My track record on Apple is pretty good.. having broke the Apple Pay news in 2014 and Last August I announced the Apple/Mobeewave acquisition. Apple is great at keeping secrets… perhaps the best tech company in the world in this regard. My latest forecast? Apple will enable payment acceptance in the US this October with Elavon as payment processing partner.Continue reading “ApplePay Accept (Mobeewave) in October”
Its tough to find time to Blog as a CEO…. Most of you my blogs are sometimes snarky and tactless (making NOT offending someone a new consideration).
I was taking a look at JPMC’s latest investor presentation and noticed that ChaseNet is gone.. Why? I’ve written on JPMC and ChaseNet a number of times over last 6 yrs. Today I’ll cover my views on the latest developments and my views on JPMC’s ChaseNet strategy. Lets recap first: Continue reading “Chase Net 2017”
18 March 2015
A major retailer just called me this AM. Theme of conversation is that the industry is creating a “perfect storm” for issuers in acceptance. While LoopPay is very secure (because of Visa/MA tokens, phone ID, and transaction counters), the existence of a commercial grade mag stripe emulator in the hands of “bad guys” will create a little chaos… particularly when the cashiers think nothing of consumers (or fraudsters) waving their phones at the POS.
While both Visa and Mastercard have set rules that prohibit merchants for asking for IDs in a contactless EMV transaction (EMV), LoopPay (Samsung calls it MST) muddies the waters as it uses the phone to talk to the magnetic reader of the payment terminal. MST transactions are magstripe transactions which merchants are (and have always been) allowed to ask for IDs. Merchants can make the case that they have no idea which is which, and they have no way of “prohibiting” either, thus they must assume that it requires them to treat as something that requires them to validate (signature).
Let me see if I can list the different acceptance methods (looking for input into what I miss)
Add to this list Token authority (Tier 1, Tier 2, Visa, Mastercard, TCH, Bank, …) and TSM for GSM style NFC and we have quite a complex mess. The good news is that issuers have control over where their cards are presented.. Problem is that there are many new “exploits” which can be attacked by very well funded fraudsters.
Normally, all of this seems to put pressure to update and lock down your payment terminals. But merchants don’t bear any costs for POS fraud where they have validated signature/ID… it moves to the banks. How can Banks force merchants to lock down terminals? The incentives are very complex.. so complex that it may mean “can I see your ID” happens in every case. So much for mobile making things easier.
In EMV transactions, issuers are normally in control of when PIN is required.. In mobile there is no physical payment instrument (card) for the cashier to validate signature … so when they ask for ID what do they validate against? (ie no embossed card with your name on it). This means issuers will naturally like PIN for mobile. In the US consumers don’t know their PIN (for credit cards)..
This is just too confusing.. lets just say small issuers will have a very challenging time adapting here, while the big issuers will maintain a substantial advantage. This is the normal course of [big] bank fraud strategy: if a bear comes to your campsite you don’t have to be faster than the bear.. just faster than the slowest fellow camper (small banks)
28 Dec 2014
I hope everyone is having a wonderful holiday. Sorry for the delay in blogging, capital raising takes much more time than I had anticipated. Hope to tell you more about my NewCo in January. So much has happened since Money 2020, next week I will write a recap blog in prep for my 2015 predictions. Today’s blog is focused on “mobile” payments and platforms (iOS/Android)
I define 4 categories of mobile payments:
- Point of Sale. The phone used at a physical retailer
- mCommerce. eCommerce on your phone: buying something from a website in your mobile browser
- In App Purchase. Normally a subcategory of mCommerce, payment within an App (think Uber on iPhone). Only worth breaking out because ApplePay does this today.. and not above.
- Digital Goods. Games/Ringtones/Music/Apps (not in scope for today)
Point of Sale
Think NFC.. Not a focus for today.. but a great article from David Evans Apple Pay is Fizzling provided some key numbers. Only 4.6% of iPhone 6 users in a store that accepted NFC/ApplePay used it. Do you realize how small a percentage of use this is (4% of 3% of customers)!? If only the mainstream press realized that “50 new banks joining ApplePay” does NOT equate to usage. My bank issuer friends have confirmed what I’ve been saying.. there is no value proposition here.. and my volume estimates are accurate. Why? ApplePay does nothing beyond what your current plastic card does today.. Consumers just don’t care and Apple has made no effort to work with retailers (to promote at POS).
