EMVCo Enters the Intent Wars

September 2026 – VERY VERY LONG Tech Blog on EMVCo’s new Spec

On September 1, 2026, EMVCo published a draft framework that quietly changes the architecture of agentic commerce. The “EMV Agentic Payments — Framework for Specifications” establishes a neutral, interoperable conceptual foundation for managing consumer intent across the entire payment ecosystem. After more than a year of watching proprietary platforms race to own and orchestrate “everything” in agentic, this is the most significant structural move the industry has seen.

I have written about this problem extensively, from Agentic — Intent and the New Data Games to Carts and Mandates: Decoupling Discovery, Authentication, and Liability to Agentic Data Battle: Intent. The core argument has always been the same: without a structure for managing intent, there will be no trust in agentic transactions. EMVCo just read that memo.

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ApplePay at Walmart

Walmart announced yesterday that tap to pay arrives at select Walmart and Sam’s Club locations on August 24, with all US stores and clubs by the end of 2026 and fuel stations by mid 2027. The largest retailer in the country, and the last major holdout on contactless, is turning it on. What a great “going away” present to Jennifer Bailey!.

This is a bigger deal than the press release suggests. Walmart did not resist contactless because it disliked the technology. It resisted because contactless threatened a payment cost structure it spent twenty years building. The news here is not that Walmart added a feature. It is that Walmart concluded the feature no longer costs it anything.

For readers who want the plumbing, I laid out the EMVCo and tokenization dependencies in Understanding ApplePay in PIN Debit (May 2026). This post is the business version.

What I told Apple, repeatedly

Jennifer Bailey at Apple would always ask me the same question: “How can we get Mike [Cook] to accept ApplePay?” My answer never changed, I told her “It was not about Apple.” It was about three things:

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Processors: Understanding Competitive Dynamics

Warning – Big Blog 12 Pages

The last three weeks gave us a full sweep of processor earnings, and the results were a mixed bag (a phrase that undersells what actually happened). What we saw was not the processor sector moving together with a common tide. It was a sector splitting apart. Adyen raised guidance and jumped 16% in a day. Toast added a record number of locations and raised its full year outlook. On the “bad side of town”, we have Fiserv, which cut guidance, missed consensus, and is now down roughly 23% for the year with a brand new CEO. FIS is down about 36%. The gap between the best processors and the worst has never been this wide, and I do not think most investors have a working framework for why.

That framework is what I want to lay out here.

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Apple – Klarna: Equipment Financing

Last week, Apple launched Apple Upgrade, a device leasing program for iPhone, Apple Watch, Mac, and iPad in the United States, provided by Klarna. Apple simultaneously retired the iPhone Upgrade Program (financed by Citizens Bank) and iPhone Payments.

This is a very big deal, and it is the culmination of a strategy I first outlined over a decade ago. Equipment financing has always been the prize. Everything else Apple has done in consumer finance (Apple Card, Apple Pay Later, Apple Card Monthly Installments, the savings account) was either a stepping stone, a learning exercise, or a partner accommodation. Apple Upgrade is the main event.

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Stripe/Advent offer $53B to buy PayPal

Sometimes the biggest signal is not the price, it is who is showing up with the money. This morning, Reuters reported that Stripe and Advent International have jointly offered to acquire PayPal for more than $53 billion. Stripe, the largest privately held payments company on the planet, has walked into the room and said, in effect, we would like to own the incumbent. That framing alone reorganizes how you should read the last five years of PayPal’s decline and the next five years of network competition.

I have been writing about PayPal’s structural problems for a long time. Most recently in PayPal, Alex is Gone, Enrique is In. Recommended Focus, where I argued that Enrique Lores was inheriting a “dumpster fire” of acquisitions and shifting consumer focus, and that the only path forward was decisive surgery on the operating model. A $53B “take private” from Stripe and Advent is one very specific answer to that question. Today’s blog is a quick overview of the Reuters report together with my own read, and questions any investor should be asking before they get out over their skis on this.

