EMVCo Enters the Intent Wars

September 2026 – VERY VERY LONG Tech Blog on EMVCo’s new Spec

On September 1, 2026, EMVCo published a draft framework that quietly changes the architecture of agentic commerce. The “EMV Agentic Payments — Framework for Specifications” establishes a neutral, interoperable conceptual foundation for managing consumer intent across the entire payment ecosystem. After more than a year of watching proprietary platforms race to own and orchestrate “everything” in agentic, this is the most significant structural move the industry has seen.

I have written about this problem extensively, from Agentic — Intent and the New Data Games to Carts and Mandates: Decoupling Discovery, Authentication, and Liability to Agentic Data Battle: Intent. The core argument has always been the same: without a structure for managing intent, there will be no trust in agentic transactions. EMVCo just read that memo.

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Instinct: Hottest Agentic Assistant – Payments Advantage?

Short Blog.

Every few months something breaks out of the demo phase and starts showing up in my feed from people whose judgment I trust. This month it is Instinct, a personal assistant out of San Francisco that the WSJ covered on Friday (“The Latest Viral AI Assistant Rocketing Across Silicon Valley,”). It is worth a look, not because it solves agentic commerce (it does not), but because it is the clearest example yet of where agentic actually gets traction first, and it is not where the payments industry has been looking.

The advantages of edge Use Cases and SMS…. the biggest breakthrough is happening in categories where there is no cart at all.

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ApplePay at Walmart

Walmart announced yesterday that tap to pay arrives at select Walmart and Sam’s Club locations on August 24, with all US stores and clubs by the end of 2026 and fuel stations by mid 2027. The largest retailer in the country, and the last major holdout on contactless, is turning it on. What a great “going away” present to Jennifer Bailey!.

This is a bigger deal than the press release suggests. Walmart did not resist contactless because it disliked the technology. It resisted because contactless threatened a payment cost structure it spent twenty years building. The news here is not that Walmart added a feature. It is that Walmart concluded the feature no longer costs it anything.

For readers who want the plumbing, I laid out the EMVCo and tokenization dependencies in Understanding ApplePay in PIN Debit (May 2026). This post is the business version.

What I told Apple, repeatedly

Jennifer Bailey at Apple would always ask me the same question: “How can we get Mike [Cook] to accept ApplePay?” My answer never changed, I told her “It was not about Apple.” It was about three things:

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Processors: Understanding Competitive Dynamics

Warning – Big Blog 12 Pages

The last three weeks gave us a full sweep of processor earnings, and the results were a mixed bag (a phrase that undersells what actually happened). What we saw was not the processor sector moving together with a common tide. It was a sector splitting apart. Adyen raised guidance and jumped 16% in a day. Toast added a record number of locations and raised its full year outlook. On the “bad side of town”, we have Fiserv, which cut guidance, missed consensus, and is now down roughly 23% for the year with a brand new CEO. FIS is down about 36%. The gap between the best processors and the worst has never been this wide, and I do not think most investors have a working framework for why.

That framework is what I want to lay out here.

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Apple – Klarna: Equipment Financing

Last week, Apple launched Apple Upgrade, a device leasing program for iPhone, Apple Watch, Mac, and iPad in the United States, provided by Klarna. Apple simultaneously retired the iPhone Upgrade Program (financed by Citizens Bank) and iPhone Payments.

This is a very big deal, and it is the culmination of a strategy I first outlined over a decade ago. Equipment financing has always been the prize. Everything else Apple has done in consumer finance (Apple Card, Apple Pay Later, Apple Card Monthly Installments, the savings account) was either a stepping stone, a learning exercise, or a partner accommodation. Apple Upgrade is the main event.

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Visa Stablecoin Platform

Exec Summary

  • Consumers never wanted stablecoins, they wanted 5% yield or a crypto off ramp, BIS data confirms retail use is under 1% of volume
  • Stablecoins are a settlement innovation, networks did not hijack them, incumbents always adopt new tech to compete
  • Visa’s value is governance, operations, and distribution, VSP is just the next network in the network of networks
  • VSP = single Visa managed environment to mint, burn, move, and manage OUSD, with wallet as a service, passkeys, maker/checker controls
  • OUSD first because compliance and trust win, banks trust banks, not Circle, 63% of corporates want stablecoin access via their bank (EY Parthenon)
  • Use cases anchor on ramps and off ramps, treasury funding, global payouts, merchant settlement, stablecoin linked cards ($7B settlement run rate, 160+ programs)
  • VSP is to stablecoin what Visa DPS is to debit, same playbook, different rails and connection points
  • Visa enables Bank Issuers without picking winners, Mastercard bought BVNK and owns a single roadmap, overlap is real but philosophies differ
  • Enablement models win, every member becomes an investor in the network’s growth
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Hypothetical Scenario — Using Star as Entry Point for Zelle at POS