It would be great to know what NFC payment volume actually is, but the numbers are so low no one wants to talk about them. Overall NFC payment volume has gone DOWN in 2014 (from 2013) due to CVS, Best Buy and 7-11 “terminal configuration changes”. There are approximately 270,000 US locations which accept NFC, of which 100,000 are vending machines. My estimate for US Contactless Payment volume
- 10% of consumers (20M active phones/wallets to 200M Adults)
- 4% usage (very high)
- 2.5% of retailers accepting (150k/6M, excludes restaurants)
- $2.4T US Retail spend (ex Auto, oil/gas, Fin Ser, Restaurants, Travel)
$240M (1/100th of a % of retail sales)
I can’t believe I’m wasting time even writing about this number (my real guess is $100M). Can you imagine finding a way to make this PROFITABLE across 12 different suppliers?!
If Apple had 100% of this volume their total ApplePay revenue would be $600,000!! (25 bps). No wonder banks signed that agreement. When I went to Google in 2011, the first thing I told Osama was “run away from NFC”.. everyone I’ve known and loved has lost their lives in this NFC stuff. You could do everything right and it still wouldn’t work (see 12 party fur ball). NFC/Contactless may be very Hot in London, New York, Hong Kong, and a few other Cities (high density, mass transit, cabs, high affluent…) .. but the rest of the world is very very cold.
My analyst friends are telling me that 5 retailers will “bolt from MCX” to allow ApplePay. I told them what we will probably see is a few of them adding the option within select markets (like New York and SFO.. ) but obviously the retailers are telling the truth.. Apple consumers are not beating down the door because of the service. Consumers just don’t care (4.6%).. ApplePay .. just like all things contactless… is only “buzz”. My rule of thumb holds: Behavior Change requires at least a 20% increase in value (unless you live in NYC).
What is the difference between mCommerce and eCommerce? If you bought batteries from Amazon on your iPad while sitting in your living room?… A: _____________? (mCommerce.. !!) It makes little sense to break mCommerce out as a separate category from a consumer behavior perspective.. but it makes TREMENDOUS sense to break this out for an analyst platform view.
Total eCom/mCom sales in the US are approximately $180B/yr (See US Census Data). Note that this is a MUCH bigger payment segment than the $0.24B POS market above. Within eCommerce, there are the BIG 3: Amazon, Visa/Cybersource, and eBay/Paypal/GSI which account for over 65% of volume (ex services, my estimate).
There is massive change of consumer behavior within eCommerce over the last 4 years, as reported today, Amazon see’s 60% if volume going through mobile! Quite a tremendous change from the 5% Amazon outlined just 4 years ago (see article). In 4 years we have moved from a model where 95% of US consumers bought online on a Desktop.. to an environment where 60% are buying from an Android or iOS device. Now you start to see the strategy drivers for: Apple, Google, Paypal (Braintree), Visa (Checkout) and Amazon (firephone) moves here.
Historically eCommerce payment services focused on the ability to manage fraud, as merchants held all liability in a Card Not Present (CNP) transaction. As such, payment service providers managed card acceptance and also provided fraud management services (hence their pricing of ~340-~600bps vs the card present MDR for CP of 160-180bps). Paypal’s service was the first of its kind to allow small merchants to accept cards, as the big banks had no tools to manage CNP fraud. All the large eCom specialists became VERY VERY good at managing fraud, building custom infrastructure to assess buyer patterns, and the device which the consumer is purchasing from to score transactions. Today most of their fraud rates are under 8bps (Paypal still charges 340bps).
Move from Fraud Management to Identity
In Europe, Visa and Mastercard shifted liability within eCommerce transactions onto banks in 2006 (see 3DS a Collaborative Path to Failure). This did NOT work out well for all, as the technology was highly flawed. The US never had this facility… a good thing.. and the state of the art in fraud management stayed within the big 3. For more background on this see Authentication in Value Nets. However the billions of dollars invested in building fraud management assets are being rendered useless by identity management and authentication. This is a HIGHLY disruptive force! Existing payment intermediaries have built their position on owning the consumer and managing risk. Mobile changes both!! I will drill into this next week.
As I outlined in Perfect Authentication: A nightmare to Banks, and Who do you Trust, the ability to authenticate a consumer is far in advance of what fraud systems do. As Ross Anderson said at the Federal Reserve “if you solve for authentication in payments.. everything else is just accounting”. This statement does hold for the credit risk side.. but it does for the payments side. This is what is changing with mobile. From my blog:
The “KEY” [prerequisite] in value orchestration is owning the Consumer relationship. Therefore Identifying and Authenticating the Consumer is the first, primary, service that must be owned by a platform. What was a separate “Trusted Services Manager” in the NFC world has been co-opted by platforms which will take a proprietary route. …etc. There is an all-out war going on for the Trust role: Banks (see Tokenization), MA/V, MNOs, Samsung, retailers… everyone realizes this is the “key” to unlocking future value in the convergence of the virtual and physical world.
