of us take the view that “it just works”, and perhaps ensure that the default card is the one which allows you to accumulate the most points (Amex for me). When eCommerce started, there were few entities capable of managing card not present (CNP) risk hence specialists evolved (PayPal, Cybersource, GSI, …) that could manage this risk on behalf of the merchant/community. Payment cards/accounts had to be wrapped by these risk specialists in order for payments to be processed. As mCommerce evolved (think Apple iTunes), digital goods purchases where integrated into the “platforms” to allow seemless purchasing of content… thus starting the process by which cards were associated with “cloud” accounts accessed in mobile phones. Today, mCommerce sales are around $170B in the US, and mCommerce sales are around $10B (Digital Goods ~$4B and physical the rest .. which includes buying from Amazon on your iPad at home). Quite frankly card companies didn’t mind letting other entities like Amazon and Apple store your card information so that you could buy in either the eCommerce or mCommerce markets…. This is all changing for physical commerce because the PRIZE IS BIGGER.

With the Physical POS sales $2.4T (USA not including T&E, Auto, Oil/Gas)… The established networks and banks are saying “don’t wrap me”:

  • Amex’s new Serve product 2.0 is wrapping other bank debit and credit cards
  • PayPal’s new plastic is wrapping what they have already, Amex is threatening to cut both PayPal and Google down
  • Visa has reportedly issued a cease and desist to Google at the behest of Chase (See NFC Times)

All of these wallets (Virtual, NFC, Cloud, …) are causing issuers to wonder “who is top of wallet”?.. and how does a customer select my plastic. They seem much more concerned about one physical plastic card wrapping them (ie Serve and Paypal) than a virtual wallet, but they are also very concerned about data and letting any ONE intermediary see transaction data (and add offers/services on top of them). In other words “DON’T WRAP ME” (see blog Paypal at POS). Of course there is not much to worry about yet. Paypal is reportedly doing less than 5 transactions per WEEK per Store at HomeDepot..  But the established players want to stop anything before it starts.

How do cloud wallets manifest themselves? Well it could be NFC/Paypass, physical plastic, a QR code, or a voice print (Square).. all you need is a form of authentication (see Battle of the Cloud). Add to this the complexity of retailer data, issuer pricing, loyalty and incentives and the market is just nuts. Who is doing what to whom…? its like a 70s drug and sex movie.

Forces against NFC

27 Sept 2012

Although I’m not known for short blog posts.. I thought I would try one. Like grabbing a cereal bar for breakfast instead of my normal 3 pancakes, eggs, bacon, OJ, coffee… it will of course leave me with a large empty place… but sometimes it’s good to be hungry.

I read Scott Loftness’ tweet on no need for dedicated POS terminals if phones take off. Also was thinking of Square’s strategy of enabling all consumers to have an account (think cloud wallet), and my blog earlier this week on EMV/Verifone’s imaginary vision of the future (contactless EMV).  As a side note Verifone is telling investors the retails will by a massive display payment terminal to market to their customers.. FUBAR! Take a look at how IBM values the POS business.