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Hypothetical Scenario — Using Star as Entry Point for Zelle at POS

Summary. This is my best case scenario for a STAR acqusition and as a banker I still wouldn’t do it. PIN networks are archaic. I would externalize Zelle for POS and sell it to merchants based on value (ex instant funds availabiltiy, liability shift at POS and eCom). For the tech, I would subcontract the service to Visa while I own the network.  Don’t bother reading this blog unless you are a payment geek that wants to think about the macro options on a “new debit network”. Remember, even if the top 3 banks moved to a new debit network, it would only be a 2% revenue hit to Visa. This is almost noise.

Background

I’ve spent this week writing about what a top‑4 bank consortium buying Fiserv’s Star network would and wouldn’t accomplish. On Monday I laid out five business and political reasons the deal is unlikely to happen. Tuesday’s blog explained how ApplePay/PIN-debit works within a technical deep-dive. This blog outlined why owning Star doesn’t buy the tokenization and provisioning path that Visa still controls. Yesterday’s retailer and industry feedback captured what I heard from the merchant and processor side stakeholders. One of the stakeholder ideas surfaced with a new idea worth sitting with: what if you didn’t buy Star to run PIN debit at Durbin-exempt rates — but instead as the on-ramp for accepting Zelle at the POS?

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FISV: Star Sale? Retailer and Industry Feedback

Short update on my industry discussions yesterday (in very brief form). 

Retailers

  • Convinced US Banks would attempt to follow COF/Discover model and that Banks were not concerned about the politics. 
  • Emphasize banks want control, with most seeing that BAC/WFC would make sense as owners of STAR
  • Agreed that retailers would react to price increases, but only top 20 retailers have payment teams with enough depth to act on a plan (ex turn off Star).
  • Believed acceptance rate and processor incentives would be a key hurdle, but that if pricing was around 125bps there was room to create superior processor incentives. 
  • Loss of Tap to Pay and eCommerce (ie no PIN Debit) were consensus consumer impacts with no clear workaround. 
  • Agree that retailers would strongly lobby OCC and CPFB that this was an obvious effort to end run Durbin. May seek to block acquisition. 
  • Discover is an EMVCO member with most tools that would allow conversion of Pulse to dual message. No path for STAR (or EMVCo membership)
  • Bank Consortium could use this as a path toward Zelle acceptance at POS (for 125 bps). This was probably the biggest “new” insight I gained

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Are US Banks Really Considering a Durbin End Run with FISV’s Star?

(Paid Subscriber Research)

Yesterday’s WSJ story that JPMorgan, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and PNC have held “preliminary and tentative” talks to buy Fiserv’s Star debit network is being read as the opening shot in a big-bank campaign to escape Durbin. My first reaction: this is a bit of old news. Fiserv and its private equity suitors have been shopping Star as a spin-off for the better part of four years. Every time the pitch surfaces, the same five objections surface with it. Nothing about the current version of the deal has removed those objections; if anything, the political climate has made them harder.

Before I get to why I don’t believe it will happen, a quick refresher on the business logic, because that logic is real, and it explains why Fiserv can keep the pitch alive.

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Can Processors Win a Role in Agentic?

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Adyen’s stock is down over 40% this year. Investors aren’t just punishing one company; they’re repricing the entire processor category as agentic commerce threatens to restructure who controls economics and merchant relationships. The market sees what I’ve been writing about for 18 months: processors are at risk of becoming dumb pipes.

Yesterday, Adyen announced Adyen Agentic a suite of modular APIs encompassing Agentic Feed (product/inventory), Agentic Cart (checkout orchestration), and Agentic Payments (authentication, fraud, tokenization). The positioning is explicit: a “universal translator” that lets merchants integrate once and participate across every agent platform, protocol, and payment method.

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Merchant Litigation Settlement – Good News for V/MA

For anyone who has followed payments industry equities or competitive dynamics over the past two decades, yesterday’s ruling from Judge Brian Cogan felt like a long-exhaled breath. After 21 years of litigation, multiple failed settlement attempts, and a high-profile 2024 rejection, the Visa/Mastercard merchant interchange lawsuit finally has a path forward. Judge Cogan granted preliminary approval of the amended settlement on June 9, 2026 — and on balance, this is good news for the networks, for merchants, and for the broader ecosystem.

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