The impact of mobile and identity on eCommerce is easy to see, as the more “platforms” know about you can be used within the device you use (and trust) the most. Mobile’s impact is also hitting the offline physical retail world, but in a much more experimental phase as the platforms, online retailers and aggregators don’t work within this space (yet).
A new rate tier: Cardholder present
This “new” form of mobile authentication will enable networks to create a MUCH improved version of VBV/MSC, shifting liability onto the bank with an interchange rate between CNP and CP. Who can take advantage of this rate and liability shift? Entities that can authenticate the consumer on the mobile device (Apple, Google, ?MNOs), securely manage a token and broker identity with other parties (see Authentication in Value Nets).
How will Visa/MA roll this out? There are many, many lessons learned in the prior 3DS (VBV/MSC) roll out. Already V/MA have been talking to major issuers and eCommerce service providers. Token issuance is currently a bit of a hang up as the issuers want to get their own TSP services up and running, and the Google/Amazon, … want to run their own TSPs. If everyone would agree to use the V/MA TSP services this could happen quite quickly. But because this is NOT the case, ApplePay and Visa Checkout seem to be the only services positioned for this move.
As I stated previously in my ApplePay blog, when this new rate tier hits, it will free Apple (and others) to transfer the token to the merchant across a greater number of protocols. In store this means that NFC will compete with a BLE experience, with NFC carrying a CP rate and others carrying a Cardholder present rate (and bank liability) that is very close to the CP rate.
2014 – Payments Part of OS:
Per my July 2013 blog Payments Part of OS, both Apple and Google are integrating payment capabilities into the OS. Where Google Wallet detractors deride Google because of its lack of progress in payments, I believe they are shifting focus to what really matters: establishing Android as the core commerce platform. In this future world you don’t really care about payments.. they just happen. With great authentication your information is stored in the cloud and you choose what information and payment instruments you want to exchange with a retailer.
We see the first hints at what this will look like in this WSJ article Google Shopping to Counter Amazon. Note that this is not Google payment… this is Google SHOPPING. Let me emphasize.. the battle is NOT about payment but about delivery value to consumer within Commerce. The focus for innovation investment TODAY across banks, retailers and service providers is Android as the iPhone platform is locked down. Sure Amazon and Bank of America are leveraging Touch-ID but this requires little effort. The key for Commerce Innovation and Value Orchestration is to get 1000s of companies engaged … Apple’s efforts are 95% consumer focused.
This consumer focus is paying off for Apple as they are 3-5 years ahead of Google (and Android OEMs) in handset hardware/SW. However, Google and Amazon are 5+ years ahead of Apple in orchestrating commerce value. Value orchestration is a network business and entails enabling millions of partnerships where consumers and businesses are incented to participate. Apple isn’t exactly known for making money for anyone but themselves. Apple has a MUCH greater ability to manage identity and trust and should be pursuing a strategy of consumer focused identity brokering (see Brokering Identity, and iPhone 6 – Apple’s Platform Opportunity) but are challenged organizationally as payments/identity are deep within a hardware culture, a world where neither are capable of creating partnerships.
Bank “payment” strategy seems to center on control or redesign of existing networks and nodes. For example, Issuers are attempting to leverage old nodes (Cards) and current market position to form a new orchestration role (see Card Linked Offers). Jamie Dimon created a new Data Division at Chase run by Len Laufer with a bifurcated visa*net. What banks forget is that their role is that of a neutral broker, they were NEVER the starting point for commerce (their network and nodes are weak). The harder banks work to build barriers to entry, the greater the value of finding ways around them….(think bitcoin). Or in the case of payment in the OS.. making unique assets (fraud) a commodity… the NATURE commerce is changing and the role of payments, how they deliver value, is changing too.
Think about it this way: did you buy an Uber ride on your iPhone because it took your Visa card? Did you even think about Payment? Same with Amazon… did you shop there because of payment? Payment is becoming a back end commodity service and the mechanisms for banks to differentiate are getting smaller. There are many implications for small business. For the last 20 years much expertise has been needed to create an online store, particularly in accepting payment. All of that is changing, if I solve for fraud, integrate my inventory into search and product discovery, merge customer contact and loyalty into advertising and payment, all with standard services… it becomes EASY.