Forces against NFC

  1. Cloud Wallets. Much is made of NFCs ability to interact independent of network.. This is great.. but remember the POS system and payment terminal are always connected. How many of you remember the days where someone pulled the blue paper over the embossed card number? All that is needed is a key… voice print, loyalty card, qr code, …  There is no need for specialized hardware today.
  2. Credit card only. Issuers, Mobile Operators and Payment Networks worked to position NFC as a “premium service”. How many of you have seen contactless debit cards? Merchants are aware.. and top 20 retailers (with few exceptions) have walked away.
  3. POS systems. Why on earth would any small merchant want to buy a dedicated POS system with a cash drawer? I think we will see tablets really start to take over this space. Although I’m not a big fan of in aisle checkout… there are variants that could work. Even more so if you eliminated cash as a payment option.
  4. If tablets become POS systems…. Then Verifone is a short.. or a long short. In the next 3 years they will see a big bump in re-terminalization due to EMV. Here is a picture of a mobile chip and PIN reader my friends at Baclays put together. All of their UK consumers have one.
  5. Mobile phones.. there will be instances where consumers can pay for their purchases before they collect them, or for small merchants and small businesses where payment is to a sole proprietor  (remember there are 474,000 US restaurants with under 500 employees). IMHO THIS IS WHERE PAYPAL SHOULD FOCUS.
  6. UBIQUITY. No merchant is going to invest where only 2-3% of customers can use the product. There are not enough phones in the market, and not enough payment terminals (<200k in US) that support them
  7. No compelling value. NFC must do something else beyond payment… there are no payment problems. Therefore NFC must start with something like unlocking doors or beaming pictures..
  8. Supply chain chaos and standards. NFC will take off in homogeneous markets (or those dominated by a monopoly)  that can force a standard (Edy/Suica in Japan, Octopus, EZ-Link, The French, … ). Today’s phones largely feature an embedded NFC SE made by NXP. The carriers want SWP based solution but Gemalto can’t get the SIMs out the door. It also doesn’t help that NXP’s current chips can take only one card emulation application (only paypass, or only paywave.. but not both).. which means that the little sticker on my phone does just about everything I need.
  9. NFC is anti cloud.. everything is locked up inside this little secure vault.. it ONLY does POS payments. I can’t do a mobile checkout with an NFC phone….

Future of Retail… ?

26 September 2012

(apologize for typos in advance.. send corrections to my editorial staff)

In last 2 weeks, I was with a fantastic group of payments people: execs, investors, innovators, advisors, speakers… It struck me that most of the people in payments have been in the industry for quite sometime.. just as the execs in telecom have stayed in that industry… likewise with the execs in retail. There is very little cross pollination of talent across industries. Thus ideas and innovation is very “biased” toward a market understanding of the company which is guiding it.  Sure business heads can bring in a consulting group like McKinsey to help them build an informed strategy, but the pace of change in mobile, payments, advertising, social, …etc has put the real cutting edge of innovation inside companies.. not within consulting groups. One reason: if any consultant had a really great understanding of the market and a new idea they would go start a company… after all the investors are willing and the personal wealth equation is much better.

Today’s thought for the day is Retail. I’m certainly no retail guru.. back when I was at Oracle (98-02) our ERP suite was much more geared toward discrete manufacturing with Cisco, Sony, Motorolla, TSMC as some of my key accounts. In banking I can only recall one direct retail conversation, it was with Jane Thompson (former CEO of WMT Financial Services, now a good friend) her team came to visit Charlotte and I can still remember someone asking WMT what they thought the right rate of interchange should be. Their answer: 0%.. all the bankers laughed… but then we suddenly stopped when we realized WalMart wasn’t joking.

Over the last few years I’ve taken a crash course in retail, both through my time with Google and with people like John Buchanan (former founder and CEO of Retek)…  I have new respect for the world of Retail. Certainly one of the toughest business I have ever touched. Many of my thoughts about retail, and investment hypothesis, were laid out back in January – Remaking of Commerce and Retail.

During my meetings this week, I was struck by the biased views in the room. For example, contactless will take off because it is part of the Visa mandate to retailers (see this week’s EMV blog), obviously the bank issuers were not aware that the top retailers are moving only with Chip and PIN.. not contactless. Why is information here so poor? Well it is certainly not in Visa’s best interest to advertise it… and the banks have other things to do.

Another example is Card Linked Offers (CLO); assume you own a brand restaurant like Applebee’s .. do you want to discount your food 10% every week to every customer? Of course not! What these restaurant chains want is customers.. loyal customers.. just like any business. Yet they are being approached by 6-10 CLO start ups every week for a “deal”.  Its like no one ever heard of CRM… No retailer wants to compete on price.. they want to compete on quality, brand, experience.. they want to move away from price as the basis for competition. Sure some retailers do want to manage excess inventory, or a loyalty program (see LevelUp), or mark downs, but they don’t want to compete on price.

Reid Hoffman is a brilliant investor, but I shake my head at the thought of the Card as the next App Platform (see Forbes Article).   Why? Well card companies have no understanding of what you bought (item level information).. only your merchant preference. One other piece of information (sorry for the repetition here), retailers spend very little of their own money on marketing.. it is manufactures that spend the ad dollars. 