Summary. This is my best case scenario for a STAR acqusition and as a banker I still wouldn’t do it. PIN networks are archaic. I would externalize Zelle for POS and sell it to merchants based on value (ex instant funds availabiltiy, liability shift at POS and eCom). For the tech, I would subcontract the service to Visa while I own the network.  Don’t bother reading this blog unless you are a payment geek that wants to think about the macro options on a “new debit network”. Remember, even if the top 3 banks moved to a new debit network, it would only be a 2% revenue hit to Visa. This is almost noise.

Background

I’ve spent this week writing about what a top‑4 bank consortium buying Fiserv’s Star network would and wouldn’t accomplish. On Monday I laid out five business and political reasons the deal is unlikely to happen. Tuesday’s blog explained how ApplePay/PIN-debit works within a technical deep-dive. This blog outlined why owning Star doesn’t buy the tokenization and provisioning path that Visa still controls. Yesterday’s retailer and industry feedback captured what I heard from the merchant and processor side stakeholders. One of the stakeholder ideas surfaced with a new idea worth sitting with: what if you didn’t buy Star to run PIN debit at Durbin-exempt rates — but instead as the on-ramp for accepting Zelle at the POS?

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Understanding ApplePay in PIN Debit

Payment Geek detail on the EMVCO Dependencies of Debit and How Cap One Solved It

This is a technical addendum to today’s post on the reported JPMorgan/BofA/Wells/PNC exploration of buying Fiserv’s Star network. That post laid out five business and political reasons the deal is unlikely to happen. This one goes underneath the business case to the technical architecture that makes the wallet portion (ie ApplePay, GPay, SamsungPay) of the problem particularly ugly for any bank that thinks owning a PIN debit network gets them out from under Durbin.

The short version: an issuer that buys Star cannot simply route its ApplePay volume through Star. The tokenization and provisioning plumbing that makes Apple Pay work belongs to Visa and Mastercard, sits inside a standards body (EMVCo) that issuers are not members of, and is architecturally structured around the card brand on the card (not the issuer that issued it). A bank that owns Star still can’t put a Star token in Apple Pay; it is a new AID in the phone.

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Are US Banks Really Considering a Durbin End Run with FISV’s Star?

(Paid Subscriber Research)

Yesterday’s WSJ story that JPMorgan, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and PNC have held “preliminary and tentative” talks to buy Fiserv’s Star debit network is being read as the opening shot in a big-bank campaign to escape Durbin. My first reaction: this is a bit of old news. Fiserv and its private equity suitors have been shopping Star as a spin-off for the better part of four years. Every time the pitch surfaces, the same five objections surface with it. Nothing about the current version of the deal has removed those objections; if anything, the political climate has made them harder.

Before I get to why I don’t believe it will happen, a quick refresher on the business logic, because that logic is real, and it explains why Fiserv can keep the pitch alive.

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Open USD – Stablecoin’s New Gold Standard for Trust, Compliance, Governance and Economics

July 1, 2026

Executive Summary

  • 140+ institutions — Visa, Mastercard, Stripe, BlackRock, Google, Coinbase, and major global banks form the largest stablecoin consortium ever assembled
  • Shares reserve economics — Partners receive yield from underlying reserves, not the issuer; flips the Circle/Tether model
  • Zero-fee minting at scale — No volume limits, no enterprise penalties
  • Pre-transaction compliance — Transfer hooks block sanctioned transactions before settlement, not after
  • Burn and clawback authority — Architectural ability to freeze/burn for OFAC compliance built into Token-2022 implementation
  • Confidential transfers with regulatory visibility — ZK-encrypted balances for corporate privacy; viewing keys for auditors
  • Neutral governance — Independent board of ecosystem partners; no single corporate controller
  • Stripe default — “The default stablecoin for businesses running on Stripe”

Yesterday, we witnessed the launch of what may become the most consequential stablecoin ever: Open USD (OUSD). With over 140 financial, technology, and crypto institutions signing on—from Visa and Mastercard to Stripe, BlackRock, and Google. This isn’t merely another stablecoin entering a crowded market. This is the emergence of a new trust network architecture that I’ve been writing about for years.

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