For too long banks have leveraged your relationship to create value for themselves, hitting you with a mind numbing array of products and fees. This is their network legacy.. it is bred with inefficiencies. The bank goal was not simplicity, it was complexity and margin. Products like Apple, Square, Stripe, Paypal, Amazon, Poynt, Tesla are beautiful in that they make the complex appear simple.
ApplePay Expands to Browser
As I outlined above, the key trend in commerce and payment is the move to “mobile”. Today Google wallet works with Google chrome and app store for auto fill and checkout. Expect to see Google make authentication within Chrome, android, and apps much tighter, with Chrome becoming a cross device focus.
Today 90% of my payment friends agree that Apple’s REAL win within the next 2 years will be ApplePay in eCommerce/mCommerce. Today ApplePay’s focus is on in App purchases only. I expect to see ApplePay expand into browser based payments within 6 months or so. Apple may be first to market with the “Cardholder present” function given that tokens, authentication and bank agreements are already in place. From a merchant perspective Apple will offer a free API (akin to autofill) where Apple tokens and necessary consumer information is passed. Amazon Payments and Google already have this capability, but have not yet implemented tokens, biometrics or have bank agreements.
Apple’s greatest asset is its ability to change consumer behavior (see blog Apple and Physical Commerce, and Consumer Behavior). Apple’s reputation is well deserved and earned “the hard way” by remaking: phones, music, mice, computers, apps, …etc. Through consistent delivery of value within fantastic hardware delivering great (and fun) consumer experiences they earned trust for their products and brand. Consumers using Apple’s in app (today) or in browser (future) don’t even think about using payments… it just works.
When will we know it happened?
- When neither consumer nor merchant had to do anything unique to support an online sale.
- On phone, in app, in browser.. they all just worked and no one even thought about it.
- We used the payment instrument of our choice.
Apple has already arrived at this state with in-app ApplePay. From a technical perspective, key convergence measures are:
- Payment is treated the same regardless of channel.
- Handets, platforms, and networks can pass information, identity and trust.
- Banks accept that consumers can be authenticated without physical presences.
- Developers leverage platform payment services with ease.
Who is impacted?
Paypal. What are paypal’s assets today? Risk management, consumer accounts, DDA Funding, a few merchants. Apple, Google, Amazon, Facebook already have the consumers. The paypal risk management assets are worthless in a new environment. DDA funding looses importance as merchant costs for CNP fall from 340bps to 150bps. What do they have left? Let me know your answer..
MA/Visa. Visa/MA wins when there is card volume. Making payments part of the OS and giving consumers choice of payment instrument is a HUGE win for Visa/MA. As payments move into the OS so does V/MA. They become infrastructure. The losers? Well card issuance costs, risk management costs, fraud management costs, merchant integration costs all start moving to 0.. which means big margin compression for everyone else on the network.
With respect to eCommerce. Visa checkout/CYBS has substantial volume. They can adapt to tokenization quickly, but unclear how they would manage authentication.
Issuers. Imagine loosing all the airline CNP revenue? I don’t see an upside for issuers in this. They have a very poor ability to influence the network and are not well placed to serve in the trust identity role as consumers leave the branch and interact with the bank less often through remote channels. Banking is becoming a commodity service as well (see blog). You should have heard the squeal on the ApplePay agreement.. never before have Banks had something like this handed to them “take it or leave it”. Given the NFC volume above banks may have written if off. But this could turn out to be a big Trojan Horse as this tokenization expands into CNP/Card Holder Present. I believe their biggest fear is that Google will look to follow the model.
Merchants. Merchant that can sell or engage on mobile: Big winners.. mobile conversions, decreased fraud, liability shift to banks, changing consumer behavior. Merchants that are stuck in bricks and mortar.. no change.
Google. Big win. The only company that is cross platform/device. Buying in Chrome or in Android is seamless. Challenge is to move buying “search” back into Google from Amazon. The other advantage to convergence is the ability to close loop on behavior within the mobile/ecom process.. helping google advertising become even more effective. Google’s challenge is in Enterprise integration. Their engineers don’t like working with anyone else’s code. This is where Microsoft and Oracle are headed… helping enterprises engage consumers.
I propose the following metrics to measure/rate “Commerce Platforms” :
- Frequency of consumer touch (per day)
- Commerce transactions $/day
- Number of businesses you work with * the average time spent in managing in store experience…
Payments Part of OS: What does that Mean?