So this results in a CLO focus on Restaurants and Services.. both of which are require tremendous execution in hyper-local sales. Ask Groupon how easy that is.. but its worse for CLO companies as a basket level discount offered through a card is not performing as well…  due to brand, value, redemption experience, …

Retailers have a CRM strategy… believe it or not they have a price promotion strategy as well with digital, direct, and mass media components. Retailers want customers.. but not at any price, and certainly in support of their brand (one of the few things they have left). When I look at any “offer” or “payment” company, targeting physical retail, I look at how it can fit within a Retailer’s existing business model. How can X improve Y’s execution. Good news is that there are 100s of opportunities out there.. as advertising is fundamentally broken for most retailers. As a corollary… PAYMENT IS NOT BROKEN.

Key questions I ask

  • Customer Acquisition
  • Customer Loyalty
  • Distribution of Incentives (reaching customer where they are)
  • Brand impact – improve retailers brand or not? Is it white label?
  • Consumer Value
  • Consumer Experience (Acquisition, In Store, Checkout, Support, …)
  • Merchant Value/Cost
  • Impact on Retailer Competitive Dynamics (ex increase price competition?)
  • Require change in consumer behavior
  • Flexibility (one flavor for all..? )
  • Existing footprint
  • Privacy/Data Protection (likely to change substantially)
  • Data flow/participation by key participants
  • Value shift (ex. From Mass media to targeted)
  • … I could go on (see the NRF.com or Shop.org for more details here)

Retailers all have very distinct strategies.. after all its very challenging to sell a commodity good based on anything but price. For example CVS has the top loyalty program in the country. They certainly don’t want to throw it out the door for someone else’s … their loyalty program manager is Catalina… one of the best data analytic companies in the world, run by former CEO of DoubleClick and meshed with Neilsen. Take a look at their participation in something like MCX. My guess is that they will want to enable payment on their CVS loyalty card.. to make it operate like Target’s Red Card. They don’t want PayPal running it.. or Visa… they want to run and control it themselves. MCX will provide dumb pipes (low cost payment routing/clearing) to a smart loyalty program. This goes to my last bullet above: Value Shift… If retailers are smart they will realize that their decisions on data are far more important than their decisions on payment. Data is key to orchestrating value.

For physical retailers to succeed the orchestration of value must move from a focus on price competition. A challenge for Retailers is that Orchestration requires a network… primarily a demand generation (advertising) network (although orchestration could also include other like: entertainment,  custom manufacturing, …etc). What else can physical retailers do? What does the future of retail look like? Well the NRF just completed its conference on the subject so you should chat with some of the attendees. My answer is that the market is: ripe,  highly complex, heterogeneous, with privacy and data as key.

My actionable recommendations to Retailers:

  • Start with demand generation, consumers that do not currently shop with you
  • Ensure your partner emphasized your brand front and center
  • Find a Partner either IN CONTROL of the consumer experience (Apple/Google) or one that already has massive consumer adoption (ie Facebook).
  • Focus on creating a fantastic customer experience from end-end
  • Minimize the number of partners involved
  • Throw out partners that don’t know how to manage campaigns, data or your business
  • Have a plan “post acquisition”.. how do you retain them?
  • Ensure your partner can reach/influence consumers WHERE THEY ARE.. not where you want them to be. Email address is not influence

[youtube=http://youtu.be/t49JkakYAoE]

Fantastic must see from Tesco Korea if you haven’t seen their virtual subway store

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fGaVFRzTTP4]

PayPal at POS – Take 4

24 September 2012

Previous Blog – Paypal at POS

Just met with an institutional investors who was really high on Paypal @POS..  here is his recap of Paypal’s pitch:

Amazon is the enemy let me help you compete with them. We can help you with our marketplace to position your product, with our payments to pay for it, with GSI to help you distribute your orders and manage it for you, with our new tools to help you engage the customer before or during their [physical] shopping. We don’t want to compete against Visa, we want to help you compete against Amazon.

Price?

–          180bps for payment

–          9% of sales on eBay marketplace

Wow what a great deal.. no wonder they have 6 sales people working full time on it at PayPal. I asked Fred how this works for JambaJuice or HomeDepot neither of which do much online sales..