1 Nov 2014
Money2020 is next week, and I’m moderating the ApplePay session on Tuesday at 5pm… hope you guys can come. I’m more than a little sad that I can’t get any retailers up on stage with me. Why? The top 60 retailers are in MCX, and it makes little sense for them to get on stage and tell the world what they are NOT going to do and why. As I’m preparing to leave for Las Vegas tomorrow, was thinking “what could I write about? What unique perspective can I offer?” Well given I can’t get them on stage with me, let me try to articulate the Retailer’s view of the world. My twitter feed is blowing up as I work to explain why CVS and Rite-Aide turned off NFC. Please know I’m only trying to give perspective…
Payment Services are a brokering activity between two entities engaged in commerce. Logically, a broker must have the trust of both parties, and deliver some sort of value in managing the financial risk associated with the transaction. Within Consumer Retail, Visa and Mastercard evolved from Bank owned exclusive networks of the 1960s (see History) to ubiquitous independent payment networks. Few remember that back in the 1960s, merchants took either Visa or Mastercharge but not both as the Merchant’s acquiring bank could only be a member of one of the networks. For merchants, the value proposition was clear: consumer credit.
Payment networks thus evolved from a closed and focused value proposition, to a settlement “infrastructure”. However the rules and governance process by which many parties (merchant, acquirer, processor, issuer, network, VASP, …etc) participated in defining operation of this “brokering” activity did not evolve. This is the central issue restricting the future growth of Visa and Mastercard. One I believe both are acting on. My firm belief is that rebalancing network rules will unleash a massive new phase of value creation for these networks.
Let me take a quick side bar here..
Network Theory – Openness
As I’ve stated many times, closed networks always precede open networks until scale is reached (Building Networks and “Openness”, 2011). Weak Links (nodal affinity) influences network creation, and there are VERY few open networks which exist in Nature. This is logical as Networks form around a function rendering generic open networks less “efficient” than specialized networks around any given specialized need.
Scale-free distribution (completely open networks) is not always the optimal solution to the requirement of cost efficiency. .. in small world networks, building and maintaining links between network elements requires energy…. [in a world with limited resources] a transition will occur toward a star network [pg 75] where one of a very few mega hubs will dominate the whole system. The star network resembles dictatorships in social networks.
Networks NATURALLY form around a function and other entities are attracted to this network (affinity) because of the function of both the central orchestrator and the other participants. Open networks (internet/TCPIP, Visa, NASDAQ, … ) succeed where a common infrastructure benefits MANY NETWORKS.
Visa and MasterCard have transitioned to become common network infrastructure, a position FAR MORE valuable than that of a closed credit delivery system. They are a network of networks. However their rule making and governance processes do not match the other open networks listed above (NASDAQ, Internet, …). Most Banks, have also lost their traditional role of “brokering” and risk management (in retail) by creating a card rewards system that encourages card use paid by the merchant. This creates a brokering incentive separate from the commercial transaction… impacting brokering independence.
What do merchants want? A neutral broker!!
A top 5 merchant told me a few months ago “Retailers like Starbucks have proven that we are best placed to deliver value and influence consumer behavior. I don’t want to force my consumers to do anything, but similarly I want to networks that let me play on an even field. These next 5 years are going to be complete chaos for consumers. What do we want them to do? Swipe, dip, chip, pin, tap, QR…? We have been planning for EMV for 3 years… am I really supposed to jump to Apple in 4 weeks?”
These guys are good friends of mine, and I think their business vision is well placed. They want a network where they can play on an equal footing. A neutral broker.. or at least one where they can have a seat at the table when rules are set. Will MCX be a massive success? It depends on the consumer value proposition. Are the merchants motivated to work together in creating a neutral broker? Hell yes.
One merchant said it this way “Tom I didn’t think we would ever have someone more difficult to work with than Visa and Mastercard, but I was WRONG. Apple is a nightmare! At least we knew what was coming with Visa and Mastercard, with Apple they don’t talk to us, respond to our letters, or offer any kind of value proposition. Why on earth would I want to let another brand in my store without understanding what it will do for me? They are a great company, with great products, and certainly have a much better approach to data than Google.. but anonymity is NOT a value proposition, in fact Apple makes our efforts to deliver value to the consumer even harder as we have no defined way of using Apple to engage our consumers”. See Brokering Identity – Part 1, ApplePay and Merchants, Digital Transactions ApplePay Issuer Agreement.
Getting a card number from consumer to merchant is NOT innovation. There is just no problem here. My payment friends are already rolling their eyes. Apple does have great security and great ability to manage fraud.. but fraud losses for CP are 3.2 bps. What about store data losses? That is not “fraud”, and certainly a problem for merchants that keep PANs. Tokens do solve this problem… but so does better security, and more intelligent approach to tracking loyalty. Apple must move to create a merchant value proposition, and define how they will help with consumer engagement. I believe Google will far outpace Apple here.
Retail is a zero sum game.. I’m not going to buy MORE gas and groceries.. differentiation is about switching, product selection and pricing on data, ..the flux… once this flux dies.. steady state resumes. Perhaps all iPhone owners will only shop at whole foods, but data shows that consumers don’t make decisions this way. In fact payment is not in the top 5 reasons for consumers choosing a new iPhone.
Why are MCX merchants turning off NFC? To give themselves a little breathing room, make Apple create a merchant value proposition (engagement), get a seat at the table in a new network, and help to establish a consumer behavior that works for them too (Most Important Payment Race: Consumer Behavior, Apple’s Platform Strategy: Consumer Champion ).
What do Retailers want in Mobile?
Following from my big blog Static Strategies and the Rewiring of Retail.
- Consumer Engagement
- Consumer Acquisition
- Consumer Loyalty
- Allow Retailer to be in control of data
- Partners that allow Store’s brand front and center
- A Partner either IN CONTROL of the consumer experience (Apple/Google) or one that already has massive consumer adoption (ie Facebook).
- Creating a fantastic customer experience from end-end
- Ability to manage campaigns, data or your business
- A Partner that can reach/influence consumers WHERE THEY ARE.. not where you want them to be.
- Payment..? I guess if that comes too…
How will this play out?
- Much has been made of the MCX contract provisions that prohibit participating retailers from allowing other forms of mobile payment. This is just not accurate. Any retailer can choose to turn on NFC, any retailer can sign up for MCX. Can an MCX retailer turn on NFC? Yep.. Large retailers are not participating in ApplePay because Apple has completely failed in a merchant strategy, they have not articulated one, nor have they worked directly with merchants. This is really no different than Apple’s failure to work with Banks. Banks are just fuming over the take it or leave it terms Apple offered to them. Merchants had no terms…
- Apple will rollout a merchant friendly beacon product, and loyalty product for consumer engagement in next 6-9 months, this will also include a renewed focus on BLE. The product will fall flat until they can create an new merchant organization. Google has 4,000 sales people working with merchants, apple has around 16… so it is a big task.
- Apple will ROCK in App payments.. it will be their homerun… I will make a further bet: Apple will WIN in every situation where they can control the consumer experience from beginning to end.
- Visa and Mastercard are beginning a shift toward the merchant. They may not win the top 60, but Visa has 36M merchants.. that leaves 35,990,940 that will be open to new ideas. These are my biggest personal holdings, and I know both of the CEOs. Everything I’ve written here they know already.
- Consumer authentication is VERY disruptive to retail and banking. As Ross Anderson said “if you solve for authentication in payments.. everything else is just accounting”. The need for an independent broker and their services are dramatically different if either the consumer or payment can be authenticated (ie cash, bitcoin). Why do you need a payment product at all? Just present the identity to the bank. This is what Sofort/Klarna does… Why not do this? Because the banks have no ability to MONETIZE the transaction (no merchant agreement). There are many better ways to leverage authentication, but no other ways to currently MONITIZE IT (outside card). Perfect Authentication… A Nightmare?
- Apple is pursuing an “anti-google” approach: keep no data, closed platform, control everything. Google is 2-4 years behind on platform security.. but is catching up. The Google platform is much easier to build in and control (ex HCE), but consumer adoption lags as each Android participant must move consumer to their vision. Apple has successfully delivered security and authentication, but has not laid out a way for many apps to leverage it. Retail is a REALLY big business, with 1000s of specialists. It cannot be throttled by one company.. thus Apple will work fantastically in environment it can control. (sorry to restate).
- ApplePay and overall contactless adoption will begin with small merchants and infrequent purchases. Most phones have the capability today. MCX will not stop contactless.. but it will impact consumer behavior substantially
- Is NFC/Contactless Acceptance required as part of EMV rollout? NO!! This is the most widely held mis-understanding. While the large terminal manufacturers have no products in their official product list without contactless, the top 60 merchants order bespoke or custom terminals to fit their needs.