Here are 4 scenarios… let’s see if PayPal works in any of them

1) Best Buy. $1000 big screen … but only $800 on Amazon

2) Home Depot. 8 2x4s, 5 bags of mulch and a new drill

3) Restaurant

4) Grocery store.

Scenario 1 – Best Buy

How did the customer decide on the product? Did the customer go into best buy to see it? Did Best Buy’s team influence the customer in the sale?

If the customer has decided on the product independent of best buy it will be hard for any retailer to win them separate from price. PayPal can’t possibly help BestBuy on price, actually its online marketplace competes with BestBuy.. as many other merchants sell there too. Does BestBuy really want it’s brand in the eBay flea market? Doesn’t a manufacturer direct model make more sense here? What value is Best Buy bringing?

It would also seem very difficult for eBay to help BestBuy EVER compete on price, particularly when it is charging 180bps for payment and up to 9% in sales fees (http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html) for its marketplace.. It is actually 4x the cost of Visa.

The only circumstance I can identify, where eBay can assist in sales, is when a customer is searching for a product, and BestBuy has the lowest price, will they be able to assist. However, consumers don’t leverage eBay for price comparison shopping.. they use other tools like Google particularly when looking for merchandise in a nearby physical store (see Google Local Support).

Can eBay assist in guiding a consumer to a product? Keys are content, touch and brand. Do consumers normally go to eBay to research products? Do consumers normally trust the eBay brand to give them good shopping recommendations (online and offline)?  Again I don’t see how eBay or Paypal can play in the shopping experience until a consumer has selected a product. If selection is made what services do they have to help in completing the purchase? A: Payment… However payment does not drive product selection or purchase decision, it is a just the last phase of a long process.

Could Paypal uniquely deliver incentives to the consumer during the product selection process to influence them? sure… so could Santa Claus and ShopKick (both equally real) .. but this is not what PayPal does today so PayPal must first build credibility to establish a NEW customer behavior pattern. Paypal today does not do advertising, they do not do physical POS purchases, nor do they do enterprise sales, … in general consumers just don’t care about the PayPal brand off line. Sure, Paypal could invest to establish itself in each of these areas. But these are not trivial investments, it takes tremendous marketing investment to change consumer behavior. Little Square ($8B TPV) has more than 8x of PayPal’s POS volume… which today is primarily driven by their Masterdcard debit (only works against a balance with PayPal).

I was planning to go through 3 more scenarios.. but what is the point? How can PayPal help any physical merchant? eBay’s only asset here is a consumer account.. they may make the point that 100M consumers have a PayPal app loaded on their smart phone.. well that does not equate to usage for payment (rather balance checking)… and it certainly does not equate to usage for shopping.

Top 20 retailers take the view ” we just won Durbin.. we have $0.21 payments… we can steer… why on earth would we want to accept any other form of payments and confuse customer, or our efforts to encourage debit?”

Neither PayPal nor eBay drive sales of traditional retail. For small retailers they are a hero.. giving massive distribution to unique goods. To traditional retailers: they are a flea market that further dilutes your brand and puts emphasis back on price.

Why are retailers playing in the sandbox with paypal.. ? A: To experiment (at someone else’s expense)..

I’m open to comments..

Footnotes. Based on 2012 reporting earnings

  • Marketplaces on average charges 9% commission on transaction volume (for 2011, 10.4% in US and 8.2% International). Volume sellers will receive discount (could be 20% or higher) on final value fees (and other fees).
  • PayPal Regular rate is 2.9% + $0.30/transaction, can go down to 2.2% + $0.30

EMV Battle Impacts Mobile Payments

20 September

Most of everyone knows of the EMV efforts in the US, with Visa implementing a liability shift on October 1, 2015. In this model, any merchant that is presented with a chip and pin card, but is not capable of processing it (as an EMV), will bear fraud loss.  There have been very BIG swings in strategy over the last 6-8 months. The big issuers were all dead set against EMV.. saying they could not afford the cost to re-issue. Now all are on board… why? This is what I’m thinking about today….

Merchants have always loved PIN Debit (see blog). PIN was the cheapest transaction type prior to Durbin, and post Durbin PIN still has the unique advantage of allowing the merchant to route without going to Visa at all. Remember PIN Debit leniage was from ATM networks. Merchants also like the fact that 96% of PIN Debit fraud losses are assumed by issuers..

Visa/MA hate PIN Debit.. the countries where it has taken off like Canada-Interac, Australia EFTPOS, China Union Pay… have domestic clearing networks. This means that transactions are no longer routed through Visa/MA. In the US we have 8 debit networks (see blog). It makes little sense to continue all of these separate PIN debit networks if merchants can route directly to banks… The banks were thus looking at consolidation similar to what was done in countires above. In other words, banks were planning to take Debit back from Visa/MA in a bank owned network. After all, Bank margin improves in the PIN model (post Durbin) when payments are routed directly to them (they don’t pay a network fee ~10 bps).

Visa read the tea leaves… So how can Visa/MA stop the bank and merchant love affair w/ PIN? Force EMV…

The Merchant Stick? How will Visa “force” merchant’s to accept contactless? (See Visa Document)

Domestic and cross-border counterfeit liability shift. Merchants that cannot accept an EMV or contactless card when presented one by a customer will bear the liability of a fraudulent transaction instead of the issuer after October 1, 2015.

The Merchant “Carrot”?  Visa TIP program

TIP program allows merchants to be excused from validating their PCI DSS compliance for any year that at least 75 percent of their Visa transactions come from chip-enabled point-of-sale terminals. There are also subsidies for terminal upgrades … To qualify, terminals must be enabled to support both EMV contact and contactless chip acceptance, including mobile contactless payments based on NFC technology. Contact chip-only or contactless-only terminals will not qualify for the U.S. program

Visa’s effort to include contactless in the TIP program is very strategic. To gain the benefits of TIP, merchants must reterminalize with both contact and contactless EMV capability. Why? Well for one reason there are no contactless debit cards out there… yes everything is a credit card. These of course carry much higher fees… The other advantage of TIP is that the PCI-DSS wavier is like a “get out of jail free” card. Merchants can’t get the card without contactless… If this weren’t enough… not only does VISA want contactless.. they also want signature.

Visa says PIN not necessary – Green Sheet

“There’s a lot of confusion around the myth that EMV means ‘chip-and-PIN,'” Stephanie Ericksen, Visa Head of Authentication Product Integration, said in a blog published Jan. 13, 2012. “It doesn’t in many countries, including the U.S. That’s because, in the U.S., we can rely on online processing where transactions are transmitted in real time to the issuer for approval. With that in place, there’s no need for the offline authentication that was the genesis of chip-and-PIN.

From Chip and PIN to Chip and Choose? Visa wants  encourage signature as these transactions must be routed through them.. my position (and that of most non network people) is that AUTHORIZATION and AUTHENTICATION are completely different problem sets. The availability of real time approval means nothing if you don’t know WHO you are approving for WHICH CARD.  PIN answers the “who” question and the chip is the account number or “how” you are going to pay. I just can’t believe that Visa has come up with this story.. but they must in order to support “contactless”. Most consumers don’t know that today contactless transactions have limits. These limits are set by the issuer, in Europe they are typically around $25. However the issuer can choose to increase the limit (no PIN required), or require a PIN with a contactless payment.  All of this is a little absurd for Visa as PIN is always viewed as key to authentication, AND Visa just waved the signature requirement for mobile payments. So no signature required for Square.. but Visa wants it optional at the merchant POS so it can retain the volume?….  Expect some Regulatory involvement here.

Large Merchants are very, very aware of this strategy to improve the credit transaction mix and make mobile/contactless payments a “premium” service. The top 20 retailers have put their foot down and said “no way” will we be putting contactless readers in our store (MCX members particularly). The terminals that they are ordering DO NOT have contactless capabilities.. only EMV chip and PIN. Most retailers agree that signature is a worthless authentication mechanism. Visa clings to signature in order to ensure transactions are routed through them. Expect MCX to look toward a PIN model..

So this EMV “battle” has many sides to it.. it impacts mobile payment adoption, EMV rollout, plastic re-issuer, consumer behavior, consolidation of national PIN debit networks, …

Comments appreciated.